

Concordia Theological Quarterly

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**Maintaining the Lifeline of the Church:
Pastoral Education for the Ministry of the
Spirit with the Word**

John W. Kleinig

**Two Kinds of Righteousness and Moral
Philosophy: *Confessio Augustana* XVIII,
Philipp Melanchthon, and Martin Luther**

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Design**

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Spirit, Righteousness, Typology, and Creation

This issue contains a wide range of articles on themes that recur in theology. In our lead article, John Kleinig probes the importance of the Spirit's work through the word of God in the seminary curriculum. Seminary students and pastors can easily slip into understanding their use of God's word as "professional activity." Kleinig stresses the value of helping future pastors approach their life-long study of God's word in a devotional manner that sees it as the means by which the Spirit shapes and refreshes them for service in Christ's church.

Luther's teaching about "two kinds of righteousness" has been receiving more attention in recent years. Detlev Schulz's article examines this theme in both Luther and Melancthon. He demonstrates the unanimity that existed in their understanding of the first kind of righteousness (passive) but contrasts their respective understandings of the second kind of righteousness (active). Schulz stresses the kind of influence that moral philosophy had on the understanding of civil righteousness in both reformers, especially on Melancthon's teaching of ethics as a rational pursuit of individual precepts.

When we hear talk of "biblical typology," we typically think of its horizontal dimension (e.g., creation to new creation). Horace Hummel contributes an article on vertical typology, namely the patterning that exists in biblical texts between heavenly reality ("up there") and earthly reality ("down here"). He focuses especially on the vertical typology evident in Old Testament texts about worship and then applies what is learned to understanding Christian worship.

Although Paul Zimmerman is known in our circles primarily for his service as the president of our colleges in Seward, Ann Arbor, and River Forest, he is also respected for his long-standing defense of the Genesis account of creation. In light of the publicity that Charles Darwin's 200th birthday will generate, Zimmerman has used his training in both theology and biology to challenge the theory of evolution once again. Not only does his article revisit Darwin and evolution, but it also engages the most recent research on intelligent design. These subjects resurface in Adam Francisco's discussion of the movie *Expelled* in the Theological Observer section.

Readers will notice a new section in this issue of *CTQ* entitled **Research Notes** (pp. 76-80). These and future contributions will be brief summaries of recent research that may be of interest to our readers. We hope these notes enrich your continued study of theology.

The Editors

Maintaining the Lifeline of the Church: Pastoral Education for the Ministry of Spirit with the Word¹

John W. Kleinig

In his discussion on confession in the Smalcald Articles, Martin Luther said, "God gives no one his Spirit or grace apart from the external Word that goes before."² That bold claim of Luther is even more relevant today than when he first opposed three kinds of enthusiasm: the enthusiasm of the papacy, the enthusiasm of the Pentecostal spiritualists, and the enthusiasm of Islam. His insight provides the key for us to meet present challenges to the lifeline of the church, the transmission and reception of the Holy Spirit through the ministry of the gospel.

If we are to counter that attack, we need first to recognize our own vulnerability, the weakness that has, so often, disabled us. Our weakness does not lie in our theology but in our piety. It does not come from inadequate teaching about the Holy Spirit but in our failure to apply it properly in pastoral theology and in the formation of pastors.

Take, for example, what seems to be happening in the Lutheran Church of Australia. Many of the students that have been admitted as candidates for ordination have not been catechized in classical Lutheran piety but in charismatic spirituality. While they have, in most cases, received some instruction in the doctrine of Luther's Small Catechism, their piety has not been shaped by it. By and large, they hold to Lutheran

¹ This study was presented to the Westfield House International Symposium at the High Leigh Conference Centre, August 18-31, 2007.

² SA III, VIII, 3. Later he adds: "In short: enthusiasm clings to Adam and his children from the beginning to the end of the world—fed and spread among them as poison by the old dragon. It is the source, power, and might of all heresies, even that of the papacy and Mohammed. Therefore we should and must insist that God does not want to deal with us human beings, except by means of his external Word and sacrament. Everything that boasts of being from the Spirit apart from such a Word and sacrament is of the devil" (SA III, VIII, 9-10). See also Martin Luther, *Luther's Works*, American Edition, 55 vols., ed. Jaroslav Jan Pelikan, Hilton C. Oswald, and Helmut T. Lehmann (Philadelphia: Fortress Press; St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1955-1986), 34:286; 40:146 [hereafter LW].

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theology, but they have not been initiated into its liturgical and devotional enactment. They accept the authority of the Bible and are devoted to the Holy Spirit. The missing link, for them and many of my fellow pastors, is the ongoing reception of the Holy Spirit through hearing the Spirit-giving word of God and meditating on it.

This seems to be a far-reaching problem. All over the world we have Lutheran pastors who are not actually Lutheran in their practice. You cannot blame them for this, because many have not been taught, either at seminary or subsequently, how to enact the gospel liturgically, devotionally, and pastorally.

The book in the New Testament that has the most to say about the preparation of pastors for ministry is Paul's second letter to Timothy. It teaches about the handing on of the deposit of teaching to candidates for ministry as well as what is required of those who are preachers of the gospel. Yet that letter begins in a strange way. In 2 Timothy 1:6-8, Paul gives this prayerful advice to Timothy:

I remind you to fan into flame³ the gift of God that is in you through the laying on of hands, for God did not give us a Spirit of timidity, but a Spirit of power, of love, and of sound-mindedness.⁴ So do not be ashamed of the testimony of our Lord, but join with me in suffering abuse⁵ for the gospel by the power of God.

Helpfully, Paul here connects three things. First, he links ordination with the giving of the Holy Spirit as a gift from God through the laying on of hands. In 1 Timothy 4:14, that endowment is associated with the word

³ This term seems to be a Pauline invention. It combines the notion of rekindling fire on a hearth with the idea of keeping a living, life-giving fire alive.

⁴ In Greek the same word is used for sound-mindedness and sexual self-control. Its opposite is insanity. The New Testament uses this Greek word in its various forms for the sound-mindedness and spiritual sanity of a redeemed person. The emphasis does not lie on autonomous self-control, as most translators seem to imply, but on clear-sighted self-appraisal. At its most literal level, it describes the mental sanity of a person who had been freed from a demon (Mark 5:15; Luke 8:35). But sound-mindedness is also used to describe the spiritual sanity of a person with a clear conscience. Christ redeems us from our ungodliness and disordered passions so that we may live "sound-mindedly" (Titus 2:12). Sound-minded people have a clear sense of themselves and their situation in the world, a sense of sober self-appraisal that comes from faith in Christ and the knowledge of God's grace (Rom 12:3). Its awareness of God's judgment leads to prayerfulness (1 Pet 4:7). Sound-mindedness is both a gift of the Spirit (2 Tim 1:7) and a requirement for all Christians, whether they are male pastors (1 Tim 3:2; Titus 1:8), women at prayer (1 Tim 2:9, 15), older men (Titus 2:2), younger men (Titus 2:6), or older or younger women (Titus 2:4-5).

⁵ See 2 Tim 2:3; cf. 2:9; 4:5.

of God that was spoken to him prophetically by Paul and the other pastors that ordained him.

Second, Paul links the gift of the Holy Spirit with the empowerment of Timothy in his ministry. God the Father gave Timothy the Holy Spirit as a gift of grace to overcome his embarrassing timidity and to empower him to preach the gospel with love and sound-mindedness. More than that, God also gave Timothy the power to suffer the abuse that comes from preaching the embarrassing gospel of the crucified and risen Christ.

Third, Paul encourages Timothy, in his daily devotions, to draw on the power of the Holy Spirit for his ongoing work as preacher, the power that was made available to him at his ordination. Daily ministry requires daily reception of the Holy Spirit. The picture that Paul uses is a fire, the holy perpetual fire on the altar of burnt offering at the temple, a fire that needs to be fed with firewood and fanned into flame each morning (Lev 6:8–13).⁶ The Holy Spirit is that fire, the sanctifying fire that provides every pastor with the power, warmth, and light to do holy work, the Lord's work.⁷

The question is this: How can we teach our students and pastors to feed and fan that holy life-giving flame in their hearts, so that they keep that flame alight in the church?

I. Ministry by the Power of the Spirit

In John 6:63 Jesus says: "The words I have spoken to you are Spirit and life." That short sentence summarizes the connection of the Holy Spirit with God's word. By his word, God speaks his Spirit to us and breathes his Spirit into us. The association of "spirit" with spoken words was obvious to all Hebrew and Greek speakers in the ancient world. For them "spirit" meant "life-breath," the "life-power" that was evident in breathing. Speaking used breath to form words and to carry them into the ears of the hearer. So breath and speaking went together. The power of a person's speech depended on the life-power of the person that was conveyed by the words that were spoken.

So, too, with God the Father! So, too, with Jesus his Son! The risen Lord Jesus spoke the Spirit to his apostles when he commissioned them (John 20:22). He stills speaks the Spirit to us, the Spirit who speaks the word of God to us (Heb 3:7; 10:15–17; Rev 2:7, 11, 17, 29; 3:6, 13, 22). His

⁶ See John W. Kleinig, *Leviticus*, Concordia Commentary (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 2003), 146–149.

⁷ See the use of the image of the Holy Spirit as fire in Acts 2:2; Rom 12:11; 1 Thess 5:19; cf. Luke 12:49; 24:32.

words are effective and powerful (1 Thess 2:13; Heb 4:12). Since his words are filled with the Spirit, they do what they say. When he speaks, the Spirit acts through his words. The performative power of his words depends on the Holy Spirit that energizes them and those who hear them. When he speaks, he speaks with the Holy Spirit; his words convey the Spirit.

That, too, is the teaching of the Book of Concord.⁸ Thus the Augsburg Confession teaches that since "the Holy Spirit is given through the Word of God" (CA XVIII, 3), God has appointed ministers to teach the gospel and to administer the sacraments as the means by which "the Holy Spirit is given who effects faith where and when it pleases God in those who hear the gospel" (CA V). That word is the external word,⁹ the embodied word, the word that is heard in the reading of the Scriptures, spoken in the absolution, proclaimed in the sermon, sung in the liturgy, and enacted in Baptism and in the Lord's Supper.¹⁰ It is the lifeline of the church because it is the means of the Spirit. So then the ministry of the word is "the ministry of the Spirit" (2 Cor 3:8). It is empowered by the Spirit to convey the Spirit to the faithful people of God through his word.

This teaching of God's word as the means of the Spirit affects our preparation of candidates for the office of the ministry in two ways. It affects what we do as pastors as well as how we do it.

⁸ For the bestowal and work of the Spirit through the word, see CA V, 1-4; XVIII, 3; XXVIII, 8; Ap IV, 135; XII, 44; XXIV, 48, 49, 70; SA III, VIII, 3-13; LC II, 38, 42, 58; FC Ep II, 1, 4, 13, 19; XII, 22; FC SD II, 5, 38, 48, 52, 54, 55, 56, 65; III, 16; XI, 29, 33, 39, 40, 41, 76, 77; XII, 30. For the treatment of this topic in Lutheran Orthodoxy, see also Robert Preus, *The Inspiration of Scripture: A Study of the Theology of the Seventeenth Century Lutheran Dogmaticians* (Edinburgh and London: Oliver and Boyd, 1955), 170-192.

⁹ Note the words of the condemnation in CA V, 4: "Condemned are the Anabaptists and others who teach that we obtain the Holy Spirit without the external (embodied) word of the gospel through our own preparations, thoughts, and works." Luther explains what he means by "the external Word" most fully in SA III, VIII, 3-13. It is the opposite of "the internal word" that is received by the enthusiasts who believed that they had God speaking his words in them. In contrast to this exaltation of immediate spiritual inspiration, Luther taught that the Spirit was mediated through the external word, the embodied word. It is telling that his teaching on the external word comes in the article on confession which focuses on the value of private absolution as God's spoken word of pardon to the sinner. By the use of this term, he refers to the written words of the Sacred Scriptures that are preached and heard in the divine service, the words that are spoken in the Absolution and enacted in the Sacrament of the Altar, the words that are meditated on and assimilated in daily devotions.

¹⁰ For a discussion on the close connection between the external word and the ministry of the word, see Norman Nagel "Externum Verbum: Testing Augustana V on the Doctrine of the Holy Ministry," *Logia* 6, no. 3 (1997): 27-32.

First, if we are to bring the Holy Spirit to people, we need to do everything with the word. Everything that is done by the word and in consonance with it is performed by the power of the Holy Spirit. The work of that pastor is consecrated by the most holy word of God.¹¹ It is therefore holy work, God's work. So we do not just preach and teach with the word; we baptize and commune with the word; we absolve and bless with the word; we pray and praise with the word; we confirm and ordain with the word; we deliver people from the unclean spirits and deliver Christ to them with the word; we minister to people and perform all pastoral acts with the word.¹² When we work with the word, we work with the Holy Spirit.¹³

All this needs to be done in faith, for we can only give as we ourselves receive from God. And we act in faith and exercise our faith when we pray according to the words and promises of God. We take him at his word and ask for what he wishes to give us in his word. We may pray for the gift of the Holy Spirit because Jesus has promised that God the Father will give his Spirit to those who ask him (Luke 11:13). What is more, when we pray according to God's word, we pray by the power of the Spirit (Eph 6:18; Jude 20). So the apostles quite rightly held that devotion to the ministry of the word went hand in hand with devotion to prayer (Acts 6:4).

All this has far-reaching implications for the training of pastors. These implications are summed up by Paul's advice to Timothy about the use of the God-breathed, Spirit-filled Scriptures in 2 Timothy 3:14-17. The inspired Scriptures are to be used to equip pastors for their work by teaching, rebuking, correcting, and training them in righteousness. How that is done takes us beyond our present discussion. So I merely ask: How adequately do we equip our future pastors with the word in each theological discipline and in our whole theological curriculum?

¹¹ See Luther's remarks on this in his explanation of the third commandment in the Large Catechism (I, 91-94).

¹² See Luther's remarks in *LW* 40:21: "But the first and foremost of all on which everything else depends, is the teaching of the Word of God. For we teach with the Word, we consecrate with the Word, we bind and absolve sins by the Word, we baptize with the Word, we sacrifice with the Word, we judge all things by the Word."

¹³ See Luther's definition of what is spiritual in *LW* 37:92: "Thus, all that our body does outwardly and physically, if God's Word is added to it and it is done through faith, is in reality and in name done spiritually. Nothing can be so material, fleshly, or outward, but it becomes spiritual when it is done in the Word and in faith. 'Spiritual' is nothing else than what is done in us and by us through the Spirit and faith, whether the object with which we are dealing is physical or spiritual."

Second, the teaching of the word as the means of the Spirit affects how we work as pastors. We who bring the Spirit to others must ourselves operate by the power of the Spirit.¹⁴ We receive that power from the word of Christ that instituted the ministry of word and sacrament.

The Augsburg Confession teaches that Christ himself has instituted the ministry of the gospel. That important claim is part of a larger argument about the life and work of the church. Whenever Luther and his fellow reformers touched on any matter of doctrine or practice, they asked who instituted it, and how. In their discussions, they always distinguished those things that were divinely instituted from those that had been established by human tradition and authority. In doing this, they were concerned with the divine foundations for the life of the church; they sought to discover and maintain the lifelines of the church.

The purpose of this approach to doing ministry has, I think, not received the attention that it deserves from us who are the heirs of the Lutheran Reformation.¹⁵ It is, of course, true that the concept of divine institution was not invented by the Lutheran reformers, nor is it limited to them. It goes back to the Old Testament and to the work of the Jewish rabbis. It is a key term in Calvin's theology. Yet for all these it functions as a legal-theological term. The assumption is that by his holy ordinances God authorizes certain agents to act in his name; by his ordinances he gives them the legal warrant for what they do in his name. The accent in this understanding of divine institution therefore falls on active obedience and legal responsibility.

While Luther and his followers do not disagree with them on the legal character of divine institution, they disagree with them on its function. They understand it evangelically and liturgically as God's ongoing provision for the church and for its faithful work. By instituting what is necessary for the life of the church, God does not establish a chain of command for its government but the way by which he delivers his gifts through people to people. Take, for example, Luther's teaching on Baptism as given in his catechisms. By instituting Baptism, Christ empowers it with his word and Holy Spirit.¹⁶ The same word that institutes the rite of Baptism produces the new regenerate life of the baptized by the power of the Holy Spirit. Likewise, Christ's words for the institution of Holy

¹⁴ See Luke 24:49; Acts 1:8.

¹⁵ The best summary that I know is given by Heinz Eduard Tödt, s.v. "Institution," in *Theologische Realenzyklopädie*, ed. Gerhard Krause and Gerhard Müller (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1987), 19:206–220.

¹⁶ LC IV, 6–31, 47–63.

Communion do not just give us the warrant for what we need to do; they consecrate the bread and wine as the Spirit-filled body and blood of Christ and so deliver their benefits to those who put their trust in them.¹⁷

So if something is instituted by Christ through his apostles we can be sure that it is empowered by the Holy Spirit. When we faithfully do what Christ has given us to do in his word, we can be sure that we operate by the power of the Holy Spirit. The ministry of the Spirit is the ministry of the word.

This understanding of divine institution, I hold, is the presupposition for the Lutheran rite of ordination as well as for our work in the ministry.¹⁸ The divine power for ministry, its empowerment by the Holy Spirit, comes from God's word,¹⁹ the divine mandate for ministry. Thus we ordain with the word of God and prayer;²⁰ through the use of the words of institution that provide the mandate for the ministry,²¹ God gives the gift of the Holy Spirit to those who are ordained. The significance of that, like Baptism, lasts for a lifetime. Each day we as pastors rely on those foundational words for empowerment by the Holy Spirit. Each day Jesus speaks his inspiring Spirit into us by saying, "Receive the Holy Spirit"; each day he commissions us by his word and empowers us with the Spirit to administer the keys; each day we can pray for consecration and empowerment by the Holy Spirit in the work of ministry.

That does not just apply to the work of pastors; it applies for those who are training to become pastors, for that training in the reception of the Spirit through the word, that empowerment by the Spirit through the word, is an essential part of ordination. Unless theological education rests on its divine institution and prepares them to fulfil Christ's commission, our seminaries will not prepare their students for the pastorate of the church.

¹⁷ LC V, 4-32.

¹⁸ See John W. Kleinig, "Ministry and Ordination," *Lutheran Theological Journal* 36, no. 1 (2002): 25-37.

¹⁹ See FC SD XI, 77: "the Holy Spirit wills to be present with his power in the Word and to work through it."

²⁰ The careful and illuminating ritual analysis of the Lutheran rite of ordination by Ralph F. Smith does not appreciate the function of the word in ordination and its connection with prayer for the bestowal of the Holy Spirit on the ordinand; see *Luther, Ministry, and Ordination Rites in the Early Reformation Church* (New York: Peter Lang, 1996).

²¹ According to the Lutheran Confessions, the words of institution that provide the mandate for the ministry of word and sacrament are Matthew 28:18-20, Mark 16:15, Luke 24:44-49, and John 20:21-23.

II. Training in Reception

In 1983, Edward Farley published an illuminating historical study on the nature of theological education called *Theologia*.²² In this study he shows how, under the influence of the Enlightenment, theological education changed from training in a way of life, the formation and equipment of candidates for ministry, to the academic study of theology as a science with four disciplines, the three theoretical disciplines of exegetical, historical, and systematic theology and the practical, professional discipline of pastoral theology. In this approach practical theology involved the teaching of the skills and functions for leading a congregation in its worship and work.

This way of learning theology hinges on the distinction between theory and practice. Already in the Middle Ages theologians had argued a great deal about whether theology was part of the *vita activa*, the active life, something that was learned by doing it, like apprentices in a trade, or part of the *vita contemplativa/speculativa*, the contemplative life, something that was learned by reflection on it, like the study of philosophy. These theologians therefore distinguished between two groups of Christians. There were those who, like Martha, lived an active life of engagement in society. They got married, raised families, and did secular work in the world. Then there were also those who, like Mary, lived contemplative lives in religious orders and monasteries. They were called to devote themselves to meditation and prayer.

Luther was critical of both these approaches, for they both, in their own way, concentrate on human performance and religious self-development; they both contradict the life of faith; they both promote a piety of the law rather than a piety of the gospel.²³ He recognized that we most obviously try to justify ourselves before God and others by our practice of piety. We all too readily regard our participation in worship and the devotional life of meditation and prayer as something that we have to do apart from Christ and his presence with us. So we think of it as our duty, our work, our achievement, the product of our determination and self-discipline. That sets us up for failure and spiritual disillusionment.

²² Edward Farley, *Theologia: Fragmentation and Unity in Theological Education* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1983). See also the helpful historical analysis by Lawrence R. Rast Jr., "Historic Changes in Pastoral Education," in *Preparing Lutheran Pastors for Today: ILC – Theological Seminaries World Conference*, ed. Paulo Moises Nerbas (Canoas, RS, Brazil: Ulbra, 2006), 129–150.

²³ See Martin Luther, *Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe [Schriften]*, 65 vols. (Weimar: H. Böhlau, 1883–1993), 3:275–277 [hereafter WA].

In contrast to these two ways of life, these two ways of learning theology, Luther advocated a third way, the *vita passiva*, the receptive life of faith in Christ and his word that involves suffering with Christ.²⁴ This involved the practice of receptive piety, the exercise of evangelical piety

In 1 Corinthians 4:7-8, St. Paul confronts the enthusiastic members of the church in Corinth; since they were filled with the Spirit, they considered that they were masters of the spiritual life, possessors of spiritual powers rather than receivers of graces. In his response to their smug claims, he challenges them with these ironical words which touch on what is unique about Christian piety: "What do you have that you did not receive? If then you received it, why do you boast as if you did not receive it? Already you have all you want! Already you have become rich! Without us you have become kings!"

Our whole life as the children of God, claims Paul, is a life of reception. We have been justified by the grace of God the Father. So we now live by faith in his grace. As pastors we have our ministry by God's mercy (1 Cor 4:1).²⁵ We administer God's grace by his grace. Since we believe in him, we receive from him all that we need for our work. We receive grace upon grace from the fullness of the incarnate Christ.

Over the last forty years or so there has been much discussion in the church about the gift of the Holy Spirit. We have all, in some way, been touched by it. Some of the discussion has been about when and how Christians are filled with the Holy Spirit. This issue was put on the agenda by the teaching of the Pentecostal churches that there are two stages in our Christian journey. For them the first begins with the experience of conversion when we are born again as children of God; the second begins with our experience of baptism by the Holy Spirit, the infilling of the Holy Spirit for our empowerment in doing the Lord's work. The apparent proof of this, the initial evidence that it has occurred, is speaking in tongues. Every person who has spoken in tongues is regarded as a born-again,

²⁴ See WA 5:166,11-19; 31.I:518,34-519,23; 38:518,12-519,15; 41:56,20-58,18. Luther's use of this term and its implications have been investigated by Christian Link, "Vita Passiva," *Evangelische Theologie* 44 (1984): 315-351; Oswald Bayer, *Theologie* (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1994), 42-49 [Oswald Bayer, *Theology the Lutheran Way*, ed. and trans. Jeffery G. Silcock and Mark C. Mattes (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 22-27]; and, most comprehensively, Reinhard Hütter, *Suffering Divine Things: Theology as Church Practice* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000).

²⁵ Note how in Acts 14:26 Paul and Barnabas were committed to the grace of God when they were commissioned for their work as missionaries (see also Acts 14:23 and 15:40).

Spirit-filled believer. The link between infilling with the Spirit and speaking in tongues has been modified by some groups, but most Pentecostal churches still retain the teaching that each Christian must have a single, definitive experience of baptism by the Holy Spirit.

In contrast to this, the New Testament teaches that all those who have been baptized and believe in the Lord Jesus have received the Holy Spirit (Acts 2:38). There is only one Baptism (Eph 4:5) by which we are born again by water and the Spirit (John 3:5). We have all been given the one and same Spirit to drink (1 Cor 12:13). Yet from misunderstanding this teaching, we can also, all too readily, fall into the same trap as the Pentecostals by concluding that every baptized person has the Holy Spirit as a permanent possession that can never be lost.

The notion that we "possess" the Spirit misreads the Scriptures and misapplies the teaching of the church. Even though Christ gives us his Holy Spirit through his word in Baptism, we do not possess the Spirit, any more than a wife possesses her husband and his love because she is married to him. The giving and receiving of love in marriage is a life-long business that has its foundation in a single event, the ceremony of marriage. So too the giving and receiving of the Holy Spirit has its foundation in Baptism! We keep on receiving the Spirit daily for as long as we live; we cannot live the life of faith without doing so.

This is so because the Holy Spirit is a person, not a thing. A thing can be possessed, but a person cannot be. That process of giving and receiving begins with a single event, just as breathing begins at birth and married life starts with a wedding. Just as a husband gives himself and his love to his wife on the day of their marriage, so God the Father gave us his Holy Spirit through Jesus on the day that we were baptized. But that is not the end of it. We who have been given access to the Spirit in Baptism keep on receiving the Holy Spirit from God the Father for as long as we live here on earth. So, in that sense, we never possess the Spirit, just as we never possess the light of the sun. In fact, for the whole of our life as baptized people we keep on receiving the Holy Spirit. Paul therefore tells the Christians in Ephesus, people like us who have already been baptized, to "be filled with the Spirit" (Eph 5:18).

The various aspects of the biblical teaching on the Holy Spirit make full sense only if we realize that Christ does not just give us his Holy Spirit once for all, at one point in our lives, but continually. Jesus is the fountain, the spring from which we receive the Holy Spirit, like drinking water from a tap (John 7:37-39). When he declares that his words are "Spirit and life" (John 6:63), he tells us that he gives his life-giving Spirit through his word.

He has been sent by the Father to give us the Spirit by speaking the Father's words to us (John 3:34). In Galatians 3:1–5, St. Paul teaches us that we receive the Spirit by hearing God's word. So wherever God's word is proclaimed and enacted, wherever it is used in meditation and prayer, we can be sure that Christ is there giving the Holy Spirit for us to receive.

Since that is so, we go to church and have our daily devotions in order to receive the Holy Spirit. We go to church to be filled with the Spirit. This does not just happen as we hear the word of God in the Bible readings and the sermon, but also as we receive Christ's body and blood. They are our Spirit-filled, Spirit-giving food and drink for our journey through life (1 Cor 10:3–4). There we who have been baptized by one Spirit are given the same Spirit to drink (1 Cor 12:13). That, too, is why we do well to begin and end each day with meditation on God's word and prayer. Jesus encourages us to depend on the Spirit by giving us this promise in Luke 11:13: "If you then, though you are evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more will your Father in heaven give the Holy Spirit to those who ask him." If we are going to live by the Spirit and walk in the Spirit on our daily journey, we need to receive the Spirit day by day.

In keeping with this teaching on the ongoing reception of the Holy Spirit, Luther proposes an evangelical pattern of piety as reception rather than self-promotion in his influential *Preface to the Wittenberg Edition* of his German writings.²⁶ The practice of theology involves three things: prayer, meditation, and temptation. All three revolve around ongoing, faithful attention to God's word. These three terms describe the life of faith as a cycle that begins with prayer for the gift of the Holy Spirit as the teacher of God's word, concentrates on the reception of the Holy Spirit through meditation on God's word, and results in spiritual attack by Satan who tries to drive the word from the heart of its hearer. Satan's attack, in turn, leads a person back to further prayer and intensified meditation. Luther, therefore, does not envisage the spiritual life as a process of gradual self-development, but as a process of ongoing reception from the Triune God. It turns proud, self-sufficient individuals into humble beggars before God.²⁷

What is significant about this pattern of devotion is its concentration on the ongoing reception of the Holy Spirit. Practically speaking, the

²⁶ WA 50:657–661; LW 34:283–288.

²⁷ For a more comprehensive analysis of this passage and its significance, see John W. Kleinig, "Oratio, Meditatio, Tentatio: What Makes a Theologian?" CTQ 66 (2002): 255–267, as well as in *Preparing Lutheran Pastors for Today: ILC – Theological Seminaries World Conference*, ed. Paulo Moises Nerbas (Canoas, RS, Brazil: Ulbra, 2006), 11–37.

learning of theology has to do with the practice of receptive piety. This has two sides to it: prayer for the gift of the Holy Spirit as the teacher of eternal life through the Scriptures and the ongoing reception of the Holy Spirit through meditation on the external word.

All this should affect the way that we prepare pastors for the ministry of the gospel. First, we need to regard the proclamation and enactment of God's word as primary theology, whether it is in the divine service, minor services, pastoral acts, or daily devotions. Second, we need to build the life of our seminaries around daily worship as the focal point of our curriculum. Third, we need to use the courses on worship to teach about the divine service as the proclamation and enactment of God's word for the delivery and reception of the Holy Spirit. Fourth, we need to train our students in the practice of receptive piety by participating in the divine service, meditating on God's word as law and gospel, praying together with Christ as guided by his word and the Holy Spirit, and relying on Christ and his word for power in spiritual warfare.

III. The Holy Flame

In the Old Testament, the priests did not light the fire for the altar of burnt offering. It was lit by God himself. On the day that the divine service was inaugurated at the tabernacle, fire came from the Lord's presence in the Holy of Holies and kindled the wood on the altar (Lev 9:23-24). Each morning the priests on duty rekindled the fire with the coals from the previous day; each evening they covered them up with ashes to keep them alight overnight (Lev 6:8-13). Through that supernatural fire God manifested his glorious presence to his people; through that perpetual fire he sanctified the altar and all the offerings that were placed on it.

That heavenly fire prefigures Christ's gift of the Holy Spirit through his word. We who are the keepers of that flame do not generate it; we are called to tend it and to spread it abroad through the ministry of the word. We are also required to train others to keep the holy fire burning in the church. The life of the church depends on keeping that flame alight at all costs and despite the persistent opposition of Satan.

The trouble is that the Spirit's fire is hidden from us; it is a fire that is spread in a hidden way, from altar to altar, and from home to home. That heavenly fire is received through faithful participation in the divine service and kept alight by the practice of receptive piety. Its stewardship is all rather mundane and decidedly unglamorous. It is, in fact, so countercultural that the spread of the Spirit through the ministry of the gospel is regarded with contempt even within the church, and those who

minister faithfully all too often suffer ridicule and abuse for their faithfulness.

That abuse comes from many different quarters; it comes from Pentecostal enthusiasm as well as from the liberal theology of inclusivity, from papal catholicity as well as from pragmatic decision theology. Yet all that opposition has this one thing in common, the dissociation of the work of the Holy Spirit from the external word of God.²⁸ Those who disconnect the Spirit from the word disregard the divinely instituted lifeline of the church. Despite their apparent zeal for the Spirit, they, quite unintentionally, dim and perhaps even quench the fire of the Spirit in the congregations that adhere to their teaching and practice.

So the task for those of us who are the heirs of the Lutheran Reformation is to tend the flame of the Holy Spirit through faith in God's word and to train faithful men to minister to others with the Spirit-filled, Spirit-giving word. We have nothing to fear from opposition to this enterprise. We have no reason to be embarrassed at the apparent insignificance of the gospel. Rather, we have good reason for sober confidence in what we are doing, confidence in the presence of the triune God with us, confidence in the God who, through the darkest times, has kept his holy flame alight in his church and in the hearts of its faithful custodians. We are not called to attack those who despise that hidden fire. Our task is to spread that fire, from person to person, through our devotion to God's word, as we are empowered each day by his Holy Spirit.

²⁸ See Luther's sharp judgment on Karlstadt and his followers in *LW* 40:147: "Do you not see here the devil, the enemy of God's order? With all his mouthing of the words, 'Spirit, Spirit, Spirit,' he tears down the bridge, the path, the way, the ladder, and all the means by which the Spirit might come to you. Instead of the outward order of God in the material sign of baptism and oral proclamation of the Word of God he wants to teach you, not how the Spirit comes to you but how you come to the Spirit. They would have you learn how to journey on the clouds and ride on the wind."

Two Kinds of Righteousness and Moral Philosophy: *Confessio Augustana* XVIII, Philipp Melanchthon, and Martin Luther

Klaus Detlev Schulz

The two kinds of righteousness is an important feature of Lutheran theology. It correctly explains not only our salvation but also the role that Christians play in this world. "It is our theology," Martin Luther pointed out in his *Lectures on Galatians* (1535).¹ "We teach," he continued, "a precise distinction between these two kinds of righteousness, the active and the passive, so that morality and faith, works and grace, secular society and religion may not be confused. Both are necessary, but both must be kept within their limits."² Philipp Melanchthon underscored Luther's approach in his short commentary on Romans, the *Dispositio*, by using the doctrine of the twofold righteousness as the key hermeneutical principle for Scripture, in particular for his interpretation of Romans: "It is very important to note in the study of all of Scripture that there are two kinds of righteousness."³

What makes the two kinds of righteousness theologically challenging is that it draws in other Christian doctrines such as law and gospel, justification and sanctification, and the two kingdoms. Moreover, as Luther stated, the two kinds of righteousness help to clarify the difference

¹ Martin Luther, *Luther's Works*, American Edition, 55 vols., ed. Jaroslav Jan Pelikan, Hilton C. Oswald, and Helmut T. Lehmann (Philadelphia: Fortress Press; St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1955-1986), 26:7 [henceforth LW].

² LW 26:7.

³ Melanchthon's *Dispositio orationis in Epistola Pauli ad Romanos* was published as a complete work in February, 1530. See Karl Gottlieb Bretschneider and Heinrich Ernst Bindseil, eds., *Corpus Reformatorum, Philip Melancthonis opera quae supersunt omnia*, 28 vols. (Halle, later Braunschweig, 1834-1860), 15:443-491 [henceforth CR], quote found on 445. See Wilhelm Maurer, *Historical Commentary on the Augsburg Confession*, trans. H. George Anderson (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986), 99, 125.

between faith, morality, vocation,⁴ natural theology, and philosophy. Thus, the second righteousness, the active one, carried out before humans and the world (*coram hominibus* or *mundo*), invites a review of social ethics and theological anthropology in connection to natural theology and moral philosophy. For natural theology and moral philosophy immediately surface as one contemplates the Christian's role in public life as he or she debates together with non-Christians the *res publicae*, the public concerns, as the ancient Romans called it. Isolationism, as proposed by Roman monasticism or the Anabaptists, was no option for Luther or Melancthon. When Christians engage in matters of the *res publicae*, however, they must anticipate that others contribute toward society's welfare with the use of their free will (*liberum arbitrium*) dictated by natural reason (*ratio*).

Augustana XVIII on the "free will" anticipates that discussion.⁵ This article, I believe, is the seat of the twofold righteousness in the Lutheran Confessions.⁶ *Augustana* XVIII, however, leaves a lot unsaid and thus begs for further comments from Melancthon's and Luther's writings on theological anthropology, particularly with respect to natural theology and moral philosophy. One important point is that, as we debate the second kind of righteousness *coram mundo*, we should take into consideration the nuances made by both reformers.

I. *Augustana* XVIII

In Article XVIII of the Augsburg Confession and Apology, "Concerning Free Will," we have the locus for an articulated description of the twofold righteousness. There we read:

Concerning free will they teach that the human will has some freedom for producing civil righteousness and for choosing things subject to reason.

⁴ In *Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved* (1526), Luther debates the two kinds of righteousness in the context of the two kingdoms and the pursuit of one's vocation; see LW 46:100.

⁵ Particularly because Melancthon's Commentary on Books 1 and 3 of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics appeared in 1529. We will examine the 1546 edition of Melancthon's commentary.

⁶ See Maurer, *Historical Commentary*, 89–101, and Günther Wenz, *Theologie der Bekenntnisschriften der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche*, 2 vols. (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1996), 2:457, 463. The topic as found in the Apology is discussed by Charles P. Arand, "Two Kinds of Righteousness as a Framework for Law and Gospel in the Apology," *Lutheran Quarterly* 15 (2001): 420–421. Explicit reference to the two kinds of righteousness is made in SD III, 32, in *The Book of Concord*, ed. Robert Kolb and Timothy Wengert (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2000), 567; for related comments to *Augustana* XVIII, see Ap IV, 22 (*Book of Concord*, 124); LC I, 26 (*Book of Concord*, 389); LC I, 150 (*Book of Concord*, 407); LC II, 13–16 (*Book of Concord*, 432); and LC II, 67 (*Book of Concord*, 440).

However, it does not have the power to produce the righteousness of God or spiritual righteousness without the Holy Spirit, because "those who are natural do not receive the gifts of God's Holy Spirit" [1 Cor. 2:14]. But this righteousness is worked in the heart when the Holy Spirit is received through the Word. . . .

They condemn the Pelagians and others who teach that without the Holy Spirit by the powers of nature alone, we are able to love God above all things and can also keep the commandments of God "according to the substance of the acts." Although nature can in some measure produce external works—for it can keep the hands from committing theft or murder—nevertheless it cannot produce internal movements, such as fear of God, trust in God, patience, etc.⁷

This article makes the important distinction of the two kinds of righteousness. The first righteousness comes through the Holy Spirit and the word. It is called the passive righteousness, the spiritual righteousness, or the righteousness of God (*iustitia Dei*). It is associated with internal movements, such as the fear of God, trust in God, and patience, which natural man cannot produce on his own. The other righteousness is that which humans create actively in the civil realm among one another by use of their free will and reason,⁸ and through the outward performance of "good deeds." With the help of his pseudo-Augustine source,⁹ Melancthon listed a number of specific "good works" by which all humans contribute to the welfare of society. He wrote:

In Book III of *Hypognosticon* Augustine says this in just so many words: "We confess that all human beings have a free will that possesses the judgment of reason. It does not enable them, without God, to begin—much less complete—anything that pertains to God, but only to perform the good or evil deeds of this life. By 'good deeds' I mean those that arise from the good in nature, that is, the will to labor in the field, to eat and drink, to have a friend, to wear clothes, to build a house, to marry, to raise cattle, to learn various useful skills, or to do whatever good pertains to this life. None of these exists without divine direction; indeed, from him

⁷ CA XVIII, 1–3, 8–9; *Book of Concord*, 51, 53.

⁸ Often "will" is mentioned alone; in such cases "reason" is implied, e.g., CA II, 3 (*Book of Concord*, 39).

⁹ Augustine is frequently quoted to defend righteousness of faith and grace from the merit of works, CA XX, 13 (*Book of Concord*, 55). In Ap IV, 29–33 (*Book of Concord*, 125), references are made to his books *On Nature and Grace* (*De natura et gratia*) and *On Grace and the Free Will* (*De gratia et libero arbitrio*) to reject the Pelagian position on reason and will in the first kind of righteousness.

and through him they have come into being and exist. However, by 'evil deeds' I mean the will to worship an idol, to commit murder, etc."¹⁰

The concession to natural man's contribution raises this question: How positive and optimistic may one be to the actual reality of non-Christians promoting civil righteousness? In answering this, the context of *Augustana* XVIII is significant. Though it may be argued that Article XVIII belongs with Articles XVI and XXVIII and sheds light on the proper relation of the civil to the spiritual realm—which it does—it is more closely tied to Articles II and XIX.¹¹ Thus, the connection between Articles XVIII, II, and XIX is that all three together define sin in terms of its nature, origin, and consequences particularly in reference to God. The overwhelming point of these three articles is to deny natural, post-lapsarian man any ability to establish a relationship with God. The first kind of righteousness is one freely bestowed by God. Therein Melanchthon dismissed the use of the free will and reason.

With regard to the second righteousness, Melanchthon also factored in the reality of sin and its destructive powers, though not as harshly as in the first kind of righteousness. In *Apology* XVIII, he observed that "it is false to say that people do not sin when they do the works prescribed by the law outside of grace."¹² Prior to this he stated: "[P]eople more often obey their evil impulses than sound judgment. . . . For these reasons even civil righteousness is rare among human beings. We see that not even philosophers, who seemed to have aspired after this righteousness, attained it."¹³ Later in the article Melanchthon cautiously conceded a practical reality of the free will in the second righteousness: "[A]ll people alike ought to know that God requires civil righteousness and that to some extent we are able to achieve it."¹⁴

Melanchthon's cautious concession "to some extent" was consistent throughout his study of moral philosophy. In his commentary on the Lutheran Confessions, Gunther Wenz ponders the actual probability of a free execution of the will *coram mundo* in view of man's sin. Does the sinful

¹⁰ CA XVIII, 4-7; *Book of Concord*, 51, 53. Similar comments are made in Ap XVIII, 4 (*Book of Concord*, 234).

¹¹ Wenz, *Theologie*, 2:89. Though Maurer frequently ties CA XVIII to CA XVI and XXVIII, his commentary gravitates towards the connection of CA XVIII to CA II and XIX; see Maurer, *Historical Commentary*, 271-283.

¹² Ap XVIII, 5; *Book of Concord*, 234.

¹³ Ap XVIII, 5; *Book of Concord*, 234.

¹⁴ Ap XVIII, 9; *Book of Concord*, 234. See also Ap IV, 23 (*Book of Concord*, 124), and Ap IV, 130 (*Book of Concord*, 141): "[O]utward works of the law can be carried out to some extent without Christ and the Holy Spirit."

corruption of the will of man, which constantly is curved away from and against God, not also negatively impact the second righteousness and relation to the world (*coram mundo*)?¹⁵ Melanchthon's answer was, as we saw, that the use of reason and will *coram mundo* can operate "to some extent." There is a freedom of choice—a freedom that is always tied to God in the sense that humans cannot pursue just any action as they please. But the reality of freedom and choice between two things is important since Melanchthon did not want his entire ethical project to topple. *All* humans are attuned to the divine law and are thus held accountable for their actions.

Why was there this preponderance for Melanchthon to contemplate the will *coram mundo* and *coram Deo*? In an important study entitled *Der befreite Mensch: die Willenslehre in der Theologie Philipp Melanchthons*,¹⁶ Wolfgang Matz traces the idea of the will *coram mundo* in Melanchthon's theological and philosophical writings. For Melanchthon, the will played an important role in the lives of Christians and non-Christians not only because of his social ethics but also because he never abandoned psychology. As a result, he demanded an explanation of what happens to the reason and will as humans respond to natural law inscribed in their hearts and to Christians as they were transformed by the word and the Holy Spirit.¹⁷ Melanchthon pointed to the will either being the third or the fourth criterion in the line of one's conversion, with the word and Spirit being the first and second causes.¹⁸ By contemplating the role of the free will at various levels of human anthropology, Melanchthon created a great controversy in Lutheranism, which was finally resolved in Article II of the Formula of Concord. Indeed, the Formula of Concord acknowledges a "*capacitas passiva*" for natural man and dismisses will as the third cause of one's conversion. In terms of the will in reborn man, the Formula of Concord concedes a "*cooperatio*," though in the relationship to the Spirit a Christian's will does not cooperate equally alongside it like two horses pulling a cart parallel to one another.¹⁹

In his study, Wolfgang Matz repatriates Melanchthon into mainstream Lutheranism by arguing that Melanchthon never intended to compromise

¹⁵ Wenz, *Theologie*, 2:89.

¹⁶ Wolfgang Matz, *Der befreite Mensch: die Willenslehre in der Theologie Philipp Melanchthons* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001).

¹⁷ Philipp Melanchthon, *Loci Communes*, 1543, trans. J. A. O. Preus (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1992), 96, 104.

¹⁸ "Reason" was often listed as the third cause.

¹⁹ FC SD II, 66, 90; *Book of Concord*, 556–557, 561–562.

the word and Spirit as the primary source (*prima causa*). He would not posit the will even as a secondary cause (*causa secunda efficiens*) for one's salvation. It is the passive will without power (*kraftlos*) that is awakened and then led to perform good works in sanctification. Thus it is important to note the context of Melanchthon's argument. He was speaking of the will active through the Spirit in reborn man after his conversion, not in that of natural man nor during his conversion.²⁰ Friedrich Bente, in his scathing critique of Melanchthon, did not engage this point.²¹

The liberty that Melanchthon seemed to grant all humans *coram mundo* is limited to a good measure not only by the reality of sin but also for another reason. This reason is the issue of divine guidance, better known as determinism. A careful reader will note that in *Augustana XVIII* Melanchthon followed his appraisal of natural man's good works with the inserted phrase that "none of these [good works] exists without divine direction."²² What he stated here is that God actually remains in control as he guides and moves natural man according to his created abilities. One should observe that Melanchthon also invited, though only implicitly, the relationship of contingency and causality. Natural man exercises his freedom of the will in these external matters contingent on the use of his reason and surrounding circumstances. Nowhere did he feel God's absolute will compelling or coercing him to act; he perceives it as freedom. Nonetheless, the act ensues by necessity of the consequence (*necessitas consequentiae*) of God allowing him to practice it.²³ However, positing God as being active "behind the scenes," so to speak, does not make him the

²⁰ Matz, *Der befreite Mensch*, 185, 251. The Formula of Concord makes the following "dangerous" statement that would also be underwritten by Melanchthon without either party intending to destroy the word and Spirit as the proper causes or insinuating that the natural will can do something prior to the work of the Spirit: "For conversion is such a change in the human mind, will, and heart affected by the Holy Spirit that the human being, through his activity of the Holy Spirit, can accept the grace offered"; see FC SD II, 83; *Book of Concord*, 560.

²¹ Friedrich Bente contended that Melanchthon was "the father of synergism" among Lutherans, pointing to controversial statements such as the one Melanchthon made in his *Explanation of the Epistle to the Romans* (1532) on Romans 9:6 that "divine compassion is truly the cause of election, but . . . there is also some cause in him who accepts, namely, in as far as he does not repudiate the grace offered"; see Bente, *Historical Introductions to the Book of Concord* (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1965), 197. The controversial statement—"cause in him who accepts"—was omitted from his 1540 edition of the *Explanation of the Epistle to the Romans*; see Philipp Melanchthon, *Commentary on Romans*, trans. Fred Kramer (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1992), 8, 189.

²² CA XVIII, 6; *Book of Concord*, 51.

²³ Matz, *Der befreite Mensch*, 16.

cause of man's wrongdoing and of evil, as Erasmus of Rotterdam accused Lutherans. To evade that predicament, Melanchthon wrote in his *Scholia* only of an "*actio Dei generalis*," a general guidance of creation through which God keeps all things flowing without robbing man of his freedom *coram mundo*.²⁴ As a result, *Augustana* XIX can dismiss the thought of making God responsible for sin; sin comes about because of "*the will of those who are evil, that is, of the devil and the ungodly*."²⁵

Melanchthon asserted a relative freedom in the realm of the second kind of righteousness for his social ethics and, in this way, justified his investigation into pagan moral philosophy. He contemplated what benefit great philosophers have made towards the establishment of a righteous society, the *iustitia civilis*, through the use of reason. By claiming a freedom for man, Melanchthon held to a moral accountability and civil obedience for all people on the basis of the imputed natural law in their hearts (Rom 2:15). That would in turn warrant society's pursuit and punishment of wrongdoers who do not fulfill the *usus civilis*. With his moral philosophy Melanchthon proved that civil authorities had to be obeyed and that those who disturbed the peace of society had to be punished. Melanchthon's point was extremely important in the context of the peasant riots of 1525: by taking up arms against civil authorities, they had defied the laws of nature. With the use of pagan philosophy he made the point that it was necessary for all people to obey civil authorities.²⁶

Scholars point out that the reason why Melanchthon inserted this passage on the *liberum arbitrium* in *Augustana* XVIII is that it offers both the traditional rebuttal of Pelagianism, as it pertains to an ability of the will in spiritual matters, but then also a correction of a philosophical prejudice against Lutheranism as a teaching that supposedly promotes anthropological determinism *coram mundo*.²⁷ John Eck's criticism that Lutherans taught a bondage of the will in every area of life that bordered on fatalism or anthropological-determinism was addressed in *Augustana* XVIII, and it did the trick. It actually assuaged Eck and Roman Catholic

²⁴ Matz, *Der befreite Mensch*, 101.

²⁵ CA XIX; *Book of Concord*, 53 (emphasis added). In Ap XIX (*Book of Concord*, 235), Melanchthon omitted the phrase "*non adiuvante Deo*" (apart from the assistance by God) lest readers conclude that God is the author of sin.

²⁶ Sachiko Kusukawa, *The Transformation of Natural Philosophy: The Case of Philipp Melanchthon* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 71, and Matz, *Der befreite Mensch*, 106.

²⁷ For Melanchthon's rejection of determinism in his study of classical social ethics, see thesis 22 of his *Summary of Ethics* (1532), in Philipp Melanchthon, *A Melanchthon Reader*, trans. Robert Keen (New York: Peter Lang, 1988), 214.

representatives at Augsburg who operated with their own understanding of moral philosophy in the tradition of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas.²⁸

From what has been stated above, it is apparent that an interplay of important issues emerges as we contemplate the second kind of righteousness: the use of reason and free will, divine law and natural law, the reality of sin, and God's guidance that is deterministic though not perceived as such by humans. We can see the interplay of some of these aspects also in Luther's *On the Bondage of the Will*.

II. Luther's *On the Bondage of the Will*

The complex history leading to *Augustana XVIII* is highlighted most notably by Wilhelm Maurer in his *Historical Commentary on the Augsburg Confession*²⁹ and Gerhard Forde's recent commentary on *The Captivation of the Will*.³⁰ Briefly we should note that in his "404 Articles" John Eck listed some of the heresies of the Reformers, which included also an attack on Thesis 13 of Luther's "Heidelberg Disputation" (1518). Luther stated in this thesis that the "free will, after the fall, exists in name only, and as long as it does what it is able to do, it commits a mortal sin."³¹ Pope Leo X called upon Luther to retract this thesis in the bull of June 15, 1520. Luther repeatedly defended his position—such as with his "assertions"³² of November 29, 1520—which prompted also Erasmus of Rotterdam to enter the debate with his *A Diatribe or Discourse concerning Free Choice (De libero arbitrio diatribe sive collatio)*. Luther then responded with his famous tract *On the Bondage of the Will (De servo arbitrio)* in 1525.³³

In this treatise, Luther argued that if freedom of the will is equal to the power (*Macht*) of making choices, then it must be rejected totally. In terms of the two kinds of righteousness, one would have to say that Luther vehemently protected any intrusions on the first kind of righteousness. If man has the ability to earn grace, then that would be equal to works righteousness. Therefore, every human being must undergo a fundamental change, but man cannot bring about that change himself. God alone does it

²⁸ *Sources and Contexts of the Book of Concord*, ed. Robert Kolb and James A. Nestingen (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2001), 116, and Wenz, *Theologie*, 2:89–90, 92.

²⁹ Maurer, *Historical Commentary*, 271–283.

³⁰ Gerhard O. Forde, *The Captivation of the Will: Luther vs. Erasmus on Freedom and Bondage*, ed. Steven Paulson (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), especially 47–59.

³¹ LW 31:73.

³² Martin Luther, "Assertio omnium articulorum M. Lutheri per Bullam Leonis X. novissimam damnatorum," in *Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe [Schriften]*, 65 vols. (Weimar: H. Böhlau, 1883–1993), 7:94–152 [henceforth WA].

³³ LW 33:3–294.

by bringing someone to faith. Luther is intentionally radical in setting forth as passionately as possible the spontaneity of the relation between God, the Spirit, and the redeemed. He wrote: "The entry of the Spirit into one's life is not a polite choice but a radical change, something more like an invasion."³⁴ Already before the switch to faith has occurred, Luther dismissed the thought of freedom. The will is bound to willing itself in one direction only. Thus, apart from God, man cannot "will anything but what he wills."³⁵ When man is without God and the Spirit, he is not free but thrown under the power of Satan. To make the point, Luther used the famous illustration of man as a beast of burden that is ridden either by God or Satan.³⁶ In other words, through God we become free, but without God we remain captive to the devil and sin.

Theologically speaking, Luther allowed natural man no freedom of the will. The will turns in one direction only, and that is decided for him either by the devil or by God.³⁷ Thus with the reference point being God, grace, and salvation, Luther considered the talk of a free will a contradiction. Even to those matters pertaining to "below," where humans arrange life with one another according to the use of reason and the will, Luther considered the will ultimately captive also.³⁸ It may seem that we are free, but that freedom is deceptive. God allows us to act in freedom, yet he remains in control.³⁹ Determinism was part of Luther's natural theology, his understanding of history, and his view of who God is. God is almighty and responsible for all things that happen (*Allwirksamkeit*). Here Luther raised the issue of contingency and necessity. For what may seem man's own decision and contribution is in fact willed by God.⁴⁰ Though Luther

³⁴ Forde, *Captivation of the Will*, 59.

³⁵ LW 33:65.

³⁶ LW 33:65.

³⁷ Svend Andersen, *Einführung in die Ethik* (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2000), 113.

³⁸ See LW 33:69 (emphasis added): "Free choice is allowed to man only with respect to what is beneath him and not what is above him. That is to say, a man should know that with regard to his faculties and possessions he has the right to use, to do, or to leave undone, according to his own free choice, *though even this* is controlled by the free choice of God alone, who acts in whatever way he pleases."

³⁹ LW 33:139.

⁴⁰ See LW 33:37-38 (emphasis original): "From this it follows irrefutably that everything we do, everything that happens, even if it seems to us to happen mutably and contingently, happens in fact nonetheless necessarily and immutably, if you have regard to the will of God. For the will of God is effectual and cannot be hindered, since it is the power of the divine nature itself; moreover it is wise, so that it cannot be deceived. . . . Moreover, a work can only be called contingent when *from our point of view* it is done contingently and, as it were, by chance and without our expecting it, because

conceded man a freedom in things "below," that freedom need not be exaggerated, and it should not compromise the underlying determinism in Luther's theology and concession that God is almighty. Though the individual seems to regulate his life on the basis of his own choices and is unaware of God in his life, God is in control, right down to all things "beneath."⁴¹ In this way Luther left nothing to fate or to causality, in other words, that all things run along their own laws (*Gesetzlichkeit*) and are explicable to reason. One can see here how theodicy and predestination turn out to be important aspects of Luther's theology and worldview. Ultimately, however, Luther found great consolation for all Christians who are troubled over the course of matters in this world in the fact that all things are taken care of by God's almighty will.⁴²

As Gerhard Forde points out, readers generally find Luther's use of the image of the beast of burden objectionable because of a general antipathy towards any idea of bondage.⁴³ Liberty and free choice are greatly treasured by any civilized society. Yet Luther opened his treatise *On the Bondage of the Will* with the caveat that the proper Christian way would be to drop the term "free will" or free choice from the vocabulary altogether.⁴⁴ With that being said, however, Luther still entertained a positive use of the *ratio* and philosophy in the earthly realm, as he contemplated the second kind of righteousness in the context of natural law and the Decalogue. First, though, we begin with Melanchthon's view of this matter.

III. Comparing Natural Law and the Decalogue

When it comes to the second kind of righteousness in *Augustana* XVIII, Melanchthon's contemplations on moral philosophy and natural theology served as an important backbone. In the following section we will consider a few readings that seem pertinent to the subject, namely, Melanchthon's commentary on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (1546), his *Summary of Ethics* (1532), and both editions of his *Loci Communes* (1521/1543).

Melanchthon's discussion of natural law is found in his *Loci Communes* of 1521 and 1543. His *Loci Communes* found great approval from Luther as

our will or hand seizes on it as something presented to us by chance, when we have thought or willed nothing about it previously."

⁴¹ LW 33:36-44, and Gerhard Rost, *Der Prädestinationsgedanke in der Theologie Martin Luthers* (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1966), 61-62.

⁴² LW 33:42.

⁴³ Forde, *Captivation of the Will*, 48-49.

⁴⁴ LW 33:37.

the book every student should read next to the Bible.⁴⁵ In another place he suggested that it deserved not only to be immortalized but canonized.⁴⁶ In his 1521 edition, Melanchthon offered his definition of natural law as follows: "A natural law is a common judgment to which all men alike assent, and therefore one which God has inscribed upon the soul of each man, adopted to form and shape character."⁴⁷ This law of nature is common knowledge to *all* humans and has as its goal that all derive their morality from it. The knowledge of natural law and the ability to distinguish between good and evil is more than a mere biological endowment (*habitus*) or certain impulses that humans have in common with the "brute beasts" such as the "preservation and production of life."⁴⁸ Natural laws and the knowledge of them are imprinted on human minds because they were created in the image of God. Even if that knowledge were corrupted by the fall and did not shine forth as clearly among people as it originally did, it is not entirely extinct. Humans have a practical reason that can identify the principles or individual laws (*capita*) for conduct just as one uses numbers and does additions. Those rules should be deduced from common principles and human reasoning through syllogisms.⁴⁹ In addition, there should be wise men, philosophers, and teachers in every society who know of them and promote them through proper education. In his 1521 *Loci Communes*, Melanchthon summarized the natural laws as follows:

I. Love God.⁵⁰

II. Because we are born unto a kind of common society, injure no man but assist whomever you may with kindness.

III. If it cannot be that no man is injured, let this be done in order that the smallest amount of people be injured by the removal of those who disturb the public peace. For this duty let magistrates be appointed, and punishments for the guilty be instituted.

⁴⁵ LW 54:440, and Heinz Scheible, "Philipp Melanchthon," in *The Reformation Theologians: An Introduction to Theology in the Early Modern Period*, ed. Carter Lindberg (Oxford, UK, and Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 71.

⁴⁶ LW 33:42.

⁴⁷ Philipp Melanchthon, *The Loci Communes of Philipp Melanchthon* [1521], trans. Charles Leander Hill (Boston: The Meador Press, 1944), 112. In his 1543 edition, Melanchthon defined natural law as follows: "The law of nature is the knowledge of the divine law which has been grafted into the nature of man"; see *Loci Communes* (1543), 70.

⁴⁸ Melanchthon, *Loci Communes* (1521), 113.

⁴⁹ Melanchthon, *Loci Communes* (1521), 111; *Loci Communes* (1543), 70.

⁵⁰ It is difficult to imagine that Melanchthon would accept an ability in natural man to love God when he underscores elsewhere that this act is not possible without the righteousness of faith; see Ap IV, 18; *Book of Concord*, 18.

IV. Divide property for the safety of public peace. As to the rest, let some alleviate the wants of others through contracts.⁵¹

In his *Loci Communes* of 1543, Melanchthon outlined the individual laws of nature by comparing them to the Decalogue. For him natural law finds its truest expression in the Decalogue:

Thus the first law of nature itself acknowledges that there is one God, who is eternal, wise, just, good, the Creator of things, kind toward the righteous and punitive toward the unrighteous, by whom there has been ingrafted into us the understanding of the difference between good and evil, and that our obedience is based on this distinction; that this God is to be invoked and that good things are to be expected from Him.⁵²

According to Melanchthon, this law was argued against atheists by Xenophon, Cicero, and other men like them. Even the second and third commandments of the first table were defended in ancient Rome and Athens. The God invoked is to be honored and worshipped and his name may not be taken in vain since perjury will lead to punishment. In fact, the virtues known to man, such as righteousness, chastity, truthfulness, moderation, and kindness, should not only promote a lawful and just society but should also be kept for the sake of worshipping God.⁵³

The laws of the second table of the Decalogue also find their evidence in natural law. Human reason recognizes that in society there is a need for order and direction. That sense of direction and order is first imprinted upon humans through the authority of parents and then later added to rulers who govern and defend entire society.⁵⁴ The fifth commandment prohibits all evil violence which harms anyone. The sense for justice has been divinely instilled in men from the beginning of humanity, as the story of Cain and Abel shows. Murder is forbidden and must be punished by the magistrate. In regard to the sixth commandment, reason shapes life for humans in a way that beasts do not share. Human reason supports marriage and therefore disapproves of adultery and "moving from one bed to another."⁵⁵ In terms of the seventh commandment, human reason is aware that the distinction of ownership applies to man's very nature and must be protected through legal methods. This has been identified in the past by philosophers who have called for the distinction of ownership and right of property. In regard to the eighth commandment, it has been

⁵¹ Melanchthon, *Loci Communes* (1521), 116.

⁵² Melanchthon, *Loci Communes* (1543), 71.

⁵³ Melanchthon, *Loci Communes* (1543), 71.

⁵⁴ Melanchthon, *Loci Communes* (1543), 71.

⁵⁵ Melanchthon, *Loci Communes* (1543), 71.

grafted into human reason that we should love and maintain the truth and avoid lying. That principle is followed strongly by the courts, which seek to establish and preserve the truth.

Melanchthon specifically chose to compare the Decalogue to natural law in order to prove that their substance is essentially the same. The laws of nature are just like those of the Decalogue: they are divinely instituted and promoted for good order in societies through their proper authorities.⁵⁶ Melanchthon's high regard for the Decalogue was based on the fact that it was specially proclaimed from heaven "so that God might testify that He is the author of this natural knowledge," and that he wants obedience in accordance with the natural knowledge of these laws.⁵⁷ Finally, human reason has been weakened and, to a degree, misled by sin; thus, needs further enlightenment from the Decalogue.⁵⁸

Melanchthon approved of the Decalogue so highly that one is inclined to ask, "Why does Melanchthon not demand that the government, as custodian of both tables, explicitly promote the Decalogue itself?" Nevertheless, Melanchthon abstained from imposing a theocratic system on society based on the Decalogue. It seems that Melanchthon stopped himself from going so far, not because of the distinction of both kingdoms, but rather because his survey of classical society built on the Roman law (*römisches Recht*) revealed it to be enough of a promotion of natural law, the *ius gentium*. Roman law clearly is the highest product of human reason and of true moral philosophy. In fact, Melanchthon expressed his personal wish that the innate ideas that underlie the Roman jurist tradition would remain in the political philosophy of rulers at his time.⁵⁹

IV. Moral Philosophy

The basis for Melanchthon's above comments and observations is the argument that the divine law exists as natural law and can be promoted in society through those who are wise enough to pursue moral philosophy. In his *Summary of Ethics*, he defined moral philosophy as "the complete awareness of the precepts of the duties of all the virtues, which reason understands agree with man's nature and which are necessary for the conduct for this civil life."⁶⁰ Philosophy, he stated, is the study and

⁵⁶ CA XVI; *Book of Concord*, 49.

⁵⁷ Melanchthon, *Loci Communes* (1543), 72.

⁵⁸ Melanchthon, *Loci Communes* (1543), 72.

⁵⁹ Kusakawa, *The Transformation of Natural Philosophy*, 70, and Werner Elert, *Morphologie des Luthertums*, 2 vols. (Munich: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1953), 2:348.

⁶⁰ Melanchthon, *A Melanchthon Reader*, 203, and Elert, *Morphologie*, 2:334-350.

promotion of the laws of nature itself that have been written by God in men's minds. In other words, for Melanchthon there was a congruency between the *lex naturalis* and the *mens divina*. Natural law is God's law, used by him to order civil life. Philosophy is thus an explanation of the laws of God, as far as reason understands law, particularly the second table of the divine law.⁶¹ Christians do well to study philosophy since it is "called part of the divine law and the explanation of the law of nature."⁶² Christians should know, however, that they are justified freely through Christ and not through law or philosophy.⁶³ Melanchthon also approved of moral philosophy's investigation of man's end or goal of life through reason and the promotion of virtues. According to Aristotle, the end or goal must be defined as happiness guided by the virtue of moderation through the will.⁶⁴ But the pursuit of happiness plays a role only *coram mundo*, namely within the laws of outer and civil life. For, theologically speaking and according to the gospel, man's end is to "recognize and accept the mercy offered through Christ, and in turn to be grateful for that gift and obey God."⁶⁵

Though every human is endowed with reason, the ability to connect the correct virtue or habit to a law resides especially with the wise and learned.⁶⁶ As he did in his *Loci*, Melanchthon applied philosophy and the study of virtues to the two tables of the Decalogue. Even if philosophy has shortcomings, particularly about God since faith and love are lacking, it counts the fear of God and a certain amount of external reverence for God among the virtues. In regard to the second table of the law, Melanchthon praised important virtues that have positive effects on civil life and preserve society. Cicero and Aristotle also recognized these within their categories of virtues: the first category of the second table revolves around human order, which calls for the virtues of obedience, piety, and justice. The second precept teaches about physical soundness; thus, "do not kill" calls for gentleness. The third precept deals with marriage, thus continence applies. The fourth concerns property; here generosity applies. The fifth, concerning truth, calls for all virtues.⁶⁷

⁶¹ Melanchthon, *A Melanchthon Reader*, 204, Thesis 2.

⁶² Melanchthon, *A Melanchthon Reader*, 204, Thesis 3.

⁶³ Melanchthon, *A Melanchthon Reader*, 204, Thesis 3.

⁶⁴ Melanchthon, *A Melanchthon Reader*, 205, Thesis 6.

⁶⁵ Melanchthon, *A Melanchthon Reader*, 205, Thesis 6.

⁶⁶ Melanchthon, *A Melanchthon Reader*, 210, Thesis 14.

⁶⁷ Melanchthon, *A Melanchthon Reader*, 209, Thesis 13, and B. A. Gerrish, *Grace and Reason: A Study in the Theology of Luther* (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 1962), 35.

It is important to note that Melanchthon's appraisal of antiquity builds on the use of the judgment of the mind and free will *coram mundo*. Melanchthon contemplated moral philosophy with the idea of a *societas*. Man is not created as an individual alone but for society. Every human needs to be engaged in mutual communication of affairs with others so that from it emerge justice and honesty. Here Melanchthon, and Luther also, praised the Aristotelian *aequitas* or ἐπιείκεια that enforces the laws equitably and reasonably and serves society best. For example, in the context of the peasant revolution in the 1520s, *aequitas* would distinguish between the instigators and those who were forced to join. In all areas where laws are applied, the will must make proper choices based on the judgment of reason.⁶⁸

Melanchthon rejected determinism and the divine governance theory that diminish the dual liberty of the will. Liberty is not removed with the argument or reference to sin, even if sin causes man to struggle against so many bad emotions.⁶⁹ However, though Melanchthon applauded Cicero and Aristotle for having made correct advances in the area *coram mundo*, there is an inexplicable factor in their moral philosophy. Philosophy cannot explain the cause of human failure and the weakness of nature or why faulty emotions come in and impede a good act. Philosophy's perplexity is real because of a denial of the reality of original sin.⁷⁰ Melanchthon was aware that the metaphysical constructs of philosophy are inadequate in explaining the phenomenon called sin and why the virtue or goal of happiness, as Aristotle upholds, is so often missing among people. In the eleventh chapter of his commentary on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, Melanchthon did not leave the explanation of unhappiness as a cause of circumstance and misfortune but frames it within law and gospel.⁷¹

⁶⁸ Melanchthon, *A Melanchthon Reader*, 210, Thesis 13, and Elert, *Morphologie des Luthertums*, 2:341–350.

⁶⁹ Melanchthon, *A Melanchthon Reader*, 214 and 215, Thesis 22: "[N]evertheless we are able to control and do our honest outer deeds by ourselves. . . . Thus some liberty still remains in men for choosing honest external acts, even if it is not without difficulty that natural weakness is conquered . . . and these outward good deeds are called civil or moral virtues."

⁷⁰ Melanchthon, *A Melanchthon Reader*, 214, Thesis 22.

⁷¹ "Philosophy cannot adequately explain this question, since good fortune is supposed to reward virtue. The reason that does not happen is unknown to philosophy, since human nature is oppressed by sin, and for that reason is subjected to huge tribulations; but the gospel teaches us that they are happy in this life who have the beginning of light and justice and the first fruits of eternal life, and the guidance and protection of God. Meanwhile they bear the harshest struggles and calamities. Later when sin and death are truly abolished they will have absolute peace. But the gospel

Thus, for Melanchthon, the gospel is the answer to all those stricken by sad things. For those in a state of unhappiness, such as having experienced the loss of a child, happiness can still be found in the gospel. It is evident that Melanchthon did not follow the same purpose as Aristotle in his commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics* and in his *Summary of Ethics*. As he confined moral philosophy to *coram mundo*, he repeatedly brought in his theological and Christian point of view.⁷² Elert claims that Melanchthon entertained an idealism and utopianism of a just and perfect society built on classical moral philosophy.⁷³ His theological bearing, however, came across strong in the area of harmatology that denied him utopianism. In other words, though Melanchthon saw the *usus politicus legis* at times fulfilled by non-Christians, he proceeded to compare their laws and behavior to the *usus in renatis* and revealed some outstanding issues among non-Christians. At the same time, we notice—as we did in *Augustana* XVIII already—that Melanchthon never went so far as to disqualify the works of natural man *coram mundo* as useless and bad works. As a result, after the publication of his *Scholia* on Colossians in 1527, Melanchthon confidently made philosophy productive for, and servant to, theology in the context of civil justice and morality.⁷⁴

V. Luther and Natural Law

Both Melanchthon's and Luther's presentation of moral philosophy and natural law have the distinct feature of drawing a comparison between natural law and the Decalogue. A noticeable aspect of that comparison is how Melanchthon itemized the law both for non-Christians and Christians. The Decalogue was reflected in the specific laws of pagan moral philosophy. Though Luther acknowledged the identification of the Decalogue and natural law, he went further and summarized or condensed all natural laws and the Decalogue into one law, the law of love.

Luther came to that conclusion by comparing the relationship between the laws of nature, the Decalogue, and the New Testament. This reasoning is most lucidly discussed in his tract *How Christians Should Regard Moses*.⁷⁵ To Luther, the Ten Commandments agreed with natural law and are a

says that it is not in the human power in this life, which is subject to death and the stings of the devil, to pursue the sure conjunction of virtue and good fortune"; see Melanchthon, *A Melanchthon Reader*, 198, Chapter 11.

⁷² Matz, *Der befreite Mensch*, 200.

⁷³ Elert, *Morphologie des Luthertums*, 2:31.

⁷⁴ Matz, *Der befreite Mensch*, 100 and 238.

⁷⁵ LW 35:159–174.

good summary of it. Both the Ten Commandments and natural law, however, agreed with the dual commandment of love in the New Testament.⁷⁶ He thus asked: "Why does one then keep and teach the Ten Commandments? Answer: Because the natural laws were never so orderly and well written as by Moses. Therefore it is reasonable to follow the example of Moses."⁷⁷ The commandments of Moses, however, derive their validity only because they are in agreement with the laws of nature and the New Testament: "Thus I keep the commandments which Moses has given, not because Moses gave the commandment, but because they are implanted in me by nature, and Moses agrees exactly with nature."⁷⁸ Elsewhere he wrote: "We will regard Moses as a teacher, but we will not regard him as a lawgiver—unless he agrees with both the New Testament and the natural law."⁷⁹

Luther placed the laws of the Decalogue in relation to natural law and the law of loving your neighbor. He found in the Golden Rule and the dual commandment of love a good summary of the laws of nature and the Decalogue. Thus, the prescriptions of the Old Testament have lost their special status. All prescriptions that exist in the Old Testament were understood as the laws of the Jews, as their "*Sachsenspiegel*." Just as little as the Saxon laws (*Sachsenspiegel*) apply to the French, so too the Old Testament laws cannot be binding for Christians.⁸⁰ What is binding in the

⁷⁶ When in the Sermon on the Mount Jesus summarizes the Old Testament laws in the Golden Rule, it is indicative of the law of Moses being an expression of the natural law: "Thus, 'Thou shalt not kill, commit adultery, steal, etc.,' are not Mosaic laws only, but also natural law written in each man's heart, as St. Paul teaches (Rom. 2 [:15]) Also Christ himself (Matt. 7 [:12]) includes all the law and the prophets in this natural law, 'So whatever you wish that men would do to you, do so to them; for this is the law and the prophets.' Paul does the same thing in Rom. 13 [:9], where he sums up all the commandments of Moses in the love which also the natural law teaches in the words, 'Love your neighbor as yourself'; see *Against the Heavenly Prophets*, in LW 40:97.

⁷⁷ *Against the Heavenly Prophets*, in LW 40:98.

⁷⁸ *How Christians Should Regard Moses*, in LW 35:168.

⁷⁹ LW 35:165.

⁸⁰ *How Christians Should Regard Moses*, in LW 35:167. Luther made similar statements on the *Sachsenspiegel* in *Against Heavenly Prophets in the Matter of Images and Sacraments*, e.g., in LW 40:97: "Therefore Moses' legislation about images and the sabbath, and what else goes beyond the natural law, since it is not supported by the natural law, is free, null and void, and is specifically given to the Jewish people alone. It is as when an emperor or a king makes special laws and ordinances in his territory, as the *Sachsenspiegel* in Saxony. . . . Therefore one is to let Moses be the *Sachsenspiegel* of the Jews and not to confuse us gentiles with it, just as the *Sachsenspiegel* is not observed in France, though the natural law there is in agreement with it." See also Andersen, *Einführung in die Ethik*, 108–110.

Old Testament for the Christian are those laws contained in the Decalogue, but they are meaningful for Christians insofar as they explicate the law of love.

These insights are an important commentary to the few positive statements Luther made on reason and its use in the context of worldly affairs, insofar as it does not interfere with the first kind of righteousness. On these occasions when reason pertains to spiritual matters and true knowledge of God, Luther made derogatory statements calling reason both blind and the devil's maid.⁸¹ Sadly, humans always tend to bring their contributions to the second kind of righteousness into the spiritual realm. Luther saw much of that interference occurring precisely in the philosophy of Aristotle, particularly in the theological discourses of Scholasticism. This is evident in the use of the term *synthesi* by Scholastic theologians, who claim that natural reason apart from faith can attain true knowledge of God.⁸²

Luther, however, conceded to reason (*ratio*) a relationship with God via natural law. The preaching of the fully revealed law of God does not strike onto a barren field. As Luther stated: "If the Natural Law had not been inscribed and placed by God into the heart, one would have to preach a long time before the consciences are touched."⁸³ It further presupposes that Luther often praised reason as the greatest gift given by God to mankind. That statement must be seen in the context of society and the first article on creation. In the worldly realm, reason is given supreme authority. It serves man to exercise his dominion over the world to plan, organize, and rule society. Even after the fall, reason has the ethical ability of recognizing what is required and what is good and bad. Reason informs every human that he may not steal, fornicate, or withhold property from others. In other words, reason must rule over the "spoiled flesh of man." In this way the pursuit of moral things (*moralia*) will lead to a *iustitia civilis*.⁸⁴ This applies also to the passing and enforcing of laws. The codification of laws is a reflection of the divine laws in man's heart. No special revelation is needed because God the Creator endowed rulers and magistrates with reason to apply the laws. Ultimately, therefore, lawgivers are accountable

⁸¹ Bernhard Lohse, *Ratio und Fides: Eine Untersuchung über die ratio in der Theologie Luthers* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1958), 72.

⁸² Lohse, *Ratio und Fides*, 47.

⁸³ Martin Luther, *Dr. Martin Luthers Sämtliche Schriften*, ed. Joh. Georg Walch (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1894), 3:1053. See also David J. Valleskey, *We Believe, Therefore We Speak: The Theology and Practice of Evangelism* (Milwaukee: Northwestern Publishing House, 2004), 24, and Lohse, *Ratio und Fides*, 83.

⁸⁴ Lohse, *Ratio und Fides*, 122-123.

to God, and in the end they do not create laws but receive them as God's gift (*accepi not feci*).⁸⁵ Thus Luther did not come up with a formal-biblicist understanding of suggesting which laws government should impose. This explains why heathens sometimes have better laws than the Jews.⁸⁶

VI. Motivation and Christological Bases in Luther

In his seminal study *Ratio und Fides*, Bernhard Lohse shows that Luther distinguished the *ratio* of serving law in society and upholding the justice of society (*Rechtsordnung des Staates*) from the renewed *ratio* (*renovatio mentis*) of a Christian guided by the Christian understanding of love.⁸⁷ Even if the distinction between Christian and non-Christian exists, however, it does not make much of a difference in the promotion of worldly matters. Here Luther did not separate the *ratio* of a non-Christian and that of a Christian. Such an attempt would land one in enthusiasm. Like faith, a Christian's reborn reason is hidden and not visible. For Luther and Melanchthon, all ethical discussion oriented itself not so much toward the act itself, which both Christians and non-Christians share, but far more deeply toward the motivation (*Gesinnung*) behind it. What matters is the motivation of love through faith in Christ, which natural reason lacks.⁸⁸

Thus as far as motivation goes, the two kinds of righteousness are not disconnected for Melanchthon or Luther. That connection lies in the inner motivation stemming from faith in Christ. Faith, as a gift of God, receives the righteousness of Christ and then brings forth good fruits in the civil realm. This implies that from a theological perspective one would expect Christians to contribute towards the second righteousness with the purest intentions, insofar as the motivation goes. Luther made this distinction in the preface to his commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans when he called human deeds lacking proper motivation, "human law," and those done from the bottom of the heart, "divine law."⁸⁹

⁸⁵ Maurer, *Historical Commentary*, 115–118.

⁸⁶ Lohse, *Ratio und Fides*, 131.

⁸⁷ Lohse, *Ratio und Fides*, 13.

⁸⁸ Lohse, *Ratio und Fides*, 132.

⁸⁹ "The little word 'law' you must here not take in human fashion as a teaching about what works are to be done or not done. That is the way with *human laws*; a law fulfilled by works, even though there is no heart in the doing of them. But God judges according to what is in the depths of the heart. For this reason, his law too makes its demands on the inmost heart; it cannot be satisfied with works, but rather punishes as hypocrisy and lies the works not done from the bottom of the heart. Hence all men are called liars. . . . For everyone finds in himself displeasure in what is good and pleasure in what is bad. If, now, there is no willing pleasure in the good, then the inmost heart is

In this point, Luther went further than Melanchthon by highlighting the christological basis for his ethics. It seems that the distinction between a Christian and non-Christian's reason motivated by love *coram mundo* was more pronounced in Luther than in Melanchthon. To be sure, Melanchthon also offered a decidedly Christian perspective by highlighting the Holy Spirit and faith as the basis for Christian action.⁹⁰ But he did not underscore the christologically based and motivated ethic as intentionally as Luther. In his treatise on the *Two Kinds of Righteousness* (1519), Luther made it abundantly clear that a Christian assumes a Christ-like unselfishness in practicing his love for the neighbor. Christians pursue the second kind of righteousness because faith becomes active through love. Although the second kind of righteousness cannot stand in front of God's throne, it matters a great deal for Christians as they engage with their neighbor.⁹¹ For Christians, this second kind of righteousness becomes particularly meaningful in light of Philippians 2:5: "Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus." What followed for Luther is what we may call a "putting-on-the-mind-of-Christ" in a self-effacing or kenotic way. The second kind of righteousness flows from the righteousness that Christ earned on the cross and leads a Christian to total dedication or surrender of service in the example of Christ. Luther explained this further with this statement in *Two Kinds of Righteousness*:

This righteousness is the product of the righteousness of the first type, actually its fruit and consequence. . . . It hates itself and loves its neighbor; it does not seek its own good, but that of another, and in this its whole way of living consists. For in that it hates itself and does not seek its own, it crucifies the flesh. Because it seeks the good of another, it works love. Thus in each sphere it does God's will, living soberly with self, justly with neighbor, devoutly toward God. This righteousness follows the example of Christ in this respect [I Pet. 2:21] and is transformed into his likeness (II Cor. 3:18). It is precisely this that Christ requires. Just as he himself did all things for us, not seeking his own good but ours only—and in this he was most obedient to God the Father—so he desires that we also should set the same example for our neighbors.⁹²

To a degree, Luther's strong christological perspective comes to bear in his *On Temporal Authority* (1523) where he optimistically embraced the idea that if society were comprised only of Christians there would be no need

not set on the *law of God*. Then, too, there is surely sin, and God's wrath is deserved, even though outwardly there seem to be many good deeds and honorable life"; see *LW* 35:366.

⁹⁰ Matz, *Der befreite Mensch*, 204–205.

⁹¹ FC SD III, 32; *Book of Concord*, 567.

⁹² *LW* 31:299–300.

for the use of the law. For the law was placed by God to control and curb the sins and aggressions of non-Christians.⁹³ Here Luther offered his own utopianism of a Jesus-disciple society where Christians in complete freedom from the law follow the laws as if there are no laws. Christians respond to the *viva lex*, that leads them to act voluntarily and unselfishly, motivated by love for the neighbor.⁹⁴ Nevertheless, he realized for himself that a utopian society would and could never exist. Christians are spread too thin in society in the midst of evil and lawless people, and even Christian hypocrites find their home among sincere Christians. Thus, Christians should not seek isolation but rather endure and bear the cross for all the evil incurred on them. Christians live in that eschatological tension of enduring the present and waiting for what is still to come. In addition, the call to daily repentance would involve Christians also so that among them too the ideal is dampened by the reality of sin. As Elert points out, repentance and eschatology always accompany the Lutheran *ethos* as an important corrective.⁹⁵

For Luther, both Christians and non-Christians share common social and ethical concerns, but they come to it from different angles. The contribution towards civil righteousness by a Christian is christologically motivated and a result of faith attributed to the Holy Spirit, whereas for non-Christians it is a response to the law of love as a summary of the natural law (*lex naturalis*).⁹⁶ This distinction would allow us to debate the particular aspects of a Christian's role as the righteous in society,⁹⁷ even if his sinfulness and shortcomings remain just as much an issue in the second kind of righteousness as it does with non-Christians.

⁹³ "The law has been laid down for the lawless . . . so that those who are not Christians may through the law be restrained outwardly from evil deeds"; see LW 45:90.

⁹⁴ "Those who belong to the kingdom of God are all true believers who are in Christ and under Christ. . . . These people need no temporal law or sword. If all the world were composed of real Christians, that is, true believers, there would be no need for or benefits from prince, king, lord, sword, or law"; see LW 45:88–89.

⁹⁵ Elert, *Morphologie des Luthertums*, 2:23, and Wolfgang Trillhaas, *Ethik* (Berlin: Alfred Töpelmann, 1959), 23 and 29. The ethicist Paul Ramsey discusses the question: "How can there be a Christocentric vocation without withdrawing an individual quite completely from actual tasks in the world?"; see *Basic Christian Ethics* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950), 153.

⁹⁶ In this refined way, Luther suggested early on in his career that we should distinguish between three kinds of righteousness, as he elicits in his *Sermon on Three Kinds of Righteousness* (1518), WA 2:44,32–38; see Robert Kolb, "Sermo de triplici iustitia," *Concordia Journal* 33 (2007): 171–172.

⁹⁷ Timothy Saleska, "The Two Kinds of Righteousness!: What's a Preacher to Do?" *Concordia Journal* 33 (2007): 141.

sinfulness and shortcomings remain just as much an issue in the second kind of righteousness as it does with non-Christians.

VII. Conclusion

Augustana XVIII broadens the theological scope by pairing a Christian's contribution to uphold the second kind of righteousness in society to that of non-Christian citizens. Melanchthon draws into that discussion his approval of moral and social philosophers from antiquity, such as Aristotle and Cicero. He views classical philosophy positively and as relevant to Christian thought but without compromising his Christian perspective. Though he is willing to entertain an ideal society based solely on natural law and moral philosophy, he also sees the shortcomings of pagan moral philosophy, in that it fails to take into account the reality of sin, and he concedes that the freedom endowed to natural man is due to God's providential care as limited and restricted.

Melanchthon's social project is interesting in that he does not consign the "remnant knowledge" of natural man after the fall to an indefinable mess. A reader notices how studiously Melanchthon went about to prove the point that the natural law in the life of all humans is encoded in specific laws. The revelation of law has occurred for all humans, for non-Christians and Christians. Moral philosophy itself is not a purely human study of that divine law; it actually operates with revelation. To Christians, revelation has come through the Decalogue. A comparative study of natural law and the Decalogue shows that there is a closeness between them. To be sure, the Decalogue was a clearer and more helpful addition in the context of the second kind of righteousness. That insight, however, did not diminish the commonality between both Christians and non-Christians. Both parties are in possession of the divine law and together assume civil and moral responsibility with the use of their reason. In fact, in the realm *coram mundo* it seems as if Melanchthon makes little difference between the reason of those who believe and of those who do not. In both cases, there is the responsibility for moral conduct on the basis of divine law.⁹⁸ Christians cannot automatically possess an additional sixth sense over non-Christians in their dealings within society.

A comparison of Melanchthon with Luther reveals that Melanchthon did not reduce the natural law and the Decalogue to an agape-motivated ethics based on the dual commandment of love as Luther did.⁹⁹ For

⁹⁸ Melanchthon, *A Melanchthon Reader*, 29.

⁹⁹ For example, see B.A. Gerrish, *Grace and Reason: A Study in the Theology of Luther* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 34.

Melanchthon, the law takes a central role for all of humanity, non-Christians and Christians alike: for non-Christians the divine law expresses itself in the natural law, and for Christians it is the divine law identified in its third use. A Christian continually struggles with sin. As a result, the divine law assists as a guide.¹⁰⁰ For this reason, Melanchthon would not push a freedom from the law in the radical sense as Luther did. Arguably, therefore, Melanchthon was closer to Calvinism on this matter than was Luther. For Luther, ethics is *agape*-motivated, while for Melanchthon it becomes a rational pursuit of individual precepts. What is missing in Melanchthon is Luther's emphasis on the freedom of the law and love as the summary of all law. For Melanchthon serving the neighbor is a rational and premeditated pursuit of individual codes, whereas for Luther it becomes a combination of love and circumstance. Luther would allow Christians to act with greater personal freedom depending on what love informs one to do in his vocation. Melanchthon, on the other hand, offers concrete and categorical advice, laying out a number of principles from natural knowledge.¹⁰¹

In terms of the first kind of righteousness, unanimity largely exists between Luther and Melanchthon. It is the second kind of righteousness that exhibits their nuances. When it comes to the second kind of righteousness, it is evident that Melanchthon was no Luther. Though Luther would praise Aristotle's natural or moral philosophy as valuable for establishing a just, earthly kingdom, he found it most dangerous when mixed up with theology of grace and salvation. Melanchthon agreed with Luther theologically, but he actively pursued classical moral philosophy, complimenting it as an ideal approach to society for all politicians to emulate. Melanchthon returned to the Greek teachers and classics for his information, and that recourse influenced his social ethics. Obedience to civil authorities could be made plausible also to those who were non-Christians, an important point of his argument as he encountered the civil disobedience of the Anabaptists. The difference between Luther and Melanchthon lies in their approach to the law and gospel structure. One scholar's observation summarizes it well:

¹⁰⁰ Melanchthon, *Loci Communes* (1543), 74.

¹⁰¹ Melanchthon's system has a contemporary ring in two ways. It would facilitate the discussion on establishing "common human rights" (*allgemeine Menschenrechte*) among all religions, as Hans Küng currently offers with his Global Ethos project, see Hans Küng, *Global Responsibility: In Search of New World Ethic*, trans. John Bowden (New York: Crossroad, 1991). Also, Melanchthon and Luther's approach to the world would underscore Paul Tillich's method of correlation; see Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, vol. 1 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), 59–66.

Luther, the theologian, sought to establish the Gospel, Melanchthon, the Greek teacher, the Law: Luther attacked and endeavored to eliminate traditional philosophy, including natural philosophy, because it obstructed the true message of the Gospel; Melanchthon restored the teaching of classical moral philosophy as part of the Divine Law.¹⁰²

¹⁰² Kusakawa, *The Transformation of Natural Philosophy*, 74; see also Gerrish, *Grace and Reason*, 34-35.

Vertical Typology and Christian Worship

Horace D. Hummel

"Typology" is a word that is anything but unknown in Lutheran circles, though it is not one of the more familiar words. Usually when the concept is considered, we think of the horizontal dimension, from creation to new creation, from the fall into sin to the final redemption, or the like. In brief, it is usually understood to refer to some event, person, place, or institution which anticipates and presages some event, person, place, or institution later in biblical history, mostly from Old Testament to New Testament, although a little of it occurs within the Old Testament itself. Some mere analogy must be present, but the subject must also be performative, not only reiterating but also recapitulating and consummating it.¹

Thus, typology parallels or is the other side of the coin to prophecy. In a broader use of the term, it might even be considered a subdivision of prophecy. With "prophecy" we usually think of verbalizations, that is, of explicit, spoken predictions by the prophets. In contrast, types by themselves tend to be mute. Their futuristic or eschatological import is not usually evident in the text and would remain unknown apart from their elucidation in the New Testament.² The usual language is type and antitype, corresponding to prophecy and fulfillment respectively. Inevitably the two overlap at times.

This correspondence is analogous to our pairing of "word" and "sacrament." By "word" we do not mean mere verbiage, but the proclamation of the *realia* of salvation, basically Christ and the salvation he offers. These physical *realia* are offered in the physical *realia* of Baptism and the Eucharist, which, however, would be mute and impotent without the

¹ For a brief description of "recapitulation" in Irenaeus, see Justo L. Gonzalez, *A History of Christian Doctrine*, vol. 1, *From the Beginnings to the Council of Chalcedon*, rev. ed. (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1987), 165-168.

² Inevitably, Augustine's famous aphorism comes to mind: "The New Testament is latent in the Old: the Old is patent in the New [*In Vetere Novum latet et in Novo Vetus patet*]" ; see *Quaestiones in Heptateuchum* 2.83, quoted in Saint Augustine, *Concerning the City of God against the Pagans*, trans. Henry Bettenson (London and New York: Penguin Books, 2003), 211 n. 76.

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dominical word accompanying them. Sometimes we use "word" in a broad sense too, which is then subdivisible into "word" and "sacrament." Or we express their essential unity by speaking of absolution and preaching as the "spoken sacrament" and the sacraments as the "visible word."

It should come as no surprise that there is no unanimity in the proper definition of typology. Some of the difference arises from the nature of the Scriptures or exegetical theology which does not express itself in abstractions. Even the word τύπος [*typus*] is used some fifteen times in the New Testament and twice in the Septuagint of the Old Testament, but in varying senses.³ In his preface to his Psalms commentary, Franz Delitzsch calls the life of David a *vaticinium reale* of Christ.⁴ Of course, the idea is often present when that vocable is not used at all. Some of the variation in defining the term arises from the varying theological presuppositions of the interpreters; and some of it is almost intrinsic to the supernatural process which it describes. No human vocabulary is ever going to be adequate to that task.

Other language besides "typology" has been and still is sometimes used. "Allegory" was probably the most frequently used term in the early church, pioneered perhaps by Paul, especially in Galatians 4:21–31 where it is used of Sarah and Hagar. Probably the best introduction to, and survey of, patristic use of typology is Jean Daniélou's *Sacramentum Futuri*, translated into English under the title *From Shadows to Reality*.⁵ Daniélou has other important works in this area, perhaps most significantly *The Bible and the Liturgy*.⁶ When one reads these books, however, especially the first, it is often hard to distinguish what we would call "allegory" from "typology." It is usually agreed that Pauline and patristic "allegory" ultimately differs radically from the type used by Philo, usually called

³ The Hebrew תְּבִיטָה is used twenty times in the Old Testament but is translated differently.

⁴ C. F. Keil and F. Delitzsch, *Commentary on the Old Testament*, vol. 5, *Psalms*, trans. Francis Bolton (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1866-91; Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1996), 41. Citation is from the Hendrickson edition.

⁵ Jean Daniélou, *Sacramentum Futuri: Études sur les Origines de la Typologie Biblique* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1950); *From Shadows to Reality: Studies in the Biblical Typology of the Fathers*, trans. Wulstan Hibberd (London: Burns & Oates, 1960). The English title uses biblical language, but, regrettably, loses the "sacramental" dimension, that is, efficaciousness through some external element.

⁶ Jean Daniélou, *Bible et Liturgie: La Théologie Biblique des Sacraments et des Fêtes D'après les Pères de l'Église* (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1951); *The Bible and the Liturgy* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1956).

"symbolic" versus the biblical "historical" type. Be that as it may, "allegory" has today almost universally come to imply an approach which demeans, ignores, or even denies the literal or historical sense of the text and hence is no longer useful. In contrast, "typology" builds on the literal sense, and, although aware of discontinuities, proclaims the extension, prolongation, and consummation of the literal sense of the text.

The church fathers often also spoke of a "mystical sense," especially in connection with the "mystagogy," as they called it, of catechetical instruction. Contemporary Roman Catholic usage does not speak of any "mystical sense," but common talk about the "paschal mystery" combines typological, liturgical, and sacramental perspectives. We are acquainted with the word "mystery" in the biblical sense and even use "mystic(al)" in other contexts. Yet to speak of a "mystical sense" of Scripture would, if anything, probably suggest some sort of esoteric allegory or "mysticism" as a theological posture.⁷

Another option is to speak of a "spiritual" sense. Initially there is something very attractive about such a usage, if one could, in effect, keep the initial letter capitalized, that is, relate it to the Holy Spirit who first inspired the sacred text and who in word and sacrament brings it out of the remoteness of ancient history. Yet today would hardly be the time to champion the term, awash, as our culture is, in "spiritualities" of all sorts, usually totally subjective and tending in "new age" directions.

The point of this digression is to emphasize that there is nothing sacrosanct about the word "typology" or "typological." If one is going to avoid positivism, historicism, literalism, or some other "-ism" which takes the Bible as a purely human document, or which does not let Scripture interpret Scripture, then a label will have to be found for this position. "Typology" today enjoys as wide a currency as any alternative.

Although it derives from a word frequently used in the Bible itself, it should be stressed that "typology" does not refer to some exegetical method by which one extracts meaning from Scripture but primarily connotes an underlying mentality or confession. Since Yahweh is taken as constantly guiding history toward its Messianic goal, not merely occasionally bestirring himself to intervene (although certain events and

⁷ It is worth noting that some of the theologians of Lutheran orthodoxy, most notably Abraham Calov (1612-1686), did speak of a *sensus mysticus*, which he subdivided into allegorical, typical, and parabolic senses. See also Benjamin T. G. Mayes, "The Mystical Sense of Scripture According to Johann Jacob Rambach," *CTQ* 72 (2008): 45-70.

people will stand out), one sometimes gets the impression that, humanly speaking, the biblical writers made an almost random selection of examples to illustrate the point. That would explain why the Old Testament is often quoted very freely in the New Testament, why it usually follows the Septuagint rather than the Hebrew, and why modern scholars often vary as much as they do in their perceptions of what typological patterns are being followed. That is also why debate about precisely how many types or prophecies there are is misguided. All of the Old Testament is prophetic (consider the phrase “prophetic and apostolic Scriptures”), and in the same broad sense all of it is typological, all of it christological, all of it eschatological, and so forth. Basically then, “typology” is simply an expression and exemplification of our conviction that type and antitype are of the same genus or family—which we commonly refer to as the “unity of Scripture.” For all the external differences, both focus on grace, not works, and both center in Jesus Christ.

I. Typology Since the Reformation

It is beneficial also to take a brief look at the history of typology in more recent times, especially since the Reformation. The study on prophecy and typology from the Commission on Theology and Church Relations (CTCR) of The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod (LCMS) is extensively documented.⁸ Contrary to what some have thought, it demonstrates the extent to which Martin Luther used typology throughout his life. It includes a couple of quotations from the Apology of the Augsburg Confession to show how sympathetic the confessors, as a whole, were to the broader typological reading of the Old Testament.⁹ It uses not only the word *typus*, but also *umbra* (σκιά) and *imago* (εἰκών) to describe the relation of the two testaments to one another. Abraham Calov (1612–1686) was only one of the theologians of Lutheran Orthodoxy who discussed the topic.¹⁰

One is not surprised that Rationalism and Pietism did not concern themselves much with the subject, although honorable mention should be given to Johann Albrecht Bengel (1687–1752), who especially with his *Gnomon Novi Testamenti* is often hailed as one of the forerunners of

⁸ Commission on Theology and Church Relations, “Appendix R3-01A: Prophecy and Typology,” in *The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod, Convention Workbook: Reports and Overtures, 60th Regular Convention* (St. Louis: The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod, 1998), 57–61, <http://www.lcms.org/graphics/assets/media/CTCR/Prophecy%20and%20Typology.pdf> [all page numbers are from the *Convention Workbook*].

⁹ Ap IV, 395; VII, VIII; XXIV, 36, 37, 53; see “Prophecy and Typology,” 58.

¹⁰ “Prophecy and Typology,” 58.

Heilsgeschichte, a viewpoint with many affinities to typology.¹¹ For Lutherans, another damper on the study of typology in this period came from the Reformed side with its excessive use of the term, especially in its "covenant" or "federal" theology, classically represented by Johannes Cocceius' work.¹² Some later works from this school were more moderate, perhaps especially Patrick Fairbairn (1805–1874), whose *The Typology of Scripture* remains useful if used with discretion.¹³

Higher criticism naturally dismissed typology as an antiquated approach. Little attention was paid to the subject in those circles until the rise of so-called "biblical theology" under neo-orthodox auspices after the two world wars. Its endorsement by giants in the field like Walter Eichrodt and Gerhard von Rad gave respectability to the topic, and considerable literature on the subject was generated, but in the last decade or so other interests have largely displaced it.¹⁴

In the LCMS, however, attention to typology seems to have been part of its theological horizon from the outset. The CTCR report singles out a work by D. C. G. Hoffman (1703–1774), entitled *Institutiones Theologiae Exegeticae*, which was used as a hermeneutics text during Walther's presidency and which devotes some twenty pages to the proper interpretation of types.¹⁵ Later LCMS exegetes, however, probably reacting to the increasing threat of historical-critical scholarship, took a dim view of the subject.¹⁶ The attempt by what became the Semineer faculty to use typology as a means to deny actual predictive prophecy did not endear the subject to the more conservative-minded. During the same period,

¹¹ Johann Albrecht Bengel, *Gnomon Novi Testamenti* [*Exegetical Annotations on the New Testament*] (Tübingen: Henr. Philippi Schrammii, 1742). The *Heilsgeschichte* viewpoint was developed by Daniélou (See n.4 and 5.) and also Oscar Cullmann, *Salvation in History*, trans. Sidney G. Sowers (New York: Harper & Row, 1967).

¹² Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche, 3rd ed., s.v. "Cocceius, Johannes."

¹³ Patrick Fairbairn, *The Typology of Scripture: Viewed in Connection with the Whole Series of the Divine Dispensations*, 2 vols. (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1911).

¹⁴ On Walter Eichrodt (1890–1978) and Gerhard von Rad (1901–1971), see James K. Mead, *Biblical Theology: Issues, Methods, and Themes* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2007), 42–44.

¹⁵ Carl Gottlob Hoffman, *Institutiones Theologiae Exegeticae in Usum Academicarum Praelectionum Adornatae* (St. Louis: Ex Officina Synodi Missouriensis Lutheranae, [1876]). Its title refers to "Methods/Principles of Exegetical Theology."

¹⁶ For example, Georg Stoeckhardt, *Christ in Old Testament Prophecy*, trans. Erwin W. Koehlinger (Fort Wayne, IN: Concordia Theological Seminary Press, 1984), and Theodore Ferdinand Karl Laetsch, *Bible Commentary: Jeremiah* (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1952).

interestingly, the Wisconsin Synod tended toward a more positive view of the subject, evidenced especially in August Pieper's *Isaiah II*.¹⁷ Only in very recent times has typology become more familiar in the LCMS, although not without opposition.

II. The Biblical Evidence for Vertical Typology

The word "typology" usually occurs with reference to its horizontal aspect, and little attention is paid to the vertical. This concentration on the horizontal corresponds, of course, to the thrust of the gospel from creation to parousia, from the fall to the fall of the "last enemy." The Christian faith seeks neither escape from the body after the fashion of gnostics or mystics nor retreat into the psychological interiority or solipsism of much contemporary "spirituality." Yet conscious, explicit neglect of the vertical aspect runs the risk of thinking of God as purely immanent, part of the historical process, and subject to our manipulation as "co-creators."¹⁸

How then does the vertical intersect with the horizontal? An illustration—poor though it be—may be helpful. It is the picture of the two-story universe which the Bible assumes throughout, and to which the Christian church also subscribes, although often quite nominally. What we know as "history" proceeds on two parallel tracks. Man, the creature, on the lower, empirical track likes to think that he is the maker of history, while "He who sits in the heavens laughs" (Ps 2:4). Man has his measure of freedom, of course (*De servo arbitrio*), but the ultimate decisions are made above. The Hebrew root שפט (usually translated "judge/judgment") refers not only to condemnation, as it tends to be heard (although often enough that is the application), but simply to decisions or verdicts of the heavenly court. These apply not only to the "justification" of the individual (צדק שפט) but to the right ordering, as he wills it, of the entire universe. As Dorothy Sayers put it, the resurrection "is the only thing that has ever really happened."¹⁹ Not, of course, that what we know as the "historical" is an illusion but that it has ultimate content or significance only *sub specie aeternitatis*.

In the illustration, the two parallel tracks begin or first diverge at the fall and do not converge again until the parousia. The language of

¹⁷ August Pieper, *Isaiah II: An Exposition of Isaiah 40–66*, trans. Erwin E. Kowalke (Milwaukee, WI: Northwestern Publishing House, 1979).

¹⁸ It is ironic that the medieval *quadriga*, for all of the "Affenspiel" often connected with it, did climax in a search for the "anagogic" (from the Greek for "lead up") sense of the text.

¹⁹ Dorothy L. Sayers, *A Man Born to Be King: A Play-Cycle on the Life of Our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ* (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1990), 290.

verticality (heaven as “up” and earth as “down”) is the language of Scripture itself. It is from God’s perspective anthropomorphic in nature and not to be pressed literalistically. It is one of the many “metaphors” God himself has graciously condescended to give so that communication might be possible.

As with the continuousness of horizontal typology, so also with the vertical: in a sense, God alone is intervening in earthly history all the time, but there are certain times and places where that intervention is more obvious. Explicit typological language may not always be used, but the vertical dimension is obvious nonetheless. We are usually not told in concrete terms what transpired when the “word of Yahweh” came to the prophets, although sometimes we meet the language of dreams and visions (πν).²⁰ Various theologoumena are used when God intervenes more personally. For lack of a better term, these may be called “hypostases,” because they are all manifestations of the pre-incarnate Christ/λόγος ἁρκος, that is, ways in which he was “incarnationally” present on earth before the incarnation itself. Besides “word” used in that sense, there are other terms such as the “angel of Yahweh” (when paralleled with Yahweh himself), “name,” “glory,” “spirit,” and “wisdom.” All these are understood as reaching their climax in the incarnation proper but continued until the second coming by the Holy Spirit operating through word and sacrament.

There are two areas of Scripture where the upper track regularly descends and guides the horizontal. These are the realms of warfare and of worship. Explicit typological language is not ordinarily used of the first, but it is of the second.

III. Warfare and Vertical Typology

The subsidiary area of warfare is considered first. It is all but certain that the epithet “Sabaoth,” which so often follows the divine name, is probably best translated “armies.” “Lord of Hosts” is archaic, and the “Lord God of pow’r and might” of *Lutheran Book of Worship*, *Lutheran Worship*, and *Lutheran Service Book* is an unacceptable paraphrase because it replaces a very concrete word with two abstractions.²¹ Already in the

²⁰ E.g., Gen 15:1; 2 Sam 7:4, 17; 1 Chr 17:3, 15; Ezek 1:1-3; 7:1, 13.

²¹ This phrase appears in three settings for Holy Communion in *Lutheran Book of Worship* (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1978), 69, 89, 110; in *Divine Service II* in *Lutheran Worship* (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1982), 170, 189; and in the first two settings for the Divine Service in *Lutheran Service Book* (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 2006), 161, 178.

"Song of the Sea," Yahweh is described as a "man of war" (Exod 15:3). Not any wars, of course, but only those of his people, and only when they do his bidding. Long before the temple fell in 587 BC, the prophets were predicting that Yahweh could and would fight against his own people if they abandoned him. Use of the word is associated especially with the Ark of the Covenant, which led the Israelites into battle. It used to be that the term "holy war" was spoken freely, but its use by radical Muslims to translate *jihad* has led to the substitution of "Yahweh's war."

A few examples illustrate the concept. In Joshua 5:13-15, as Joshua is reconnoitering Jericho, a heavenly visitor suddenly appears and identifies himself as "the commander of Yahweh's army," that is, the commander-in-chief of the combined armies of heaven and earth. In 2 Kings 6 when Elisha's servant is frightened by the Syrian armies that had surrounded Dothan, Elisha prays that God would open his eyes so that he would see that "the mountain was full of horses and chariots of fire round about Elisha" (2 Kgs 6:17). In Daniel 9-10, the angel Gabriel makes Daniel wait twenty-one days until Michael comes to relieve him in the battle against "the prince of the kingdom of Persia" before he can answer Daniel's prayer for the real (ultimate) meaning of the "seventy years" of captivity prophesied by Jeremiah. His interpretation of the seventy years as seventy *weeks* of years is one of the Bible's own clearest examples of typological exegesis.

Nor does warfare language cease in the New Testament era. From Herod's attempt to kill a possible competitor to the apocalyptic battles of the book of Revelation, spiritual war continues, no longer against political entities or "flesh and blood," but in Paul's words, "against the principalities, against the powers, against the world rulers of this present darkness, against the spiritual hosts of wickedness in the heavenly places" (Eph 6:12). In fact, a "theology of the cross" implies a victory, and victories follow wars. Exodus and Paschal typology, arising in their own martial contexts, seem to be better reflected in Easter hymns and liturgies than in Easter preaching. Here is one more example: When the seventy return rejoicing from their missionary journey in Luke's Gospel, our Lord's exclamation is: "I saw Satan fall like lightning from heaven" (Luke 10:18).

IV. Worship and Vertical Typology

In turning to verticality in the area of worship, the realm of warfare should not be left behind too hastily. The role of Urim and Thummim, held in the high-priest's breastpiece, often were to give battle instructions. The book of Psalms picks up the theme of conflict and often celebrates at various points the victory God has given or will give. The prophet Elisha

enlists the services of a harpist-minstrel in order to aid a Judah-Israel-Edom coalition in a major battle against Mesha, king of Moab (2 Kings 3), and the Chronicler often writes a sort of eschatological history, eternity already invading time. For example, in 2 Chronicles 20, in a battle against Moab and Ammon, King Jehoshaphat fields an army in the form of a chanting temple choir, and the enemy is routed. Such a pericope probably reflects the empirical side of ancient warfare but implies a suprahistorical component as well. In the New Testament, Revelation 4 ushers us into a worship scene, but what unfolds in apocalyptic language is martial to the core.

Much biblical parenesis uses battle metaphors, perhaps most famously 1 Thessalonians 5:8: "Put on the breastplate of faith and love and for a helmet the hope of salvation." Both *Lutheran Worship* and *Lutheran Service Book* have an entire section captioned "the church militant," the former beginning with "A Mighty Fortress."²² Thoughtless use of war and worship language might produce the ultimate oxymoron, or even encourage some jingoistic chauvinism, but if deployed correctly it may aid the worshippers in remembering what their Christian worship and life are all about. At worship, Christian warriors celebrate the victory already won on Calvary and are empowered to continue to "fight the good fight" until the end (1 Tim 6:12; cf. 2 Tim 4:7).

At the center of the verticality of Old Testament worship is, of course, the altar, so much so that the Bible almost takes it for granted. There is no recorded command to start building altars, and never is there any real discussion of their significance as such. The Hebrew word *מִזְבֵּחַ* is purely functional in meaning, signifying simply a place for sacrifice. There are plausible arguments suggesting that the altar was thought of as a "miniature mountain of God," a place symbolically closer to heaven and thus a natural place to communicate with God. Ezekiel's word for "altar" is *הַהָרְיָאֵל*, "mountain of God," written as one word (Ezek 43:15-16), and may be an alternate form of the enigmatic *אַרְיֵאֵל* applied to Jerusalem in Isaiah 29:1 (traditionally often translated "lion of God," which makes no sense in the context, whereas "mountain of God" might). This is partly speculation, and, if so, the Bible never develops the idea. It may belong

²² For the hymns on the church militant, see *Lutheran Worship*, #297-305, and *Lutheran Service Book*, #655-669 ("A Mighty Fortress" is #656). There was no separate section for the church militant in *The Lutheran Hymnal* (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1941); "A Mighty Fortress" (#262) was among the hymns listed under the heading of "Reformation."

more to the study of the history of religions, where there are many parallels, than to biblical theology.

The smoke of the sacrifice, together with incense, are partly objectified "sacramental" forms of prayer, and forgiveness of sins is explicitly promised to the believer through them, not *ex opere operata*, but in prospect of Christ's all-availing sacrifice. It is repeatedly described as a "pleasing smell" to God—language that could be misunderstood as the pagan notion of pacifying or propitiating an angry deity but in biblical context must be understood as eucharistic in intent, a God-pleasing way of expressing thanksgiving. The metaphor continues to be used in the New Testament, both of Christ's sacrifice and of "sacrificial" Christian living.

One pericope that clearly depicts the intimate vertical connection between altars and heaven is that of the annunciation of Samson in Judges 13. The heavenly messenger, (the angel of) Yahweh, will not tell Manoah and his wife his name, but only that it is פִּלְאִי ("wonder/miracle/sign"—a word closely related to the semantic field of "type"). Neither will he join them in a meal. He will only accept a burnt-offering, and, when they make one, he ascends into heaven in the flame and disappears.

Most Old Testament mention of altars concerns those in the tabernacle/temple.²³ How important altars were is seen in the fact that the shrines contained two of them. The large "bronze altar" at the center of the outer courtyard was the focal point of most of the activity around the structures. There was also the "golden altar," the altar of incense, at the foot of the steps leading into the holy of holies, where Yahweh sat enthroned in his "house" between the wings of the cherubim above the Ark. That same vertical correspondence with heaven is evidenced by the fact that the Ark can be labeled both God's throne and his footstool, depending on perspective. The two perspectives are also reflected in the tendency to use the verb שָׁכַן of Yahweh's "incarnational" presence on earth (consider the derivative noun, "Shekinah," sometimes used later of Christ and/or the Holy Spirit) and a different verb, יָשַׁב, of his enthronement in heaven.

The book of Exodus shows the importance of the tabernacle by devoting nearly half its space to the subject and, in effect, covers the entire subject twice. First, in Exodus 25–30, God commands Moses in some detail how to construct the tabernacle and its appurtenances (imperatives =

²³ I shall treat these two structures together, because, except for dimensions, they are virtually identical.

"prescriptive") and then, in Exodus 35–40, repeats almost verbatim how Moses obeyed (indicative = "descriptive").

That entire section is introduced, however, by the command that the construction of the tabernacle should follow the תְּבִינָה, the pattern, that God will show him (Exod 25:9). The command is repeated in Exodus 25:40. The word, a derivative of בָּנָה, "build," is usually translated "pattern," "model," or "blueprint." Use of the word "see," however, indicates a vision of a completed structure, not merely a blueprint. The Septuagint renders it with τύπος. Just how the heavenly counterpart of the tabernacle and all its components would look or function on the second story defies human comprehension and simply must be put in the "anthropomorphic" category.

That, however, is not the point of the word or the verses. The direction is from heaven to earth, not the other way around. It does not intend to reveal heavenly mysteries but to validate the earthly structure and its rites. That is why the term "typology" is preeminently appropriate. Without the heavenly word, command, and model, tabernacle and temple were both nothing more than human structures, each with parallels in the pagan world. It is the same principle as with horizontal typology or prophecy: Apart from revelation and divine validation, we have nothing but impotent human words, works, and hopes.

So pivotal was this principle of reflection of a heavenly prototype that it is repeated when the temple replaces the tabernacle (1 Chr 28:19; strangely absent from the Kings text). Stephen refers to it in his sermon before his martyrdom (Acts 7:44), and the author of Hebrews cites it in his argument for the superiority of the new covenant (Heb 8:5). Both use the word τύπος, although Hebrews uses τύπος for the heavenly model and ἀντίτυπος for the earthly copy (the latter also called ὑπόδειγμα, "image," and σκιά, "shadow"). Other references appear in the OT Apocrypha and OT Pseudepigrapha, as well as in rabbinic thought. It was commonplace in the thought of the ancient Near East.

Often the significance of the temple is extended to the entire city of Jerusalem/Zion. The two names are somewhat interchangeable, but often "Jerusalem" is simply the name of another city, whereas "Zion" depicts an elect, holy city, the capital of a spiritual kingdom (often so used in messianic contexts).²⁴ The eternal significance of the "city of God," as Augustine called it, is never explicitly expressed in typological terms, but

²⁴ Compare the fair number of contemporary churches called "Zion," but none "Jerusalem," to the best of my knowledge.

Augustine called it, is never explicitly expressed in typological terms, but both the vertical and the horizontal dimensions of the concept are clearly present. When Sennacherib was threatening Jerusalem in Hezekiah's day, Isaiah proclaims "the inviolability of Zion," an umbrella which in that case also covers the earthly city. The term came to be misunderstood as "the inviolability of Jerusalem" in a political and military sense, so a century later both Jeremiah and Ezekiel have to preach "*Ierusalem delenda est*" if it did not repent. Ezekiel expresses it in terms of the *קְבוֹר*, God's "incarnational presence" in the city. When the *קְבוֹר* forsakes the city and resides on the Mount of Olives (Ezekiel 11), Jerusalem is only another city of wood and stone, ripe for destruction. Yet God's promises will not be permanently thwarted. In Ezekiel 43, it is prophesied that the *קְבוֹר* will return to the new Jerusalem, described in semi-apocalyptic terms, that is, in God's good time, perhaps only eschatologically but certainly nonetheless. So it is of the Christian churches: Individual structures and church bodies may fall, but "the gates of hell shall not prevail" against the church itself (Matt 16:18).

Some of the psalms, often called "Hymns of Zion," describe Jerusalem in supra-historical terms, often employing ex-mythological language to describe Zion's universal and cosmic significance. For example, consider Psalm 46 with its "river," the starting point of "A Mighty Fortress," or Psalm 48's "in the far north." Some other hymns follow them, for example, "Glorious Things of Thee Are Spoken."²⁵

Does this really change in the New Testament? "Jerusalem" loses its physical or geographical sense, but as "Zion" it still remains the "navel" or "center" of the whole earth in a theological sense.²⁶ Jesus often tells his unconvinced disciples that he "must" (*δεῖ*) go up to Jerusalem; *ἀνάγκη*, "necessity," is laid upon him. The Son of Man can suffer and die nowhere but in Jerusalem. Why? Because he (Israel reduced to one) must recapitulate and consummate the journey of Israel through the wilderness to the promised land and Zion—but, of course, his victory will be accomplished by his death and resurrection. Similarly, the sacrifices and the Old Testament ordinances were commanded to be performed *לְעוֹלָם*, "forever," but Christ is the *עוֹלָם*, the essence of time and space, virtually *עוֹלָם* itself, and so he becomes the climactic and pivotal sacrifice.

²⁵ "Glorious Things of Thee Are Spoken," *The Lutheran Hymnal*, #469; in *Lutheran Worship*, #294, and *Lutheran Service Book*, #648, "You" replaced "Thee" in the title.

²⁶ Mediaeval cartographers often depicted Jerusalem as the center of the whole earth.

The tendency to present the antitypes (and the fulfillment) as though they "dead-end" in Christ is unfortunate. In one sense, however, it is proper and an essential part of the gospel: *τετέλεσται!* Easter was the *τέλος*. In principle, there is no more to come. Apart from this "omega point," typology would have no anchor or ultimate referent. There is also the "not yet." Even the AD calendar expresses the "now-but-not-yet" paradox. The Church awaits a "second coming," although in the New Testament itself the distinction is semi-artificial. The "end of the ages" (*τὰ τέλη τῶν αἰώνων*) has come upon Christians (1 Cor 10:11), but the day and hour of the end no one knows. This paradox is also expressed in the Old Testament: prophecies which were fulfilled in Christ and those still awaited are often telescoped or juxtaposed.

While this may be playing with words somewhat, it is also part of the gospel that these promises are "fulfilled" in the Church. This is the role usually associated with the Holy Spirit, who buries the Christian with Christ into his death in the waters of Baptism and nurtures that new life in preaching and the Eucharist. In Christ, he brings the church out of Egypt, "the house of bondage," and through the wilderness of the futile "search for God" to Zion, although from another perspective the journey is not yet complete. Hebrews 12:12 emphasizes the "already": "You *have* come to Mount Zion, and to the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem, and to innumerable angels in festal gathering, and to the assembly of the first-born who are enrolled in heaven." Presumably, Paul has something like this in mind when he counsels that a woman at worship should have a veil on her head "because of the angels" (1 Cor 11:2-16).²⁷ Similarly in Galatians 4:25-31, Paul writes that home is in the Jerusalem above, which is free, and she is our mother; we, like Isaac, are children of promise.²⁸

There is still another phase of the fulfillment: "the fulfillment of the fulfillment," the consummation, the second coming, the parousia. As mentioned, Old Testament Messianic and eschatological prophecies demand the inclusion of this final dimension. This is not a theme which suffers from overuse in the Church's preaching, not even at the end of the church year (a sort of liturgical "type" of the second coming), or in Advent,

²⁷ See the "angels" of the seven churches in Revelation 1-3, possibly patrons or guardians and reflected in traditional names of churches.

²⁸ I have often wondered whether in their own context the Masoretes did not have some such vertical typology in mind by consistently using the *qere perpetuum* of pointing Jerusalem as a dual (ירושלים), although the consonanted text has the *yodh* of the dual ending only 5 times, mostly in very late texts, and the Septuagint plainly heard the Kethiv's *-ēm* ending as reflected in the New Testament and virtually all other non-Hebraic texts.

which is not intended to be limited to our Lord's first coming. No wonder pastors seem not to know what to make of the many judgment oracles in the prophets; they largely solve that problem by ignoring it.

Should it be different in principle with vertical typology? Can it biblically be limited to when he came "down" and took upon himself human flesh? Does he not constantly come down in the means of grace? The temple built with stones was destroyed, but Christ describes himself as the antitype of the temple. If one does not, in good Protestant fashion, misunderstand the New Testament descriptions of the church as the "body of Christ" as mere metaphors, then it will be easier to understand and resist merely institutional or individualistic understandings of what "church" means. Likewise with *κοινωνία* or fellowship. Likewise also with "land"; the Church has no "holy land" in the literal sense as fulfillment of Old Testament land prophecies, but rather a "kingdom," for which she prays constantly in the second petition of the Lord's Prayer. Ironically, one never has difficulty with "land" when heaven is its antitype. Bodies are described as temples of the Holy Spirit (1 Cor 6:15) or "lively stones" (1 Pet 2:4). Logical priority is given to the *Christus pro nobis* (justification), but not at the expense of the *Christus in nobis* (the "mystical union"). When all is fulfilled, John on Patmos sees "the holy city, new Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God" (Rev 21:2), but he "saw no temple in the city, for its temple is the Lord God the Almighty and the Lamb" (Rev 21:22). Virtually all biblical ecclesiology is contained in such language, and it should pervade the self-understanding and deportment of each congregation as well as of the entire "communion of saints."

As the altar was central in the tabernacle/temple, so it is in churches. Architecturally little is known of altars in the earliest Christianity, but the New Testament clearly uses the word as a virtual synonym of church. In 1 Corinthians 10:18–22, the "cup/table of the Lord" is contrasted with meat sacrificed on pagan altars. Similarly, Hebrews 13:10 says "we have an altar" in contrast to pagan sacrifices. In Revelation chapters 6, 8, and 9, John uses tabernacle/temple language, but the application is plainly to the New Testament, where a heavenly temple is pictured as continuing to be a *תִּבְנִית*, a *τύπος* of the Christian church.

It is no accident that, for the most part, only churches which confess a "Sacrament of the Altar" have an altar at the center of the chancel, and the choir is not seated behind a reading desk as though giving a concert but

somewhere out of sight, so that the focus is on altar and pulpit.²⁹ Wherever placed, it is no accident that it is the so-called "liturgical churches" which make altars central. Administration of the Eucharist (as somewhat also of Baptism) even in its barest form is a rite and naturally attracts other rites, as it apparently did in the earliest evidence available to us from the early church. The basic shape of that liturgy has endured now some two millennia with surprisingly little change. Few, indeed, are the individuals with both the biblical-theological and literary ability to write anything matching it. The details may be "adiaphora" (a drastically and radically overused and abused term today), but, as is evident already in Formula of Concord X, this is hardly license to abandon it and become virtual Baptists or Pentecostals. Some of what one observes in many "contemporary" services can hardly be described as anything but "useless, foolish spectacles, which are not beneficial for good order, Christian discipline, or evangelical decorum in the church" (FC SD X, 7).

V. Application to Christian Worship

The application of biblical principles to Christian worship today is no easy task. First, whatever might be the merit of suggestions made in the abstract, it is the pastors on the front lines who will have to test and implement them. Second, there are simply a staggering number of variables to take into account. No two congregations are alike, and no pastor is a clone of another. Then there are the special problems posed by ethnic groups, the number of which, at least in larger cities, seems almost legion. It would be foolhardy not to try to accommodate some of their unique cultural traits, but, in addition to doctrinal concerns, there is such a thing as a Lutheran "culture" or ethos. The relation between "cult" (=liturgy) and cultures is not merely etymological. Any vibrant religion or tradition is bound to be culture-creating,³⁰ although, undoubtedly, with some adiaphorous influences from the national or ethnic culture. An example is Russia, where the Lutheran churches follow the traditional liturgy quite faithfully, but where chanting and incense do not pose the problems they would in the United States. The elements of the liturgy—

²⁹ I personally prefer an eastward altar with its "sacramental" and "sacrificial" postures because of the explicit reverence shown to our Lord who really presides over the service. Nor am I impressed by round churches with an altar in the middle, both because of the excessive focus it seems to place on the human presider and because of the distraction of watching people opposite you.

³⁰ Jaroslav Jan Pelikan referred to tradition as "the living faith of the dead"; see *The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine*, vol. 1, *The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 9.

and, in some cases, *The Lutheran Hymnal* (TLH) simply translated—are not all that impossible to introduce, although one must “make haste slowly.”

To really address the problems of the erosion or perversion of worship it is necessary to take another look at the entire educational enterprise. Worship is not essentially didactic, but it presupposes a thoroughly informed clergy and laity. The primary responsibility is that of the seminaries, and that problem is just beginning to be addressed. The pattern has been one short course, mostly on liturgical etiquette, no electives on the subject, and no advanced degree programs. Those who taught the subject were usually trained primarily in music, which, naturally, remained their major interest. This is in glaring contrast to the great amount of attention paid to homiletics, which is not to be criticized as such but only the gross imbalance. No wonder that when the liturgy of the Saxon German services disappeared, there was a great vacuum. For a time *TLH* brought some external liturgical unity, but with little real comprehension or appreciation, and with a pervasive anti-Catholic animus; no wonder the siren call of American evangelism, recently centered especially in Pasadena, with its specious promises of “church growth” through the use of “user-friendly” services, so-called “praise songs,” and the like, proved to be irresistible to many, and that battle continues.

Parallel to adequate training of the clergy must be thorough catechesis of the laity. One still hears alarming reports of the abbreviation of time devoted to instruction of both adult converts and young catechumens. The Roman Catholic Church seems to have considerable success with its “Rite of Christian Initiation for Adults” (RCIA) program, where other adult members serve as “sponsors” until the initiate is ready for confirmation. This program has rarely been adopted by Lutherans. The Lutheran educational system could be used to better advantage. Sunday school children are all too often taught to sing silly ditties which will never be heard again instead of being introduced to the treasury of great hymns and a liturgy they may use all their lives. Sometimes it seems to be little better when full-time day schools are maintained. Similarly, choirs may edify with an unfamiliar piece when they might better aid the congregation in learning hymns and chants which could be used repeatedly.

In summary, the church needs to communicate better both the “Paradise on Earth” (vertical typology) and “Paradise Restored” (horizontal) dimensions of worship. Somehow it must be communicated that when the worshippers enter the sanctuary they have momentarily left ordinary time and space. Christians really are in *God’s* “house”! Although rooted in a different culture and spared the ravages of the Enlightenment

and the iconoclastic tendencies of many Reformation churches, no church does this better today than the Eastern Orthodox Church. The reputed reaction of Vladimir's envoys from Kiev still rings true: in contrast to synagogues or mosques, the envoys reported that when they visited churches they felt uncertain whether they were on earth or in heaven. That such an external context is in the service of a theology which Lutherans could never own as "orthodox" is a reminder it cannot stand alone as a vehicle of a pure gospel, but many aspects of it would certainly not detract and would probably contribute and enrich, if properly explained and understood.

If the proper kind of "superhistoricality" is to be established, it must begin with the worshippers' realization that they are standing on "holy ground," that is, that they come as unworthy and unclean who have no right to enter except through confession and absolution, both private and corporate. A baptismal font situated in the narthex would constantly remind how and where the Christian was first and must be continuously "reborn."

The architecture and furnishings of the church play a role. There is much to love in the biblical phrase "the beauty of holiness" (Pss 29:2, 96:9; 1 Cor 16:29; 2 Cor 20:21). There is a theoretical danger here of theatricality or of aestheticism, but that danger is slight. Even the most makeshift worship space can be partially transformed by judicious use of banners. Vestments, paraments, and stained glass windows—especially if a cryptographer is not needed to understand them—contribute. Candles signify Christ as "light of the world." Incense and chanting characterize something not of everyday time and space. A prominent crucifix highlights the "theology of the cross." A bare cross will do, but not as well, and still reflects the Reformed iconoclasm which substituted them. Many will know of older churches which almost unfailingly had at least a statue of Christ in the reredos and often some or all of the apostles as well. The barren "less is more" ideal of the Reformed seems to have overtaken most Lutheran church architects, so that often few externals differentiate Lutheran from Protestant churches. Finally, "the abomination of desolation . . . standing in the holy place" (Matt 24:15; see Mark 13: 14), that is, the American flag, should be expelled from the sanctuary. Perhaps so soon after 9/11 is not the time to emphasize it, but it signals a confusion of throne and altar, of civic religion and an awareness that our true citizenship is in heaven. If a church wishes to demonstrate its patriotism—an unobjectionable idea as such—the flag and other patriotic emblems can be displayed many other places on the church premises.

In discussing the text of the ordinary of the liturgy, one should concentrate on the Sanctus and the words which introduce it: "together with angels and archangels and all the company of heaven." In the liturgy earth joins heaven to glorify God. The *Te Deum* expresses this well:

We praise you, O God; we acknowledge You to be the Lord. All the earth now worships You, the Father everlasting. To You all angels cry aloud, the heavens and all the pow'rs therein. To You cherubim and seraphim continually do cry: Holy, holy, holy, Lord God of Sabaoth; heaven and earth are full of the majesty of Your glory. The glorious company of the apostles praise You. The goodly fellowship of the prophets praise You. The noble army of martyrs praise You. The holy Church throughout all the world does acknowledge You. . . .³¹

Even if the Service of the Word is entirely spoken, the familiar chant tones at the beginning of the Anaphora ("rising"/"raising"), which almost immediately exhorts us to "*sursum corda*," "lift up your hearts," are uplifting. The LCMS continues to impoverish itself by rejecting eucharistic prayers, as though it needs to repristinate precisely the Reformation battles and as though thoroughly evangelical ones could not be composed which would not compromise *solus Christus* and *sola gratia*. After a short doxology, most eucharistic prayers, in obedience to the Lord's command in the Words of Institution, "remember" not only Christ's death and resurrection but also his second coming (as though it were past) in the anamnesis, thus transposing the order of historical time and ushering the congregation into transhistorical time. The form of most eucharistic prayers holds the whole history of salvation—including the Old Testament—before the believer, suggesting by words or concepts taken from the Bible how the Bible is to be understood from Genesis to Revelation, from creation to "the time for establishing all that God spoke by the mouth of his holy prophets" (Acts 3:21; ἀποκαταστάσεως πάντων).

Isaiah heard the seraphic choir sing the Trisagion in the eighth century BC (Isa 6:1–3), and toward the end of the first century AD John saw four living creatures seated around the heavenly throne who "*never cease to sing, 'Holy, holy, holy'*" (Rev 4:8). The only possible non-rationalistic explanation for the similar reports is that the seraphim had been singing the hymn without interruption over the intervening eight hundred years. The prayers introducing the Sanctus emphasize that, if the angels praise God without ceasing, what they do is the *telos* toward which everything else tends. Singing the Sanctus will not someday be replaced by something else. They are words on loan from the heavenly choirs and give a sampling

³¹ *Lutheran Service Book*, 223.

of what will occupy the church throughout eternity. Already now they allow Christians to discern the intimate link between the worship offered on earth and the liturgy of eternity. The present worship of the Christian on earth is a sort of apprenticeship for what is to come. Faces are turned toward God, not toward society. Any instrumental approach to the liturgy, for example, for outreach or for catechesis, misunderstands the doxological essence of what a vertical typology can teach, that it is not primarily intended to edify man but to contemplate and thank the Triune God and what the Son came *down* to do "for us men and for our salvation."

Thus, the worshiper is reminded of the upper track of history, of *real* history, and his thoughts are oriented toward the eschatological convergence of the two tracks into which the savior initiates him. Even someone who wanders in off the street might, pray God, sense that a double church is present,³² and through the "poor lisping, stammering tongues" of the congregation might hear, if only as an echo in the distance, the thunderous sound of the church above joining the angels in singing, "Holy, holy, holy."³³

³² Origen speaks of a "double church" of men and angels in *On Prayer* 31.5 in *Origen: An Exhortation to Martyrdom, Prayer and Selected Works*, trans. Rowan A. Greer, The Classics of Western Spirituality (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), 167.

³³ See, Robert Louis Wilken, "With Angels and Archangels," *Pro Ecclesia* 10 (2001): 460-474.

Darwin at 200 and the Challenge of Intelligent Design

Paul A. Zimmerman

Charles Darwin was born on February 12, 1809, in Shrewsbury, England, the same day Abraham Lincoln was born. Without a doubt each bicentennial will be observed and receive widespread attention. The July 7, 2008 issue of *Newsweek* already anticipated this celebration.¹ Even after many years, Darwin continues to command interest. Darwin is revered by many today as a "secular saint."² *The Origin of Species* has been called "the greatest scientific book of all time."³ No doubt his praises will be sung loud and long. It will be declared with great emphasis that evolution is a proven fact. The doctrine of creation will be described as simply a religious myth. In fact, both of the foregoing statements are themselves untrue. The purpose of this essay is to speak of Darwin and his theory of evolution with special emphasis on the status of Darwinism today. As we shall see, modern science has challenged Darwinian evolution and supported a concept known as "intelligent design."⁴

Darwin's father was a wealthy physician, and his grandfather, Erasmus Darwin, wrote books often regarded as harbingers of his grandson's theory of evolution. In his early days, Darwin gave thought to the study of medicine. His father wanted him to prepare for the ministry. The young Darwin, however, was interested in the study of nature. He collected and studied beetles for years. The turning point in his life came when he was appointed to serve as a naturalist—without pay—on the scientific vessel, the *H. M. S. Beagle*. This ship explored the east and west coasts of South America from November 27, 1831, to October 2, 1836.

¹ Malcolm Jones, "Who Was More Important: Lincoln or Darwin?" *Newsweek*, July 7, 2008, <http://www.newsweek.com/id/143742>.

² For example, see Janet Browne, *Darwin's Origin of the Species: A Biography* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006), 116.

³ See, for example, Edward O. Wilson, introduction to *On the Origin of Species*, by Charles Darwin, in *From So Simple a Beginning: Darwin's Four Great Books*, ed. Edward O. Wilson (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2006), 437.

⁴ William A. Dembski, *The Design Revolution: Answering the Toughest Questions about Intelligent Design* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2004), 147.

A result of studying animal life during the long voyage was his five-volume work titled *The Zoology of the Voyage of H. M. S. Beagle* (1840–1843). The book that made him famous was *The Origin of Species*, published November 24, 1859. *The Origin of Species* was immensely popular. The theory of organic evolution was not new with Darwin but originated around 700 BC in Ionian Greece. In Darwin's day, several other scientists also published their ideas about evolution. Herbert Spencer (1820–1903), an English philosopher, proposed a complete evolutionist theory just prior to Darwin's publication of *The Origin of Species*. Spencer was the first to use the phrase "the survival of the fittest."⁵ Darwin's book, however, was the most popular. It reportedly sold out on the day of its publication.

Reaction to Darwin's book was divided. A clergyman labeled Darwin as the most dangerous man in England.⁶ Today things are different. Many theologians accept the theory of evolution without question.⁷ They simply say that evolution was God's method of creating. This surrender is based on the erroneous idea that evolution is a proven scientific fact. They fail to recognize the incompatibility of the naturalistic philosophy, which underlies evolution, with Holy Scripture. First, I shall let Darwin speak for himself; then we shall turn to the status of evolutionary theory today as it faces the challenge of intelligent design.

I. Darwin's Theory and Modern Science

Darwin believed that changed conditions in life produced variability in a given species. He had no idea what produced the changes but apparently believed that something in the environment or way of life produces an advantageous change in a given organism. This would result in the changed organism living and producing better than its previous form. This is the principle of the survival of the fittest. He theorized that as variations accumulated a new variety would be produced, then a new species, finally followed by the transformation of one major type of plant or animal life into another. Thus pure chance replaces the Creator.

⁵ Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Biology*, 2 vols. (London: Williams and Norgate, 1864), 1:444.

⁶ This description is found in a letter of Roland Trimen, see Edward Bagnall Poulton, *Charles Darwin and The Origin of Species: Addresses, Etc., in America and England in the Year of the Two Anniversaries* (London and New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1909), 214; see also, Charles Darwin, *The Correspondence of Charles Darwin*, vol. 11, 1863, ed. Frederick Burkhardt and Sydney Smith (New York and Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 102–104, especially 104 n. 11.

⁷ See George L. Murphy, "A Theological Argument for Evolution," *Journal of the American Scientific Affiliation* 38 (1986): 19–26.

In *The Origin of Species*, Darwin wrote, "This principle of preservation of the survival of the fittest I have called Natural Selection. It leads to the improvement of each creature in relation of its organic and inorganic conditions of life, and consequently, in most cases what must be regarded as an advance in organization."⁸ All animals descended from at most only four or five progenitors, and plants from an equal or lesser number. Darwin repeatedly stated that he had no use for a Creator in this process. Yet faced with the problem of the origin of life from non-living material, he did concede, "There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one."⁹

Darwin's theory of evolutionary processes required vast periods of time to be effective. He was encouraged by the publication of Charles Lyell's *Principles of Geology* thirty years before *The Origin of Species* was written.¹⁰ Lyell's theory of great ages for the various rock strata provided Darwin with the time required for his theory. Nonetheless, a basic problem threatened Darwin's theory then and now. His theory postulated a truly enormous number of intermediate forms as change took place; however, these intermediate forms could not be found in the geological record. Darwin recognized the difficulty: "This is, perhaps, the most obvious and serious objection which can be urged against the theory. The explanation I believe is in the extreme imperfection of the geological record."¹¹ Today, a century and a half later, the intermediate forms are still missing.

Darwin's theory lacked crucial evidence. Its appeal to a naturalistic, materialistic philosophy of science made it hugely popular. Thomas Woodward, a proponent of Intelligent Design, recently wrote, "Darwin was the key figure in world history who cemented the transition to fully naturalistic science."¹² Woodward explains that natural law, or chance, are the only allowable types of explanations for living forms for the naturalist. A designer, or God, is arbitrarily ruled out, since it moves the question outside science. Richard Dawkins, a noted Oxford Darwinist, asserts, "Darwin made it possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist."¹³

⁸ Charles Darwin, *The Origin of Species* (New York: Modern Library, 1998), 168.

⁹ Darwin, *The Origin of Species*, 649.

¹⁰ Charles Lyell, *Principles of Geology*, 3 vols. (London: John Murray, 1830–1833).

¹¹ Darwin, *The Origin of Species*, 406.

¹² Thomas Woodward, *Darwin Strikes Back: Defending the Science of Intelligent Design* (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2006), 187.

¹³ Richard Dawkins, *The Blind Watchmaker: Why the Evidence of Evolution Reveals a Universe without Design* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1996), 6.

Microevolution versus Macroevolution

How then is it possible for biology textbooks to assert that evolution is a proven fact? The answer lies in the proper distinction between what is called microevolution and macroevolution. Taxonomists divide the realm of living organisms into groups. The most comprehensive groups are called phyla; the smallest groups are called species. Between species and phyla, the ascending order is species, genus, family, order, class, sub-phylum, and phylum. There is no dispute over the fact that species may adapt to their environment or even that there may be a change in gene structure brought about by mutations. Thus bacteria may develop a resistance to certain chemicals. This is called microevolution. There is evidence for this, but it remains unproven that all the phyla and subclasses developed from one original life form. It is also important to note that Genesis refers to God creating various "kinds" of plants and animals. In each case it is recorded that he created them after their *kind*. "Kind" is a translation of the Hebrew noun *מין*, and it may also be translated as "division" or "class." It is broader than the taxonomic term "species." In Leviticus 11:13-19, ceremonially unclean birds are listed according to "kinds." For example, the hawk is referred to as a "kind." In modern science, however, the hawk is listed as a super-family that contains many species. The Bible does not say that no new species may arise. A great deal of the so-called evidence for evolution falls into this category. Microevolution is not in conflict with the biblical creation account.

The Impact of Modern Biochemistry

Biochemists have discovered that the cells which make up the bodies of living organisms are far from the simple structures that early researchers imagined. For example, consider the fertilized egg in a human embryo. Human life begins with an egg too small for the human eye to see. Yet it contains chemicals which direct the growth of the embryo so that it develops into a complete human being with a complex physical structure and a brain far more complicated than a computer. The principal director in this drama is a chemical commonly known as DNA, which stands for deoxyribonucleic acid. This chemical is among the largest and most complicated of all the biological macromolecules. Some DNA molecules comprise more than 100 billion nucleotides or units. In 1953, James Watson and Francis Crick used x-ray studies to determine that DNA consists of two strands that wrap around each other to produce a double helix. Segments of the DNA are called genes. DNA directs the cell's development and replication. When a part of the chain is damaged, a mutation is produced. This affects the cell, producing death, damage, or change in the organism. This is the agency for change in species. The huge challenge that

faces evolutionists, however, is how such an exquisite mechanism, far more complicated than any computer program, developed by chance from non-living material. It is not reasonable to think that it just happened; rather, it is rational to think that the complexity of nature points to a designer.

William Dembski, a leader in the intelligent design movement, wrote, "According to the theory of intelligent design, the specified complexity exhibited in living forms convincingly demonstrates that blind natural forces could not by themselves have produced these forms but that their emergence also required the contribution of a designing intelligence."¹⁴

II. Intelligent Design's Challenge to Evolution

From the last decades of the twentieth century to the present, intelligent design has gained momentum.¹⁵ It is an origin theory that argues that biological structures of life are too complex to have arisen out of random mutation or natural selection and that this complexity suggests the influence of an intelligent cause. Supporters of intelligent design argue that complex organs such as the eyes or digestive systems could not have evolved piecemeal but require the entire system in order to function.

The modern push for intelligent design as an alternative to evolutionary theory began with the publication of *The Mystery of Life's Origin* in 1984.¹⁶ Among its arguments advanced was the problem of DNA. Since DNA depends upon proteins for its functioning and proteins depend upon DNA and RNA for their own assembly, there exists the ultimate chicken-and-egg question as to which came first. The authors also advanced arguments against a living cell being produced by chance in a prebiotic soup.

¹⁴ Dembski, *The Design Revolution*, 147.

¹⁵ The concept of intelligent design is not new. It has existed in one form or another since the days of the ancient Greek philosophers. The term "intelligent design" as an alternative to blind evolution has been credited to F. C. S. Schiller who used it as early as 1897; see Schiller, "Darwinism and Design," in *Humanism: Philosophical Essays*, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan and Co., 1912), 128 and 141. Darwin, *Evolution, and Creation*, written on the occasion of the centennial of the publication of Darwin's *The Origin of Species*, devotes several pages to "Evidence of Design"; see Paul A. Zimmerman, "The Evidence for Creation," in *Darwin, Evolution, and Creation*, ed. Paul A. Zimmerman (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1959), 85-88.

¹⁶ Charles B. Thaxton, Walter L. Bradley, and Roger L. Olsen, *The Mystery of Life's Origin: Reassessing Current Theories* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1984). The authors were a materials scientist (Walter Bradley), a geochemist (Roger Olsen), and a chemist and historian (Charles Thaxton).

The next year, 1985, Michael Denton, an Australian-New Zealand expert in human molecular genetics, published *Evolution: A Theory in Crisis*.¹⁷ He followed this with *Nature's Destiny: How the Laws of Biology Reveal Purpose in the Universe* in 1998.¹⁸ Denton argues against the logic of Richard Dawkins, one of the staunchest defenders of Darwinism today. Dawkins asserts, "Provided we postulate a sufficiently large series of sufficiently finely graded intermediates, we shall be able to derive anything from anything else."¹⁹ Denton called this argument "unrealistic not only because of the functional restraints problem, but also because there are several cases where there are biophysical barriers to particular transformations, and in such cases, no matter how many intermediates we might like to propose, there is simply no gradual route across."²⁰ Denton's argument is directed against Darwinian Theory as it exists today. He also describes the phenomenal complexity of the human brain, which contains one billion nerve cells. Each cell makes between ten thousand and one hundred thousand connections with other cells, which amounts to a total of one quadrillion connections for the whole brain. Such a marvelous mechanism surely points to design. It could not just come into being by chance!

Phillip Johnson, sometimes called the father of intelligent design,²¹ is a retired Berkeley law professor who wrote an analysis of Darwinism called *Darwin on Trial*.²² Johnson's thesis is that, judged from the point of view of logic and the accepted canons of scientific research, Darwinism is severely lacking in confirmatory evidence. He asks if Darwinism itself has become a kind of faith, a pseudoscience held by its devotees in spite of, rather than because of, the evidence. He also points to the fantastic complexity of living organisms. Johnson writes,

The simplest organism capable of independent life, the prokaryote bacterial cell, is a masterpiece of miniaturized complexity which makes a spaceship seem rather low tech. Even if one assumes something much

¹⁷ Michael J. Denton, *Evolution: A Theory in Crisis* (Bethesda, MD: Adler & Adler, 1986).

¹⁸ Michael J. Denton, *Nature's Destiny: How the Laws of Biology Reveal Purpose in the Universe* (New York: Free Press, 1998).

¹⁹ Richard Dawkins, *The Blind Watchmaker* (London: Longman Scientific, 1986), 317–318.

²⁰ Denton, *Nature's Destiny*, 331.

²¹ For example, Robert B. Stewart, "Introduction: What Are We Talking About?" in *Intelligent Design: William A. Dembski and Michael Ruse in Dialogue*, ed. Robert B. Stewart (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007), 2.

²² Phillip E. Johnson, *Darwin on Trial* (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 1991).

simpler than a bacterial cell might suffice to start Darwinist evolution on its way—a DNA or RNA macromolecule, for example—the possibility that such a complex entity could assemble itself by chance is still fantastically unlikely, even if billions of years had been available.²³

The avalanche of books critical of evolution and supportive of intelligent design continued. Jonathan Wells—who has doctorates in molecular biology from the University of California at Berkeley and in theology from Yale—published *Icons of Evolution: Science or Myth?* in 2000.²⁴ He examines ten classical “proofs” or “icons” of evolution commonly found in biology textbooks. The icons include the 1953 Miller-Urey experiment, which attempted to demonstrate that lightning acting on gases in a primitive atmosphere could have produced the building blocks of living cells, the hypothetical evolutionary tree of life constructed from fossil and molecular evidence, and Archaeopteryx, a fossil bird claimed to be the missing link between reptiles and modern birds. Wells maintains that all these famous icons in one way or another misrepresent the truth. He states, “Some of these icons of evolution present assumptions or hypotheses as though they were observed facts. . . . Others conceal raging controversies among biologists that have far-reaching implications for evolutionary theory. Worst of all, some are directly contrary to well-established scientific evidence.”²⁵ Wells, along with other writers, also makes the following point: “The truth is that a surprising number of biologists quietly doubt or reject some of the grander claims of Darwin’s evolution. But—at least in America—they must keep their mouths shut or risk condemnation, marginalization, and eventual expulsion from the scientific community.”²⁶

One of the most influential proponents of intelligent design theory is Michael Behe, a biochemistry professor at Lehigh University in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. His book *Darwin’s Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution* was published in 1996.²⁷ His second book, *The Edge of Evolution: The Search for the Limits of Darwinism*, appeared in 2007.²⁸ Both books mount a devastating attack on Darwinism in its original and modern

²³ Johnson, *Darwin on Trial*, 103.

²⁴ Jonathan Wells, *Icons of Evolution: Science or Myth? Why Much of What We Teach about Evolution Is Wrong* (Washington, D. C.: Regnery, 2000).

²⁵ Wells, *Icons of Evolution*, 7.

²⁶ Wells, *Icons of Evolution*, 239.

²⁷ Michael J. Behe, *Darwin’s Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution* (New York: Free Press, 1996).

²⁸ Michael J. Behe, *The Edge of Evolution: The Search for the Limits of Darwinism* (New York: Free Press, 2007).

forms. According to Behe, while it was once believed that the basis of life would be exceedingly simple, progress in understanding the chemistry of life has revealed that biological functions are fantastically complex. This complexity smashes the Darwinian dream of everything having developed from one simple cell by chance. Behe writes,

The simplicity that was once expected to be the foundation of life has proven to be a phantom; instead, systems of horrendous, irreducible complexity inhabit the cell. The resulting realization that life was designed by an intelligence is a shock to us in the twentieth century who have gotten used to thinking of life as the result of simple natural laws.²⁹

In *The Edge of Evolution*, Behe revisits his description of the flagellum that some bacteria use to swim about in the living cell. The tiny device has a propeller and a motor similar in many ways to the outboard motors that propel fishing boats across lakes. Unless all the parts of this complex living organ are there, it will not work. He described this remarkable entity in his first book, showing that chance mutations could never build such a complex device. This thesis was attacked, but in his second book Behe points out that the evolutionists have failed to destroy his logic. The facts point to design, not evolution.

The Cosmos and Intelligent Design

Cosmologists studying the universe are less and less certain about the hypothesis that the world evolved accidentally. For example, Fred Heeren's *Show Me God: What the Message from Space is Telling Us About God* sets forth information about our world and the universe that points strongly to intelligent design.³⁰ Heeren, a science journalist, spent seven years interviewing astronomers, NASA scientists, and astrophysicists. Unlike most intelligent design writers, he explicitly identifies God as the designer. He lists a number of physical constants or laws that, if any one of them was the tiniest bit different, would make this universe unsuitable for life. One of these is the relative strength of nature's four fundamental forces: gravity, electromagnetism, and the strong and weak nuclear forces. If any one of these had a slightly different value, life as we know it could not exist. Another constant is the balance between the expansion force of our universe and the needed gravitational force. There is enough gravity to allow for the formation of galaxies, yet enough expansion force so that the universe does not come crashing back in on itself. Heeren quotes George

²⁹ Behe, *Darwin's Black Box*, 252.

³⁰ Fred Heeren, *Show Me God: What the Message from Space is Telling Us about God*, 2nd ed. (Olathe, KS: Day Star Publications, 2004).

Smoot, a member of the COBE satellite team, who described the discovery of cosmic microwave radiation as "the fingerprints from the Maker."³¹

All this cosmic evidence points to the universe as having been fine tuned by a designer to support life. This evidence, however, is a problem for the naturalist who insists everything must happen by itself. To accept the concept of a designer, or God, is contrary to their materialistic philosophy. To escape from the conclusion that the universe is designed, California Institute of Technology physicist Sean Carroll proposed the multiverse hypothesis.³² He suggests that infinite or near-infinite numbers of universes somewhere exist, each with its own set of physical laws. He believes that, given enough tries, one of the universes had to get it right and come up with laws and constants suitable for life. It is hard to take this idea seriously. It is simply an attempt to escape the facts pointing to intelligent design. Because this multiverse hypothesis cannot be falsified by scientific research, it does not qualify as science.

Is Darwinism Indispensable for Science?

The claim is frequently made that Darwinism is the cornerstone of modern experimental biology. Theodosius Dobzhansky wrote that nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution,³³ but this claim has been recently challenged. For example, Phillip Skell, emeritus professor at Pennsylvania State University and a member of the National Academy of Science, stated:

My research with antibiotics during World War II received no guidance from insights provided by Darwinian evolution. Nor did Alexander Fleming's earlier discovery of bacterial inhibition by penicillin. Recently I asked more than 70 eminent researchers if they would have done their work differently if they'd thought Darwin was wrong. They all said no.³⁴

He added, "Modern experimental biology gains its strength from new instruments and methodologies, not from historical biology. . . . For

³¹ Heeren, *Show Me God*, 177.

³² John Johnson Jr., "Mysteries of Time, and the Multiverse," *Los Angeles Times*, June 28, 2008, <http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jun/28/science/sci-carroll28>.

³³ Theodosius Dobzhansky, "Nothing in Biology Makes Sense Except in the Light of Evolution," *The American Biology Teacher* 35 (March 1973): 125-129.

³⁴ Philip S. Skell, "Darwinism: Right, But Beside the Point?" *Philadelphia Daily News*, February 13, 2006. Under the title "Darwinism Is Beside the Point," the article is available on *The Discovery Institute – Center for Science and Culture Web site* (Seattle: The Discovery Institute), <http://www.discovery.org/a/3248> (accessed September 1, 2008).

students aspiring to benefit society through experimental biology, Darwinism is simply beside the point."³⁵

Is Theistic Evolution the Answer?

Many theologians, Protestant and Catholic alike, profess to see no problem with accepting Darwinism. They take for granted the claim that evolution is an established scientific fact and, therefore, think they must adjust their theology in accordance with evolutionary theory. Writing on the subject of theistic (God-directed) evolution, Keith Ward, a professor and ordained minister of the Church of England, writes, "As a theologian I renounce all rights to make any authoritative statements about matters of natural science. . . . I take it that it is an established fact of science that human beings have descended by a process of mutation and adaptation from other and simpler forms of organic life over millions of years."³⁶

In *Where Darwin Meets the Bible*, Larry Witham delineates what accepting evolution means. Evolutionists will accept only a material or natural basis of life and its development. The following propositions must be then accepted: first, there is or has been no supernatural intervention in nature; second, there can be no interruption in the regularity of natural law, that is, no miracles; third, there is no ultimate teleology, that is, design; fourth, there are no preordained "types" in biological life; and, fifth, one must either reject the idea of a God or see no role for him in the origin and development of life.³⁷ Theistic evolutionists usually do not understand these restrictions; they frequently hold that God is only a first cause who got the universe started. Of course, the pure evolutionist rejects even that.

The Roman Catholic Church is divided on the question. It is reported that some Roman Catholics are really Darwinists, others are theistic evolutionists, and still others are creationists. Pope Benedict XVI has long been a critic of materialism and, to the extent that Darwinism is materialism, he is reported to be against it. In 2006, Pope Benedict, echoing his encyclical *Deus Caritas Est*, stated, "At the origin of the Christian being—and therefore at the origin of our witness as believers—there is no

³⁵ Skell, "Darwinism Is Beside the Point," *The Discovery Institute Web site*.

³⁶ Keith Ward, "Theistic Evolution," in *Debating Design: From Darwin to DNA*, ed. William A. Dembski and Michael Ruse (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 261.

³⁷ Larry A. Witham, *Where Darwin Meets the Bible: Creationists and Evolutionists in America* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 44.

ethical decision or great idea, but the encounter with the Person of Jesus Christ.”³⁸ Later in the same address he said that there is an implication

that the universe itself is structured in an intelligent manner, such that a profound correspondence exists between our subjective reason and the objective reason in nature. It then becomes inevitable to ask oneself if there might not be a single original intelligence that is the common font of them both. . . . The tendency to give irrationality, chance and necessity the primacy is overturned. . . .³⁹

For a Christian, the inspired word of the Holy Scriptures takes precedence over anything else. The late Raymond Surburg wrote,

The Biblical account of man’s creation militates against the evolutionary theory which makes of man a primate, an animal, and nothing more. The philosophy of evolution seeks to rob man of his distinctive character by making him nothing more than a highly developed animal. Instead of regarding man as having been created in righteousness and holiness, with the capability of fellowship with God, evolution holds that man’s moral nature evolved from the law of the jungle.⁴⁰

Under evolutionary philosophy there is no such thing as original sin, therefore there is no need of a Redeemer. This undercuts the essence of Christology; nothing is left.

Darwinists also insist that their naturalism does not allow for the possibility of miracles. They argue that a miracle is contrary to natural law and, therefore, cannot happen. Angus Menuge, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Concordia University Wisconsin, explains how this position conflicts with the very essence of Christianity: “Both the incarnation and resurrection are miracles that define the very essence of Christianity, and neither of these miracles can be understood without appeal to the supernatural.”⁴¹ Concerning the resurrection of Christ, Menuge writes, “This miracle was the Father’s attestation that Jesus had lived the perfect life and paid the penalty for all our sins. If it did not happen, then we have

³⁸ Pope Benedict XVI, “Address to the Participants in the Fourth National Ecclesial Convention [Verona],” October 19, 2006, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2006/october/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20061019_convegno-verona_en.html.

³⁹ Pope Benedict XVI, “Address to the Participants.”

⁴⁰ Raymond F. Surburg, “In the Beginning God Created,” in *Darwin, Evolution, and Creation*, ed. Paul A. Zimmerman (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1959), 73.

⁴¹ Angus J. L. Menuge, *Agents Under Fire: Materialism and the Rationality of Science* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 203.

no basis for our salvation since Christ must have failed in his atoning work. As Paul says, 'If Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile; you are still in your sins' (1 Cor. 15:17)."⁴²

The extent of the animosity that naturalists bear toward Christianity is illustrated by John Maddox, the editor of *Nature*, who wrote in his journal that "it may not be long before the practice of religion must be regarded as anti-science."⁴³

The Darwinist Inquisition

While academic freedom is supposed to exist in colleges, universities, and science journals, there is evidence that those who in any way favor the concept of intelligent design are discriminated against. Authors with excellent credentials find it difficult and frequently impossible to have their articles accepted for publication in scientific journals. There are several cases of professors in universities being denied tenure once they have criticized Darwinian evolution or favored intelligent design. It has been reported that University of Idaho president Timothy White issued an edict proclaiming that it is now "inappropriate" for anyone to sponsor views that differ from evolution in "any life, earth, and physical science courses or curricula."⁴⁴ The National Center for Science Education sent out a letter urging all fifty state governors to restrict teaching the controversies concerning Darwinian evolution.⁴⁵ The reason generally given for all this persecution of adherents to intelligent design theory is that it is creationism in disguise and thus cannot be regarded as science. This approach used in defending Darwinism indicates clearly its own naturalistic philosophy. Proponents of intelligent design, however, actually base their thesis solely on scientific evidence. They make no attempt to identify the designer but simply point to the evidence of design. While intelligent design is surely compatible with creationism, it is unscientific to refuse to consider it because of this compatibility. Naturalism, the philosophy behind Darwinism, is also a religion.

⁴² Menuge, *Agents Under Fire*, 203.

⁴³ John Maddox, "Defending Science Against Anti-Science," *Nature* 368, no. 6468 (17 March 1994): 184.

⁴⁴ Timothy P. White, "Letter to University of Idaho Faculty, Staff and Student," October 4, 2005, *The University of Idaho Web site* (Moscow, ID: University of Idaho, 2007), <http://www.president.uidaho.edu/default.aspx?pid=85947>.

⁴⁵ "Academic Freedom under Attack in NCSE Letter Seeking to Limit Teaching of Evolution," *The Discovery Institute – Center for Science and Culture Web site* (Seattle: The Discovery Institute), <http://www.discovery.org/scripts/viewDB/index.php?command=view&id=2904>.

A district court in Dover, Pennsylvania, heard a case regarding the legality of teaching intelligent design in public school classes. The trial ran from September 26 to October 11, 2005. The presiding judge ruled that the teaching of intelligent design in public school classes violated the First Amendment since he believed that it was not science because it was coupled with religious creationistic concepts. Michael Behe criticized the ruling, stating, "The Court has accepted the most tendentious and shopworn excuses for Darwinism with great charity and impatiently dismissed evidence-based arguments for design."⁴⁶ The 2005 *Kitzmiller vs Dover Area School District* case has not been appealed. It has been observed, however, that this case was based on a faulty description of intelligent design theory. Legal scholars have stated that it is clear from United States Supreme Court precedents that the U.S. Constitution permits both the teaching of evolution as well as the teaching of scientific criticisms of prevailing scientific theories.⁴⁷ It seems likely that the Dover decision will be challenged sometime in the future.

Intelligent Design Theory Makes Progress

There is evidence that intelligent design is gaining support globally. The Discovery Institute in Seattle, Washington, a non-profit public policy center that studies various subjects involving science and technology, announced in 2006 that over six hundred doctoral scientists from around the world have signed a statement publicly expressing their skepticism about the contemporary theory of Darwinian evolution. The Discovery Institute does not suggest that school districts or state boards of education require that intelligent design be taught. Rather, it believes that students

⁴⁶ Michael Behe, *Whether Intelligent Design Is Science: A Response to the Court in Kitzmiller vs Dover Area School District* (Seattle, WA: Discovery Institute Center for Science & Culture, 2006), 11, <http://www.discovery.org/scripts/viewDB/filesDB-download.php?command=download&id=697>.

⁴⁷ David K. DeWolf and Seth L. Cooper write, "It is important to note that legal scholars and groups with differing views about evolution have conceded the constitutionality of presenting scientific criticisms of evolutionary theory. In 1995 a broad range of legal, religious and non-religious organizations (including the American Civil Liberties Union, Americans United for Separation of Church and State and the Anti-Defamation League) signed a statement called 'Religion in the Public Schools: A Joint declaration of Current Law.' The joint statement of over 30 organizations agreed that 'any genuinely scientific evidence for or against any explanation of life may be taught.'" See *Teaching About Evolution in the Public Schools: A Short Summary of the Law* (Seattle, WA: Discovery Institute Center for Science & Culture, 2006), <http://www.discovery.org/a/2543>.

should have the opportunity to learn of the strengths and weaknesses of Darwinian evolutionary theory. Various school boards across the country have been interested in this concept as a necessary part of academic freedom.

III. Conclusion

Intelligent design per se is not the same as creationism. As previously noted, the theory stands on the basis of scientific evidence; yet it is exactly what a believer in the Genesis account of creation would expect. Alvin Barry, during his presidency of The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod, issued a pamphlet titled *What About Creation and Evolution* in which he wrote, “More and more scientists are reaching the conclusion that living organisms, even the most simple, show clear evidence of a creator because of their incredible complexity even at the most fundamental levels.”⁴⁸

As Christians, we realize that acceptance of the doctrine of creation is a matter of faith. Hebrews 11:1–3 plainly states, “Now faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen. For by it the men of old received divine approval. By faith we understand that the world was created by the word of God, so that what is seen was made out of things which do not appear.” At the same time, there is also the natural revelation of God. In his *Christian Dogmatics*, John Mueller writes that a part of this natural revelation is that there is a “Divine Being who has created this world and still preserves and rules all things.”⁴⁹ It is worth noting that Mueller speaks of the “teleological proof of God which argues from the design and purpose which are everywhere evident in nature.”⁵⁰ Unfortunately, sinful mankind has habitually rejected this natural revelation of God (Rom 1:18–32).⁵¹

A number of Scripture passages speak of this natural revelation of God. The Apostle Paul wrote in Romans 1:20, “Ever since the creation of the world his invisible nature, namely his eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made. So they are without excuse.” Paul told the people of Lystra that God “did not leave himself without witness, for he did good and gave you from heaven rains

⁴⁸ A. L. Barry, *What About Creation and Evolution?* (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 2000), http://www.lcms.org/graphics/assets/media/LCMS/wa_creation-evolution.pdf

⁴⁹ John Theodore Mueller, *Christian Dogmatics: A Handbook of Doctrinal Theology for Pastors, Teachers, and Laymen* (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1934), 143.

⁵⁰ Mueller, *Christian Dogmatics*, 143.

⁵¹ See “Religious Pluralism and Knowledge of the True God: Fraternal Reflection and Discussion,” *CTQ* 66 (2002): 295–305.

and fruitful seasons, satisfying your hearts with food and gladness" (Acts 14:17). Many of the Psalms speak of the magnificent creative acts of God; they speak clearly against Darwinist naturalism. For instance, Psalm 90 looks back to the beginning of creation when it declares, "Lord, you have been our dwelling place in all generations. Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever you had formed the earth and the world, from everlasting to everlasting you are God" (Ps 90:1-2). The Psalms also take us to the present as they speak of the embryo in its mother's womb: "Your eyes saw my unformed substance; in your book were written, every one of them, the days that were formed for me, when as yet there was none of them" (Ps 139:16). This sounds a lot like God directing the DNA as the child develops from the fertilized egg. An attitude of humility and reverence as we study nature is mandated by the words that the Lord addressed to Job and us: "Where were you when I laid the foundation of the earth? Tell me, if you have understanding. Who determined its measurements—surely you know!" (Job 38:4-5).

Finally, a vital aspect of our concern for the biblical teaching of creation is its relationship to Jesus Christ and the teaching of redemption. The testimony of the Scriptures to God's redemptive actions throughout history that climax in the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ are grounded in the narrative of God's creation and man's fall found in Genesis 1-3. If we allow the triune God to be disconnected from the origin of the universe and creation to be dismissed, it will ultimately impact our proclamation of Christ as both creator and restorer of creation.

Research Notes

Was Junias a Female Apostle? Maybe Not

Discussion about ordination of women pastors has come to an end among Protestant churches with the exception of the Southern Baptists, The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod, the Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod, and churches in fellowship with these churches. Once a church has ordained women, opposing arguments are not only unheard, they are disallowed. Opposition can lead to being denied ordination for candidates and defrocking for pastors (e.g., the Church of Sweden). For the last thirty years, Romans 16:7 has been a staple in arguments for ordaining women. It has been interpreted to mean that a certain Junia, a relative of Paul, presumably a woman, was an apostle. Hence women can be ordained as pastors. Eldon J. Epp's *Junia: The First Woman Apostle*, a recent extensive book on the subject, is seen by many as the scholarly frosting on a cake that was baked decades ago.¹ This book is viewed as the conclusive closing chapter on the topic.

Maybe not. At least this is what Al Wolters says in "IOYNIAN (Romans 16:7) and the Hebrew Name *Yēhunnī*," an article published in the prestigious *Journal of Biblical Literature*.² Among the greetings at the conclusion of Romans, Paul includes one to his relatives: "Greet Andronicus and Junia/s, my relatives who were in prison with me; they are prominent among the apostles" (ἀσπάσασθε Ἀνδρόνικον καὶ Ἰουνίαν τοὺς συγγενεῖς μου καὶ συναιχμαλώτους μου, οἵτινες εἰσιν ἐπίσημοι ἐν τοῖς ἀποστόλοις). Wolters does not discuss who the apostles are in this case, but they are those sent out and authorized by churches to work in other places (i.e., missionaries). While the general scholarly consensus is that Junia/s is a woman, "IOYNIAN could well be the accusative of a masculine name, as illustrated in Matt 1:8–11, where four such masculine names occur in the accusative in quick succession: Ὁζῖαν, Ἐζεκῖαν, Ἰωσῖαν, and Ἰεχονῖαν."³ IOYNIAN would be the accusative of a first declension masculine noun Ἰουνιάς, the Hellenized form of the Hebrew *yēhunnī*.⁴ Wolters concludes by saying that if his argument is right, then the IOYNIAN of Romans 16:7 "is most certainly a man's name."⁵ This discovery will not change anything in those churches now ordaining women, but if the IOYNIAN argument were to come up in our circles as biblical support for ordaining women, it would be proper to reference the evidence presented in this article.

David P. Scaer

¹ Eldon J. Epp, *Junia: The First Woman Apostle* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2005).

² Al Wolters, "IOYNIAN (Romans 16:7) and the Hebrew Name *Yēhunnī*," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 127, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 397–408.

³ Wolters, "IOYNIAN (Romans 16:7)," 399.

⁴ Wolters, "IOYNIAN (Romans 16:7)," 400.

⁵ Wolters, "IOYNIAN (Romans 16:7)," 408.

Why Was Jesus with the Wild Beasts (Mark 1:13)?

Unlike the narrative of three temptations after 40 days in the Judean wilderness as found in Matthew and Luke (Matt 4:1-11; Luke 4:1-13), Mark presents an extremely terse account of the wilderness temptation: "And he [Jesus] was in the wilderness 40 days, while being tempted by Satan, and [Jesus] was with the wild beasts, and the angels served him" (Mark 1:13).¹ This brief summary includes an interesting detail in 1:13b—unique to Mark's Gospel—that has long puzzled interpreters: καὶ ἦν μετὰ τῶν θηρίων ("and he was with the wild beasts").

There have been three primary ways of interpreting this detail in Mark's temptation account.² First, this mention of "wild beasts" has been understood to emphasize the dangerous solitude of the wilderness setting in which Jesus had been tempted. Second, some interpreters have understood the "wild beasts" as demonic allies of Satan that are part of the temptation experience of Jesus. The third interpretation, which is most prominent in recent scholarship, is to understand this as a depiction of the return to a paradisiacal peace in which Jesus is depicted as the new Adam at harmony with the animal kingdom. Even though the first two interpretations appear possible from a quick reading of the text, Mark's account does not imply that Jesus' presence with the wild beasts is an element of Satan's temptation.³ Although the third interpretation is very attractive and has merit, there is not a clear "new Adam" depiction of Jesus elsewhere in Mark.⁴

¹ Although Mark does not mention three distinct temptations in the wilderness as do Matthew and Luke, the temptation in 1:13a serves as the introduction to *three* other temptations spread throughout Jesus' ministry: the temptation by the Pharisees to provide a sign (Mark 8:11); the temptation by the Pharisees to disregard God's word on marriage (Mark 10:2); and the temptation by the Pharisees about loyalty to God or Caesar (Mark 12:15). These are the only other places in Mark where a form of πειράζω ("I tempt") is used; each has Jesus as the passive subject of temptation. This Gospel does note Jesus' acknowledgment of Satan's ongoing presence and challenge to his ministry; see Mark 3:22-27 and 8:33.

² Richard Bauckham sets forth these three basic positions in his "Jesus and the Wild Animals (Mark 1:13): A Christological Image for an Ecological Age," in *Jesus of Nazareth: Lord and Christ: Essays on the Historical Jesus and New Testament Christology*, ed. Joel B. Green and Max Turner (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1994), 3-21, esp. 4-7.

³ See further the critique of these positions in Bauckham, "Jesus and the Wild Animals," 5-6.

⁴ Even Paul's so-called "Adam Christology" is often misunderstood (Rom 5:12-21; 1 Cor 15:21-22, 44-49). Paul sets forth Christ in contrast to Adam rather than as the "new Adam" or even a "second Adam." See Charles A. Gieschen, *Angelomorphic Christology: Antecedents and Early Evidence* (Leiden: Brill Academic Press, 1998), 329-331; contra James D. G. Dunn, *Christology in the Making: A New Testament Inquiry into the Origins of the Doctrine of the Incarnation*, Second Edition (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Co., 1989), 98-128. This is not to say Adam Christology cannot be found elsewhere. Peter J.

In a significant and little-known study of Mark 1:13, Richard Bauckham examines Old Testament and Second Temple Jewish texts that provide evidence for how this detail in Mark is to be understood.⁵ Bauckham sees Isaiah 11 as being of primary importance for interpreting this detail in Mark's account, as seen in this conclusion:

So it may be more relevant to recall that Isa 11:6-9, the classic vision of the messianic peace with wild animals, is connected with Isa 11:1-5, the classic prophecy of the Davidic Messiah. The peace with wild animals belongs to this Messiah's righteous reign. Mark's account of Jesus' baptism (1:9-11), in which he is anointed with the Spirit (Isa 11:2) and addressed as God's Son (Ps 2:7), identifies him as this Davidic Messiah, who therefore inaugurates the messianic ages not only by overcoming Satan, but also by establishing the messianic peace with wild animals. Against the background of the Jewish eschatological expectation, the latter has a real significance in its own right. It is not simply a symbol of Jesus' victory over Satan or of his inauguration of the age of eschatological salvation. Peace with wild animals is actually one aspect of eschatological salvation.⁶

Joel Marcus cites Bauckham's research with approval in the newer Anchor Bible Commentary on Mark, although he combines it with his endorsement of a "new Adam" interpretation of Mark 1:13, an interpretation that Bauckham does not stress.⁷

While I consider the direction of Bauckham's interpretation to be correct and very enlightening, his primary focus on Isaiah 11 overlooks a text later in Isaiah that appears to be even more significant for understanding the theological point of the presence of wild beasts in Mark's temptation narrative. From Mark's opening Old Testament quotation that includes Isaiah 40:3 (Mark 1:3), it is clear that this Gospel is depicting Jesus accomplishing the "new Exodus" of Isaiah 40-66, a central theme of Mark.⁸ Within Isaiah's prophecy about this new Exodus and not long after the portion of Isaiah that Mark directly quotes in his opening words, this statement is made by YHWH through the prophet: "The wild beasts will honor me" [MT תִּכְבְּדֵנִי הַחַיָּה; LXX εὐλογήσει με τὰ θηρία] (Isa 43:20). There are several new Exodus themes expressed in the wider context of this statement:

Scaer argues for the "new Adam" theme in Luke-Acts; see "Lukan Christology: Jesus as Beautiful Savior," *CTQ* 69 (2005): 70-72.

⁵ Bauckham, "Jesus and the Wild Animals" (see n. 2 above).

⁶ "Jesus and the Wild Animals," 19-20.

⁷ Joel Marcus, *Mark 1-8: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary*, Anchor Bible 27 (New York: Doubleday, 2000), 167-171; see Bauckham, "Jesus and the Wild Animals," 7.

⁸ For a thorough analysis of Mark's use of the Old Testament and this theme, see both Joel Marcus, *The Way of the Lord: Christological Exegesis of the Old Testament in the Gospel of Mark* (London and New York: Continuum, 1992), esp. 12-47, and Rikki E. Watts, *Isaiah's New Exodus in Mark* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1997).

[16] Thus says the LORD,
 who makes a way in the sea and a path in the mighty waters,
 [17] who brings forth chariot and horse, army and warrior;
 they lie down and they cannot rise,
 they are extinguished, quenched like a wick:
 [18] "Remember not the former things,
 nor consider the things of old.
 [19] Behold, I am doing a new thing;
 now it springs forth, do you not perceive it?
 I will make a way in the wilderness and rivers in the desert.
 [20] The wild beasts will honor me.

It is also noteworthy that "I will make a way in the wilderness" (Isa 43:19) is a direct allusion to Isaiah 40:3 which is quoted in Mark 1:3. As can be seen from this portion of Isaiah 43, YHWH speaks here of a new and greater Exodus when he will make a way in the desert and the wild beasts there will honor him as their creator. If the reference to "wild beasts" in the wilderness temptation narrative of Mark is alluding to this Isaianic hope, then Mark is depicting Jesus as more than a new Adam or even the Davidic Messiah: Jesus is YHWH himself who would come and restore the harmonious relationship with his creation as spoken of in Isaiah 43 and elsewhere.⁹ Even though many do not recognize Jesus as the Son of God, he is none other than YHWH come as the servant he promised to be through Isaiah, and the wild beasts in the wilderness recognize him.

This is not the only place in Mark where such a theme is found. Unlike the wild beasts in Mark, the disciples often do not recognize Jesus' true identity. An example of this is found in Jesus' walking on water miracle (Mark 6:45-52). Through both an allusion to Job 9:8 and 9:11 LXX (Mark 6:48) and Jesus' speaking of the Old Testament self-disclosure formula reflected in the absolute use of ἐγώ εἰμι (Mark 6:50)¹⁰, Mark depicts Jesus as walking on water in a manner that makes it clear that he wants the reader to draw the conclusion

⁹ One can see a very sophisticated κύριος Christology in Mark already when "Prepare the way of YHWH" (Isa 40:3) is applied to John the Baptist's preparation for Jesus (Mark 1:3).

¹⁰ For the absolute usage of ἐγώ εἰμι as reflecting the Old Testament self-disclosure formula (LXX Deut 32:39; Isa 41:4; 43:10; 43:25; 45:18; 46:4; 51:12), see Marcus, *Mark 1-8*, 427, and esp. Catrin H. Williams, *I am He: The Interpretation of 'Ani Hu' in Jewish and Early Christian Literature*, Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament II.113 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000). Absolute forms of ἐγώ εἰμι in the Synoptic Gospels that draw on this self-disclosure formula are found in the following synoptic accounts: the Stilling of the Storm (Matt 14:27; Mark 6:50; but not Luke 8:24); the Eschatological Discourse (Mark 13:6; Luke 21:8; but not Matt 24:23); the Trial before the Council (Mark 14:62; Luke 22:70; but not Matt 26:64); and the Resurrection (Matt 28:20 and Luke 24:39). For John's usage of this formula, see Charles A. Gieschen, "Confronting Current Christological Controversy," *CTQ* 69 (2005): 19-21.

that Jesus is YHWH and his disciples are not recognizing their creator.¹¹ Note how Mark's account echoes the penetrating language of Job about mankind's difficulty with recognizing the creator's presence in the world:

Job 9:8 (LXX) The one who alone stretched out the heaven and **walks upon the sea** as upon dry ground [ὁ ταινύσας τὸν οὐρανὸν μόνος καὶ περιπατῶν ὡς ἐπ' ἐδάφους ἐπὶ θαλάσσης]

Job 9:11 (LXX) And when he [YHWH] goes beyond me, I shall surely not see him, and **when he passes by me**, neither do I perceive him [ἐὰν ὑπερβῇ με οὐ μὴ ἴδω καὶ ἐὰν παρέλθῃ με οὐδ' ὥς ἔγνων].

Mark 6:48 He [Jesus] came to them **while walking upon the sea** and he **intended to pass by them** [ἔρχεται πρὸς αὐτοὺς περιπατῶν ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάσσης καὶ ἤθελεν παρελθεῖν αὐτούς].

Mark's account of this miracle is, therefore, alluding to the language of the Old Testament in order to depict Jesus acting as YHWH ("walking upon the sea") and speaking as YHWH ("I am" or "It is I"). In light of the possible allusion to Isaiah 43 in the temptation narrative, Mark may also be depicting Jesus as YHWH there. Since the wild beasts are neither roaring nor devouring, they may—like the angels who served Jesus in the wilderness—be honoring him for who he is (YHWH) and what is he accomplishing (the new Exodus).

Charles A. Gieschen

¹¹ See the analysis of Richard B. Hays, "Can the Gospels Teach Us How to Read the Old Testament?" *Pro Ecclesia* 11 (2002): 409-411. Hays states that most commentators note the importance of Job 9:8 for understanding this miracle, but fail to see the significance of Job 9:11 for understanding Mark 6:48; an exception is William L. Lane, *The Gospel according to Mark*, NICNT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974), 236.

Theological Observer

Expelled

The recently-released movie-length documentary, *Expelled: No Intelligence Allowed*, has received considerable attention since its debut in April, 2008. Most of it has been negative. The National Center for Science Education (NCSE), for example, depicts it as anti-scientific propaganda designed to advance a creationist agenda. The notorious Darwinian atheist Richard Dawkins characterizes it as whiny, paranoid, and pathetic. And the mainstream media continues to make similar allegations.

For all its bad press, one thing is clear: *Expelled* touched a nerve. The film's thesis is that the scientific establishment—"big science"—refuses to acknowledge and in a dogmatic and *a priori* fashion dismisses any claim that the universe and its organisms exhibit some semblance of design. It also expels (denies tenure, refuses publication, etc.) the scientists who dare make them. Why? To suggest there is design in nature that cannot be accounted for by random natural causation also suggests that there exists an intelligent source behind such observable phenomena.

Proponents of intelligent design have been making such cases for decades. Recently, astronomer Guillermo Gonzalez (and his college Jay Richards) argued, in *The Privileged Planet* (2004), that the fine-tuning of elementary conditions necessary to sustain life found exclusively on earth is best explained by intelligent causation. Despite his stellar teaching and publication record, though, Gonzalez was denied tenure at the University of Iowa for his heterodox views. William Dembski, who holds two PhDs and is widely published, argues for the design inference on the basis of the information-rich nature of biological structures. When his views were made known he was dismissed from his position as director of the Michael Polanyi at Baylor University. Numerous other examples could also be cited.

But the Spartan war against intelligent design, argue organizations like the NCSE and a host of individuals like Oxford's Richard Dawkins and Tufts' Daniel Dennett, is necessary. Intelligent design, they claim, is nothing but a Trojan horse created by inheritors of the creationist crusade of Williams Jennings Bryan designed to sneak and then impose religious cosmology into science curricula. Thus, for the sake of science it must be resisted (even if it requires the abuse of power).

Expelled does a great job of elucidating this and what is, on a fundamental level, a worldview conflict, where the inferences of intelligent design present a threat to the presuppositions that underpin modern science: philosophical naturalism and methodological materialism. At the extremes of this conflict are theism, on the one side, and atheism, on the other. Unfortunately, the movie does not articulate well that not all evolutionary scientists are aggressive

atheists. This criticism notwithstanding, the movie draws due attention to the unintended yet logical consequences of atheistic naturalism by exposing its ideological links to the murderous social engineering of left-wing statist movements like German National Socialism, the international socialism of the Soviet Union, and its subtle import into America under the leadership of Margaret Sanger and the eugenics project of what eventually became Planned Parenthood.

These and other reasons, particularly the dry and subtle humor of its host, Ben Stein, an accomplished writer and thinker who is probably most memorable for his role as the monotone economics teacher in *Ferris Bueller's Day Off*, make the documentary worth viewing. It could also be put to good use in facilitating discussion, particularly among young adults, about some of the current cultural challenges Christianity faces.

One should not, however, think that the movie is "Christian." It is theologically neutral. It is a movie about science and the resistance of its establishment to anything that might be construed as theistic. It is, therefore, a good introduction to one of the many burning issues of the day.

Adam S. Francisco

The Death of a Christian: Membership Loss or Transfer?

As the annual ritual of completing the statistical report comes upon parish pastors once again, I am reminded of the times that I counted up the number of faithful members who had died over the past calendar year and placed that number in the "Membership Losses" column. I never felt right about it. Didn't someone once write, "For me to live is Christ, and to die is gain"? Sometime after these statistical reports have been mailed, an article usually appears in the *Reporter* on the net losses or gains in congregation membership within our beloved synod. In recent years, these articles have expressed understandable concerns about net losses. Whether there were losses or gains, however, there is usually no acknowledgment in such articles that some of our losses in the church militant were actually gains to the church triumphant. Even while it is the mission of Christ's church to proclaim the Gospel to unbelievers and baptize, it is also our mission to nurture the baptized in Christ until he brings them out of sin and death to await resurrection on the last day. Should we be concerned that some congregations are shrinking for various reasons, including deaths? Yes. Should we also rejoice that some of these membership losses are permanent gains to the church triumphant? Yes. Perhaps the statistical report should add a line for "Transfers to the Church Triumphant," and we should also rejoice in these "losses" that are heaven's gain.

Charles A. Gieschen

Book Reviews

Jesus and the Eyewitnesses: The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony. By Richard Bauckham. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006. 537 Pages. Hardcover. \$32.00.

Missouri Synod theology has tended to draw a straight line from the Spirit's inspiration of the Scriptures to the Confessions and then to the synodical resolutions. The synod's positions were viewed as what the Spirit had in mind in inspiring the Bible. Historical contexts of the documents did not play a significant role in theology. Outside the synod, theology was taking another route. Beginning at the end of the sixteenth century and coming into full bloom in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, New Testament scholarship saw its task in locating the lines leading from the man Jesus to the New Testament documents. The task was to trace the development of what Jesus had said and done through various stages into written form. To rephrase a biblical citation, "between [Jesus] and [the Gospels] a great chasm has been fixed, in order that [anyone] who would pass from [the documents] to [the written accounts] may not be able." Since one scholar came up with a Jesus different from what another did, no certain picture of Jesus could emerge. Faced with the frustration of never uncovering the real Jesus, literary, redaction, canon, and narrative criticisms took the Gospels at face value and created a fundamentalism that was not unlike the older one in circumventing the historical nitty-gritty of the who, what, when, and where of Jesus. These approaches were more than a bit tinged with anti-incarnationalism, because they turned the biblical papyri (pages) into insurmountable walls preventing access to the man Jesus.

An antidote to these approaches has now been provided by Richard Bauckham in his *Jesus and the Eyewitnesses*. It turns the once popular form criticism on its head. At the outset it should be stated that all past historical events remain at arm's length from us because we cannot reconstruct a past occurrence. We can do no more than compare historical reports, which are our only paths into the past. Ideally these accounts come from the eyewitnesses, those who knew the eyewitnesses, or those who had access to credible documents. On the basis of these principles, Bauckham tests the New Testament Gospels for their credibility. Through this approach he breaks rank with the majority of New Testament scholars who have assumed that what the Gospels preserved circulated anonymously through communities before it became settled on the written page (1-8). The operating word is *anonymously*. Foundational for Bauckham is the work of Samuel Byrskog, who showed that good historians in the ancient world depended more on the eyewitnesses to an event than stories from anonymous sources. Byrskog summarizes his position in this way: "The gospel narratives . . . are thus syntheses of history and story, of the oral history of an eyewitness and interpretative and narrativizing

procedures of an author" (10). This should be compared with the older historical-grammatical approach, which properly assumed that the events reported in the biblical texts actually happened but did not take into account how the events were interpreted by those who saw them, heard other accounts, and finally wrote them down. Examining the historical character of a biblical text did not belong to its interpretation or the theological task.

Papias, the first century bishop of Hierapolis, a city in southwest Asia Minor (in the area where John, Paul, and Peter were active), provides a test case for Bauckham. In his *Exposition of the Logia of the Lord*, Papias made use of written Gospels alongside of the recollections of those who knew those who accompanied Jesus (12–38). To advance his argument about locating credible witnesses, Bauckham takes the up-to-this-time unknown approach of comparing the personal names found in the Gospels with names common at the time of Jesus (39–66). Should the names found in the Gospels not match those found at that time, then it could be assumed that the documents come from a later period. They match (67–92). In classical form critical scholarship, oral tradition is unharnessed until it is set down in documents. Names in the Gospel accounts anchor them down to real persons. Eyewitnesses to Jesus were not anonymous. Bauckham demonstrates that the Twelve were "the authoritative guarantors of the stories they continued to tell" (93). Challenged again is form criticism which saw bits and pieces of Jesus floating around from his death to their being written down more or less a half century later. The Book of Acts, along with Matthew, Mark, and Luke, shows how the Twelve were factors in monitoring the oral tradition (93–113). Names in Mark, Luke, and John were not chosen at random, but they are those of the participants in the events in Jesus' life. As eyewitnesses they are the source of Gospels' contents (114–154). Mark is written from Peter's perspective but is not a mere transcript of his recollections. Bauckham supports this by showing that the pronoun "we" in this Gospel provides Peter's perspective as one of the Twelve, and "I" reflects his personal relation to Jesus. Peter's perspectives are not strictly private but were part of the public proclamation (155–182). A chapter on anonymous persons in Mark's passion narrative takes up the problem of how sleeping disciples heard Jesus' prayers in the garden. One solution is that the naked young man may have been close enough to hear Jesus. Borrowing a solution from Barbara Saunderson, the disciples may have not fallen asleep immediately and may have dosed on and off (183–201). Characteristically Bauckham allows for more than one explanation of these events that came to be recorded in the Gospels.

Another chapter dissects Papias' references to Mark and Matthew (202–239) and challenges a widespread view that this bishop said that Mark's Gospel was disorderly. Bauckham argues that Papias regarded Mark as a reliable historical source (227–228). In the chapter "Models of Oral Tradition," he outlines how oral tradition was transmitted. As mentioned above, according to classical form criticism, tidbits from the life of Jesus were passed

on in an almost haphazard way. In contrast, the Swedish scholars Harald Riesenfeld and Birger Gerhardsson have argued that Jesus used the rabbinic method so that each word was preserved as it was first spoken (249–252). Bauckham takes a middle position (252–257). Oral traditions remain intact but are adjusted for the different situation. Another factor is that various traditions converged with and informed each other (285). Oral tradition already began in the lifetime of Jesus; a view so obvious that it is remarkable that it has not played a more prominent role in Gospel criticism. This means that during the lifetime of Jesus his sayings and his deeds were being shared and passed on by others. As the church spread out from Palestine, oral tradition was supervised by the mother church in Jerusalem under the leadership of Peter and John who could distinguish authentic materials from disputable ones (240–263). Bauckham adopts Hengel's position that the Gospels were not anonymous in the strictest sense because their recipients knew their authors. The author of a dedicated writing such as Luke-Acts would hardly have been unknown to its patron. Whoever the author of the Fourth Gospel may have been, he was known to the first readers (300–305).

Bauckham also introduces the concept of collective memory alongside individual eyewitness reports. Collective or shared memory is defined as traditions held by entire communities which were derived from the eyewitnesses themselves (314–318). In chapter twelve, "Eyewitness and Memory" (319–357), Bauckham tests his eyewitness theory on non-biblical accounts, another novel methodology. Memories can be affected by emotions and hence multiple meanings, but for the most part they are reliable. One chapter is devoted to "The Gospel of John as Eyewitness Testimony" (358–383) and another to "The Witness of the Beloved Disciple" (384–411). In the latter, Bauckham argues that the author's interpretation of the reported events does not detract from but lends to this Gospel's credibility. For the record, Bauckham does not hold that the author of the Fourth Gospel is John, the son of Zebedee (452, 458–463).

Even with such a marvelous book as *Jesus and the Eyewitness*, one must break rank at several places with Bauckham. Along with most practitioners of his profession, he places the writing of the Gospels between the mid 60s to the death of the beloved disciple, probably circa 90, though no specific date is given. Nothing startling here, but this is asserted rather than argued: "So the Gospels were written over the period from the death of Peter to that of the Beloved Disciples, when the eyewitness were ceasing to be available" (310). This fits in with Bauckham's thesis that the gospels "were written . . . to maintain this accessibility and function of the eyewitnesses beyond their lifetimes" (308). Agreed, but death was not the only reason to make the eyewitness accounts accessible in written documents like Gospels. Another, perhaps even more pressing, reason for encoding the eyewitness accounts was the expansion of the church from Jerusalem to Rome with stops in between in Asia Minor, Greece, and North Africa. The further oral tradition moved from

the apostolic center in Jerusalem, the weaker the signal of its oral message became. Oral tradition may have flourished in the world in which Jesus and the apostles lived, but it was easily susceptible to corruption in the pagan world of the Gentiles. There were simply not enough apostles to supervise that oral tradition, especially if it was carried by those who had second- and third-hand knowledge of it.

Thus, if a Gospel like Mark could have taken form in the late 60s following the death of Peter, as Bauckham argues, could not another Gospel have been created for the stumbling Gentile communities that would have been in dire need of one? The Pauline corpus came into existence because this apostle found written documents more useful in nailing down basic points in the Christian proclamation and in addressing aberrations. Paul knew that whatever oral tradition arose from his preaching in the Gentile churches was not doing the job for which it was intended. It had to be written down. A need for a written Gospel for former pagans would have been equally pressing, if not even greater. An earlier date for a Gospel, say in the 40s and 50s, would fit into Bauckham's view that written documents about Jesus coexisted with the oral tradition.

For a moment let us return to Bauckham's argument that the Gospels took the place of the eyewitnesses themselves. The Gospels would survive after their writers had died. This is not only a plausible but a necessary view in the light of John 21:23, where the author claims that he will not be immune to death. Peter was martyred around 64; however, martyrdom for all the surviving Twelve was a real possibility from the very beginning (Acts 12:2). The impending death of the Lord's premier disciple might have been the impetus to preserve in writing his recollections (hence Mark), but this impetus was present long before Peter's martyrdom. Acts makes it clear that the Twelve and Paul were open targets from the very beginning. Today dying without a will is unconscionable. Dying without arranging to record their recollections would have been equally irresponsible.

Seeing the Gospels as dependent on the eyewitnesses brings up the question of authorship. Bauckham holds that the author of the Fourth Gospel is an eyewitness, even if this John is not the son of Zebedee. He will get some flack on this one. No one will argue that Luke was an eyewitness, because according to his own testimony he consulted with the eyewitnesses. Mark is a half-and-half situation. Most of it comes from the testimony of Peter, but that young man with the loose and lost garment is part of the mix, at least to the Garden of Gethsemane. In the catalog of names recorded in his Gospel, he compares favorably with his co-evangelists (56–66). For Bauckham, Matthew's origins lie in mist. The feast in Matthew's house might be taken as a self-reference by the first evangelist, but Bauckham holds that the evangelist took the account from Mark and substituted the name of Matthew for Levi (108–112). This undermines Bauckham's arguments that Gospels were not strictly

anonymous because the recipients knew their authors and that the Gospels contain credible accounts. This shell game of substituting Matthew for Levi would have hardly gone unnoticed, especially for a Gospel which soon came to occupy the premier position in the early church almost to the exclusion of the other Gospels. Bauckham assumes—but does not argue—that Mark is the first Gospel (110), perhaps as the necessary price to remain in the guild of New Testament scholars. An added tax for membership requires that Matthew existed first as a Hebrew document, which later was translated into Greek (223–224). There are several reasons for disputing this, not the least of which is that a Hebrew document does not exist today and Papias' reference to Matthew having written in *hebraïdi dialecto* can be the evangelist's style, which with negative remarks about Jews and Gentiles is still offensive. Had Jesus preached chiefly in Hebrew, documents preserving his words would have been treasured. By the first century Hebrew had become an archaic, liturgical language and had been replaced by Aramaic. This raises the question of whether an Aramaic document would have served a church which was conceived in a Hellenistic world to which it would have spread its message. A document written either in Hebrew or Aramaic of which only Greek copies remain would leave us at the mercy of the translator. In any event, if Jesus preached to crowds, he did not preach in Hebrew.

While Bauckham advances his theory of the eyewitness on all the Gospels, Acts, and 1 Corinthians, Matthew receives the least attention, simply because this Gospel is presented as being the farthest removed from the life of Jesus. Now if Jesus preached chiefly in Aramaic, which seems likely, the transmission of his teaching in the Greek text of Matthew's Gospel would deserve the most attention. Bauckham holds that the Twelve in the early church were the guarantors of what Jesus did and said (93–112). In Matthew an entire discourse is devoted to them; their names being listed as "disciples" and "apostles" almost in the same breath (10:1–2) would suggest that what they preached came from what they heard and saw Jesus say and do.

Bauckham sees no clue to this Gospel's author in the similarity of the name Matthew (*Matthaios*) to the word disciple (*mathete*) in his call (9:9–10). This possible and dismissed allusion was new to me. More significantly, Bauckham skips over 13:51–52 where the Greek for "having been disciplined," *matheteutheis*, would have immediately recalled *Matthaios*, since this name had been introduced in 10:2 accompanied with the pejorative reminder that he was a tax collector. In 10:51 "the one who was disciplined" is called a "scribe," also an unfavorable designation in all the Gospels (e.g., 23:13, 15), except here and in 23:24. The scribe in 13:51–52 might be described as eyewitness, but the picture here is of one who actually hears and writes. He does not depend on eyewitnesses.

In challenging form criticism, Bauckham has knocked over a house of cards. His writing style makes the most profound and complex ideas accessible

even to the uninitiated. Those using the Three Year Lectionary will be able to add a few new twists to their preaching of the Gospel readings. This book should be considered one of the most valuable biblical works of our time.

David P. Scaer

***Understanding the Bible: A Basic Introduction to Biblical Interpretation.* By George T. Montague. Revised and expanded edition. New York: Paulist Press, 2007. 274 pages. Paperback. \$19.95.**

At times the Bible's message seems clear, while at other times it seems maddeningly opaque. So it is that a child easily grasps the message of salvation, while the learned pull out their hair trying to decipher what a given passage actually means. We often feel like the Ethiopian eunuch, who, when asked if he understood a passage from Isaiah, answered, "How can I, unless someone instructs me?" (Acts 8:31).

Montague, a seasoned Roman Catholic scholar, steps into the interpretative confusion and offers here a sturdy and helpful introduction to biblical hermeneutics. He divides the work into two main sections. In part one he addresses "the road already traveled, which discusses how our predecessors have struggled with the question of biblical interpretation" (vii). This, I believe, is the most helpful and instructive part of the book. Along the way, Montague speaks about how the Bible interprets the Bible, and how it has been interpreted throughout church history. Those who are looking for *the* answer or *the* key to Biblical interpretation may be frustrated by a survey of the past. History is long on guidance but short on specific guidelines. There are, however, some things we should note. First of all, the Bible, though diverse, has a certain unity, and that unity is to be found in Christ. As Montague notes, "To New Testament Christians, Jesus is the key to the puzzle of the Old Testament. It's as if suddenly everything that was dreamed of is realized and everything that was obscure becomes clear" (16). The entire Bible is, in fact, a Christian book in which Christ is the fulfillment not only of specific prophecies but also of "institutions, images, and events" (16). Since there is one God, the biblical narrative follows certain patterns. Though the Bible is composed of many books, the story moves forward as if in chapters and finds its culmination in the person and work of Christ.

The author's discussion of the church fathers is succinct and illustrative. He focuses particularly on Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Chrysostom, Jerome, and Augustine. To be sure, Montague notes the distinctive approach taken by each of these fathers. He shows how Clement attempted "to construct a systematic bridge between the Christian faith and the Greek world" (31). He also examines Origen's use of allegorical interpretation, and Chrysostom's more intentional literalism. He also notes Jerome's insistence on the presence of the Spirit in interpretation, as well as his belief that the "truth of the text—

that is, its *spirit*—is to be found deeper within the text, not outside it" (43). Finally, he shows how Augustine saw the integrity of the biblical witness and understood all of Scripture to teach the charity and love of God.

Those looking for a reader's manual on how to understand the Scriptures may be disappointed. The fathers, however, do exhibit some marked tendencies. As Montague writes, "They knew that the Christ-event threw a new light on the Old Testament, and their solution was to use the Old to illustrate the New" (48). In other words, the fathers interpreted all of the Scriptures christologically.

Montague's discussion of medieval exegesis is well worth reading, as is his assessment of the Reformation. He notes that, like the fathers, Luther held that "Christ is the Bible's central theme" (69). Further, the Bible is a book for preaching. He then proceeds, interestingly, to show how Calvin differed from Luther. For Luther, as previously for Jerome, the Spirit came from within the biblical text. In contrast, he claims that for Calvin, "the text only communicates and informs. It is the reader who is inspired to discern the written word to be God's word" (71).

As Montague moves forward historically, he shows how biblical interpretation became increasingly individual instead of communal and how the Bible became the target of skeptics and the subject of scholars. Finally, he surveys nineteenth- and twentieth-century hermeneutics more generally, that is "the theory or philosophy of how human beings derive understanding and meaning from any text or communication" (96). He bounces along from Schleiermacher to Dilthey, and from Heidegger to Ricoeur. The best section is where he criticizes Ricoeur's theory of deconstruction and the claim that language, finally, has no meaning. As he colorfully describes the situation,

Interpretation becomes a kind of linguistic Marxism, a struggle to level all distinctions linguistically, or at least to say that one interpretation is as good as another. If the modern period is identified with the Enlightenment and its rationalistic approach to the Bible, the postmodern period is identified with the decentered relativism, a new kind of agnosticism, of which deconstruction is one example. (143)

In the end, Montague argues, words mean things.

The second part of the book is a standard survey of the various "criticisms," including historical, rhetorical, narrative, social-scientific, and canonical criticisms. For the most part, Montague writes in a measured, even-handed way, and with a healthy dose of skepticism. Underlying his discussion is the helpful notion that ultimately the Scriptures belong not to the academy but to the church. One wishes Montague were a little more insistent on the historicity of the Scriptures, which in too facile a manner he describes as a "mixture of history and theology" (149). We could agree if he meant that the two categories were coterminous, but Montague seems all too willing to cede

history to the scholars. Instead, Montague finds truth in the continuing work of the Holy Spirit within the church.

Thus, for example, Montague seems to concede that the New Testament documents may not point directly to Christ's divinity, but that, nonetheless, Christ's divinity is established in the ongoing life of the church. Or, as he puts it, "Development need not be deviation" (157). On the plus side, he ably presents the views of N. T. Wright, who generally asserts the historical character and reliability of the Scriptures.

So, will this book change your life? Probably not. But, if you are looking for a good, fairly conservative reference book for hermeneutics, this is not a bad place to start. If the second half of the book seems to be off here and there, simply reread the first half and be refreshed by the christological hermeneutic of the church fathers. That is a good enough reason to buy the book.

Peter J. Scaer

The Rights of God: Islam, Human Rights, and Comparative Ethics. By Irene Oh. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2007. 158 pages. Paperback. \$24.95.

Irene Oh begins this rather peculiar book by stating what seems like the obvious: "Promoting Islam as a defender of human rights is fraught with difficulties." However, she insists this should not be the case and argues that Islam can make valuable contributions to human rights dialogue. The problem, she believes, is that Islam has not been given a fair hearing. So she takes a closer look. Examining the writings of three Muslim intellectuals, she alleges to have found a deep concern for democracy, toleration, and freedom of conscience within the tradition of Islam.

The most promising of the three authors she highlights is the contemporary Iranian intellectual 'Abdolkarim Soroush (b. 1945). He is one of a growing number of Muslim scholars seeking to make Islamic culture more amenable to modern secular values. It is no wonder, then, that Oh sees him, as well as those who take his approach, as potential contributors to ethical discourse. It is a wonder, though, why she chose the Indian Abul A'la Maududi (1903-1979) and Egyptian Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) as her other two examples. Indeed, both were prolific writers; their commentaries on the Qur'an were and still are widely read by Muslims across the globe. But those acquainted with their work knows that they were extremely hostile towards and advocated open *jihād* against non-Muslims. At best, they argued for democracy, toleration, and freedom of conscience in accordance with Islamic *shari'a*, where full human rights are only awarded to Muslims. Oh even admits as much. But she argues throughout her book—almost *ad nauseum*—that they only did so as a reaction against western colonialism. In other words, it was not Islam that led Maududi and Qutb to their extreme conclusions; rather, the

fault lies with the west and their constant mingling in the affairs of the Muslim world.

This book is typical of much of the literature on Islam produced by western academics. It champions modern liberal Muslims as the real representative of Islam and considers adherents to traditional Islam as the poor, misunderstood victims of western colonialism. Soroush and liberal Muslims like him could, in fact, contribute in many ways to ethics and international politics. But failing to comprehend the strident political and legal exclusivism of traditional Islam as espoused by Maududi and Qutb (and much of the contemporary Muslim world) is sheer foolishness.

Adam S. Francisco

***Law and Gospel and the Means of Grace.* By David P. Scaer. Confessional Lutheran Dogmatics 8. Edited by John Stephenson. St. Louis: The Luther Academy, 2008. 238 pages. Hardcover. \$25.95.**

In this magisterial study, outlining the dogmatic foci of the proper distinction between law and gospel and the gospel's action in the means of grace, David Scaer proves himself to be a worthy heir of Franz Pieper. He deftly intertwines the doctrine of law and gospel, the most important loci for the pastoral dimension of the doctrine of justification, with Christology, the heart of all genuine theology, as grounded in the Holy Scriptures and the Lutheran Confessions. The law, he notes, confronts sinners with "eternal death for which there is no relief," breaking down sinners' defenses so that they can experience contrition for sin (4). As a remedy to the sinner's entrapment, "the gospel creates faith, which in turn lays hold of Christ who is present in this proclamation, and by this faith the believer accepts the promises of eternal bliss with Him" (4-5). The proper distinction of law and gospel, so central for Lutherans descended from the heritage of C. F. W. Walther, renders the Christian life as inescapably characterized by the *simul iustus et peccator*. Indeed, "only death relieves Christians from the agonizing contradiction that they find within themselves" — in this life, Christians are at once and always condemned and saved (5).

Throughout this volume, Scaer steers this dogmatic *locus* away from the twin evils of legalism and libertinism, a feat not well accomplished by most Christians throughout history. Scaer contends that "wherever the gospels are read and the traditional liturgy, especially with the creeds, remains in place in the church, there Jesus is proclaiming Himself as the gospel" (12). Each word of Scaer's work is carefully chosen to counterbalance what he perceives as dangers when articulating this doctrine. When he claims that "the newness of the New Testament is not a creation *ex nihilo* but a completion of what was begun in the Old Testament, so that the New Testament is nothing other than the fulfilled Old Testament" (17), one cannot help but think that he is

addressing some Erlangen theologians and late-twentieth century interpreters of Luther who "existentialized" the doctrine. Scaer is unquestioningly right that the new fulfills the old. New creation, however, does hearken back to the original creation.

Honoring an "existentialist" or experiential dimension to law and gospel, he steers away from modern Existentialist misreadings of Luther, which tend to construe the Lutheran tradition as libertine. As right as Scaer is in that regard, he tends to downplay the theme of death and resurrection, which is so central for God's work in the means of grace (Baptism as *dying and rising* with Christ; the Eucharist as the *last* supper). That theme is crucial, though, to both Paul's ("if any man is in Christ he is a new creation," 2 Cor 5:17) and Luther's sacramental theologies.

Scaer affirms that while law and gospel seem to contradict one another, there is no contradiction in God. Again, his move is salutary, since even Luther's phrase "God against God" ("*Gott gegen Gott*" in WA 5:204,26f.) should not be read as a sectarian position in opposition to the classical view of God's oneness and *apatheia* but rather as the experience of the anxious sinner in relation to God and his mercy. Here, again, the drama of death and resurrection pregnant in the absolving word of imputation which acquits, forgives, and unites us to Christ could be accentuated more.

Scaer is most masterful and creative in his anti-Elertian polemic, when dealing with the third use of the law. He notes that "the principle of law and gospel has to do not only with applying the Scriptures in preaching, but also with how one conducts himself with other people. This principle is the foundation of the Christian ethic set down by Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount, according to which the Christian loves his enemies and does good to all men" (57). Most helpfully, Scaer claims that "all positive descriptions of the law in the Christian's life are Christological statements, things which Jesus did and which reached their perfection in Him. No Christian can achieve this in himself but only as he is in Christ. Fulfilled law is Christology as it describes the life and death of Jesus. He loved God with his whole heart . . ." (69). Likewise, Scaer contends that "in fulfilling the law according to its third use, the Christian does what he really believes. His works correspond with his faith" (70). The third use acknowledges that "the law has lost its prohibitions or threats and resembles how Adam and Eve knew it in Paradise. Significantly different now is the Christological dimension. In fulfilling the law, believers not only do the good works of which our first parents were once capable, but like Christ they live for others" (81), a "description of the reality of Christ's life taking form and shape in the life of the Christian. In grammatical terms, the imperative of command becomes the indicative, describing what already exists" (83). This is a helpful way of understanding how the gospel restores us to creation as God intended it. Additionally, this insight is supplemented with the view, held with Luther, that the new man is able to do good works

"spontaneously," within his calling, a truth which Scaer identifies as in opposition to the Reformed (64).

Scaer carries on important polemics with Karl Barth, for whom the law is the form of the gospel and the gospel is the content of the law, and Werner Elert (as mentioned), who denied the third use of the law altogether, especially as Elert's work was appropriated by theologians of The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod in the 1960s and 1970s. Scaer's point is that law and gospel do not replace the role and authority of Scripture since both belong to a larger christological core (98).

Scaer's treatise on the means of grace states the Lutheran position in relation to the Roman Catholics, who make grace a substance initiating and encouraging our growth in deification, as opposed to a forensic relationship with God, and the Reformed, who divest God's promise from its tangible, earthly mediators (water, bread and wine, and spoken word). Scaer highlights the agency of the Holy Spirit, who "reveals Himself as the giver of life, the one who makes alive, *vivificans*, to bring life out of death" (159). The book furthers Pieper's work by addressing issues less important in Pieper's day, such as Pentecostalism, the charismatic movement, libertinism, and the authority of Scripture.

This volume, a clear and judicious guide, will serve pastoral candidates well for many decades to come.

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***Preaching to the Converted: On Sundays and Feast Days Throughout the Year.* By Richard Leonard. New York: Paulist Press, 2006. 389 pages. Paperback. \$24.95.**

Richard Leonard, SJ, (Ph.D. in cinema studies) has written *Preaching to the Converted* as his remedy to three prevailing problems that he sees in modern preaching: 1) sermons are too long; 2) sermons are over the heads of the congregation; and 3) sermons do not intersect with the assembly's daily lives. Leonard contends that these homiletical dilemmas result from the Western media's re-shaping of how people listen and respond to aural and visual communications. Leonard's present work was written for an international liturgy website to offer short, story-based solutions to the supposed dilemma facing hearers.

The introduction to Leonard's book is a fairly accurate synopsis of modern hearers. Leonard may be correct that media has shortened hearer's attentions spans and made modern people overly prone to visual stimuli. However, his antidote to counter this supposed problem is lacking when it comes to the act

of preaching. Leonard's "reflections" run in a predictable pattern of offering an opening tale, popular anecdote, or commentary on a current film and then making a leap into some nebulous connection with a scriptural (more often moral) point. In practice, Leonard's reflections rarely connect with the theme, content, or intent of the scriptural passage the reflections were meant to illustrate. Leonard's work highlights one of the dangers in using illustrative materials incorrectly—the illustrations take on lives of their own and often reflect what was not intended to be reflected.

It is very easy for preachers to believe that media is a demonic enemy to their preaching. A common reaction is a tendency to incorporate characteristics of the media into the preached word. When preachers try to combat media by using media driven characteristics in their preaching, the end result is often a slurry of anthropocentric sentimentalities. God tends to be seen as a divine bobble-head doll whom the preacher maneuvers to meet the desires of man rather than the desires of God. Leonard's work lacks any discussion of the truly refreshing word of the gospel spoken to hurting souls. When it comes down to it, the supposed influence of media on preaching is irrelevant. What matters in preaching is speaking the unique word of the gospel to hurting sinners. It is this uniqueness of Christ's gospel, rather than illustrative strobe lights that dazzle the senses but bring no satisfaction for the soul, that provides "interest" in preaching.

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